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Immigration, Economic Insecurity, and the “Ambivalent” American Public

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Abstract: Are public attitudes toward immigration policy in the United States driven by economic or non-economic concerns? Though systematic analyses are few, a burgeoning literature suggests that cultural norms and enduring values, rather than calculations of self-interest, determine immigration policy preferences. This paper challenges the contention that economic motivations play little or no role in the formation of immigration policy preferences. Drawing on recent work in political economy, I argue that individual preferences over immigration policy reflect economic and non-economic concerns – both broadly rooted in considerations of individual self-interest. While affective orientations toward ethnic groups and prejudice clearly underlie public attitudes toward immigration policy, analysts err in discounting an economic interpretation of immigration policy preferences. In fact, multivariate analysis of 1992 through 2000 National Election Study surveys reveals a robust link between an individual’s position in the labor market and immigration policy. Respondents at the lower end of the nation’s occupational and/or educational distribution are more likely to oppose increased immigration, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade implies.

Introduction

At the close of the 1990s, the United States is once again wracked by passionate debate over the appropriate course for national immigration policy. As the numbers of “new” immigrants continue to rise (Lollock 2001),¹ advocates of immigration restriction today, just as in the past, contend that the U.S. can no longer afford to be a nation of immigrants, while

¹ Estimates place annual immigration to the U.S. at just over one million per year during the 1990s, with the foreign born population approaching 28.4 million (or 10.4% of total population) in the year 2000. Whether these figures are “large” or “small” is the subject of heated debate. Camarota (2001) suggests that recent trends represent an alarming

proponents retort that the nation can ill-afford not to be (Cf. Borjas 1996; Kennedy 1996).

Political elites and opinion leaders increasingly frame the immigration debate in economic terms – disputing the “price of immigration” – but racial and ethnic prejudice is never far from the surface. A majority of the public, according to national surveys, is wary of further immigration and attitudes toward immigration policy appear to reflect an uncertain mixture of economic anxiety and racial or ethnic antipathy.

Are the determinants of public attitudes toward immigration primarily economic or non-economic? Recent empirical work on public opinion in the United States reveals a strikingly counter-intuitive finding. Despite a national debate cast largely in economic terms (Borjas 1999; Smith and Edmonston 1997, 1998), economic motivations appear to play little role in explaining individual policy preferences toward immigration policy (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; also see Fetzer 2000). After testing a number of variants of the hypothesis that economic insecurity underlies restrictionist sentiment, for example, Citrin et al. (1997: 874) conclude that immigration policy “constitutes another case in which narrow self-interest is not a significant influence on preference formation.” Burns and Gimpel (2000) concur, finding that negative ethnic stereotyping, rather than economic self-interest, explains immigration policy preferences, and Fetzer (2000) argues that cultural solidarity among the predominant societal group underlies anti-immigration sentiment.

This paper challenges the contention that economic motivations play little or no role in the formation of immigration policy preferences. Drawing on recent work in political economy (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Gabel 1998), I argue that individual preferences over immigration policy reflect both economic and non-economic concerns, broadly rooted in

increase in immigration. When expressed as a share of total population, however, figures are considerably below those of the early 20th century (see Gibson and Lennon 1999).

considerations of individual self-interest. While affective orientations toward ethnic groups and prejudice clearly underlie public attitudes toward immigration policy, analysts err in discounting an economic interpretation of immigration policy preferences. In fact, after reviewing extant work, I demonstrate that skill based cleavages identified by international economic theory play a significant role in determining individual attitudes toward immigration policy.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a cursory review of recent work on immigration and American public opinion. Section 3 outlines a political economy approach to understanding the interaction of economic and non-economic determinants of public opinion toward immigration. The data and econometric analysis are described in section 4. Section 5 presents preliminary results and section 6 concludes.

Immigration and American Public Opinion

As a nation of immigrants, the United States has long been considered a haven for the oppressed and a melting pot in which diverse nationalities and ethnic groups fuse into one. Yet, from the Aliens Act of 1798 to the contemporary U.S.-Mexican migration dialogue, American attitudes toward immigration policy have diverged considerably from this ideal. Increasing immigration, over the course of the nation's history, has often been a source of public anxiety and the contemporary period is no exception (Shanks 2001; Tichenor 2002; also see Higham 1994; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999). National opinion surveys, from their inception in the late 1930s to date, reveal little public support for increased immigration (Simon 1985; Simon and Alexander 1993; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw and Yang 1997) and analysts of mass opinion point to a hardening of attitudes underlying a "neorestrictionist era" in the early to mid-1990s (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Espenshade and Belanger 1998). Though the anti-immigrant sentiment of mid-decade – manifest in California's Proposition 187 and the punitive 1996 immigration (and

welfare) reforms – appears to have receded, large segments of the American public remain wary of increased immigration (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Jones 2001), as the summary of national survey questions on immigration levels in Figure 1 suggests.²

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Economic conditions figure prominently in many accounts of trends in national opinion and public policy. Though the paucity of comparable time-series data precludes strong inference, analysts note a statistically significant relationship between the percentage of respondents favoring decreased immigration and economic conditions in the United States at the national level over time (Espenshade and Belanger 1998; Fetzer 2000; also see Muller 1997).³

Somewhat surprisingly, however, the link between public attitudes toward immigration and economic conditions at the individual level appears less clear. While one might plausibly suspect that a respondent's assessment of the material consequences of immigration for personal and/or national welfare affect evaluations of policy, multivariate analyses of survey data suggest otherwise. Citrin et al. (1997), in careful empirical analysis of 1992 and 1994 National Election Study (NES) data, find that respondents' preferences for liberalizing or restricting immigration policy are driven not by economic motivations but rather by enduring values and attitudes. Ideological identification and affective orientations toward particular ethnic groups are linked to immigration policy, with ideological conservatives and respondents expressing negative affect toward minority groups least likely to support increasing immigration. Independent variables

² For summaries of national poll results, consult the Roper Center's searchable iPoll database, available on-line at <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>. The Gallup Organization's "Poll Topics: A to Z" web page, also provides thorough coverage of immigration related issues: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/index.asp>.

³ Fetzer (2000, 79-91) finds that an increase in real disposable income per capita is associated with a fall in restrictionist sentiment in time-series analysis of U.S., German, and French polling data. Espenshade and Belanger (1998, 387) and Espenshade and Hempstead (1996, 539) note a close association between unemployment and

designated to capture the effects of various respondent characteristics (such as age, education, gender, etc.) and economic considerations (including occupational categories, union membership, income, and evaluations of the economy) prove poor predictors of respondents' preferences for increased or decreased immigration levels (but see Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

Burns and Gimpel (2000), in a similar analysis of 1992 and 1996 NES data, also find little support for various measures of economic self-interest. Personal economic evaluations have only modest effects on attitudes toward immigration levels, but pessimistic national economic forecasts are associated with support for decreased immigration (also see Chandler and Tsai 2001). In summarizing their results, Burns and Gimpel argue that stereotypical beliefs about the work ethic and intelligence of minority groups, rather than economic considerations, underlie attitudes toward immigration levels.

Extant studies of individual opinion make a strong case for the centrality of non-economic motivations in understanding respondents' attitudes toward immigration policy. Cultural norms and values (presumably acquired during early life experiences), rather than narrow self-interest, are found to determine policy preferences and immigration policy is considered another policy domain in which "symbolic politics" trumps "economic politics" (Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1990).⁴

Yet, the case against economic self-interest is not as strong as its critics contend. On empirical grounds, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) analyze 1993 CBS News/*New York Times* polling data and find that labor market competition is associated with support for decreased

opposition to immigration in the U.S. The bivariate correlation between the unemployment rate and support for decreased immigration in Figure 1 is .64 ($p < .01$; $N = 14$).

⁴ Symbolic politics, in explicit contrast to instrumental approaches (i.e., rational choice), generally argues that individual behavior is motivated by expressive, non-instrumental concerns (such as group identification or social

immigration. Respondents of low education and low income express greater reservations about increasing immigration than those at higher levels of education or income, suggesting that economic insecurity plays some role in determining policy preferences. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), in a sophisticated analysis of 1992 through 1996 NES data, also present compelling evidence that respondents most susceptible to immigrant induced labor market competition, that is those of lowest skill, are most likely to favor decreasing levels of immigration.

Furthermore, the findings in Citrin et al. (1997) and Burns and Gimpel (2000) are consistent with alternative interpretations rooted in economic self-interest, though ones that arguably stretch beyond the standard “narrow” self-interest qualifier. As Citrin et al. (1997, 872) acknowledge, economic concerns in their analysis, namely retrospective evaluations of the national economy and negative assessments of the economic and social costs of immigration, are consistently related to restrictionist opinion. Gimpel and Burns (2000, 220) also find that pessimistic evaluations of the national economy and low levels of education are associated with support for decreasing immigration. The argument that economic self-interest fails to account for immigration policy preferences thus rests on the claim that individuals’ assessments of their own personal finances or economic situation are critical components of the underlying model – a claim that is seldom advanced by its proponents (see Chong 2000).

Nonetheless, the minor role for economic considerations in extant work, as analysts credibly contend, is puzzling in light of the emphasis on the costs and benefits of immigration in national political debates. I draw on recent work in international economics and political economy to address this puzzle below. The key distinction from prior work entails a shift of emphasis from subjective to objective measures of economic self-interest. Rather than viewing

values) as opposed to cost-benefit calculations. The two approaches rest on distinct approaches to political behavior and need not be mutually exclusive, as Barry (1978) among others persuasively notes.

economic interests narrowly in terms of perceptions of personal economic security, I examine how the distributional consequences of immigration shape incentives to favor or oppose changes in the level of immigration contingent upon immigration induced changes in the labor market. Individuals employed in occupations facing potential adverse wage effects from increases in the labor supply are expected to oppose increased immigration, as standard open economy models of international economics suggest.⁵

International Economics and Immigration Policy Preferences

The impact of immigration on the national economy is the starting point for much of the analysis of public opinion toward immigration policy. Drawing on simple economic models of the labor market (see Borjas 1995, 1999), analysts derive a number of plausible hypotheses linking individual attitudes to the perceived economic effects of immigration. In this work, the underlying logic is straightforward: immigration is assumed to alter factor returns (i.e., income) in predictable ways, with aggregate economic gains – the immigration “surplus” – outweighing losses that may accrue to certain individuals or in particular sectors of the economy. By construction, immigration is economically efficient and redistribution provides a theoretical mechanism through which to compensate those suffering temporary dislocation. Because redistribution seldom curbs incentives for distributional conflict, this closed-economy framework suggests potential opposition to immigration from aggrieved individuals, typically laborers of

⁵ Though the logic is familiar, extant work offers only a weak test of the empirical implications of labor market competition (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001 for a notable exception). In positing that individuals of low income or particular occupational categories face greater economic “threat” or competition from immigration, analysts erroneously assume that the distributional effects of immigration are uniformly distributed throughout segments of the economy. There is little reason to suspect that labor market competition underlies restrictionist sentiment unless directly tied to an individual’s specific occupational or educational context, as I discuss in greater detail below.

similar skill to migrants, and provides a theoretical basis for efforts to test a labor market competition hypothesis in public opinion work.

Models of international trade offer a similar but richer distributional basis for examining political preferences and potential conflict over immigration policy (Kessler 1999; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Bilal, Grether, and de Melo 1998). In a trade-theoretic context, the impact of immigration on the national economy hinges upon differences between immigrants and non-immigrants, the structure of the domestic economy, and the size of the immigration flow. If immigrants are of similar demographic or labor market characteristics to members of the national population, immigration is akin to an increase in the labor supply, providing little independent basis for political action.⁶ Where immigrants differ from non-immigrants, however, observable implications for immigration policy preferences follow.

Consider, for example, a scenario in which immigrants differ from members of a domestic population in terms of their skills or training. If immigrants are, on average, of lower skill than non-immigrants, as data for the U.S. case suggests (see Borjas 1999, 19-37; Smith and Edmonston 1997, 181-189),⁷ an increase in immigration reduces wages for domestic workers of similar skill by way of changes in production and the labor market. In this instance, an inflow of low skilled labor increases production of low-skill intensive products, prompting a fall in the their relative price and a corresponding decline in wages. Accordingly, domestic workers of

⁶ An increase in the labor supply does indeed exercise predictable effects on labor and housing markets (see Ehrenberg and Smith 2000), yet little independent reason to mobilize for or against immigration should exist in this scenario on economic grounds alone. The quantity of immigration does figure prominently, however, in the libertarian case for open borders (with greater numbers associated with increasing productive capacity) as well as certain environmental arguments against immigration on the grounds of congestion and rapid population growth. Reimers (1998) and Gimpel and Edwards (1999) provide informative overviews of these arguments in the context of U.S. immigration politics during the 1990s.

⁷ The skill distribution of U.S. immigration is actually bimodal, with immigrants over represented at the high- and low-ends of the skill distribution. Note that skills are typically gauged as relative measures of educational attainment and/or occupational performance. Though analysts often note a fall in the average skill level of immigrants (relative to non-immigrants) in recent decades, educational attainment for immigrants exhibits a secular increase over time (Smith and Edmonston 1997, 183; Betts and Lofstrom 2000).

low-skill have an economic incentive to oppose increased immigration, while those of high skill clearly do not (as above). Much like work informed by the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade (see Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Milner 1999; Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 66-91), policy preferences are expected to fall along factorial lines, with skill level the primary determinant of an individual's policy preference. To the extent that the skill level of immigrants differs by observable characteristics (e.g., country or origin, ethnicity, or race), we might further expect policy preferences to exhibit a nativist cast among individuals of low skill.

Suppose, alternatively, that immigrants are of higher skill on average than non-immigrants. Under this scenario, relevant in certain high technology, engineering, and professional sectors of the U.S. labor market (see Cheng and Yang 1998; Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan 2001), a large immigrant inflow is likely to adversely affect the wages of domestic workers of high skill, with negligible impact on workers in other sectors of the economy. In this case, akin to the specific factors model of trade (see Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Milner 1999; Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 37-65;), policy preferences should form along sectoral lines, with anti-immigrant sentiment evident among high skill laborers tied to specific, immigrant-intensive industries. While not as pronounced as in the case of workers of lower skill, incentives to oppose entrants into specialized sectors of the economy on ascriptive grounds exist in this scenario as well, though the targeted groups most likely differ by ethnicity and national origin.⁸

Immigrants may also differ from non-immigrants along a range of non-economic dimensions. Individuals are likely to vary in their evaluations of the costs and benefits of

⁸ Consider, in this context, the debate over H1-B visas in the U.S. Though unsurprisingly endorsed by employers, highly skilled and educated U.S. workers have often voiced skepticism and have not been above resorting to base characterizations of immigrants (see North 1995).

Analysts often pose a distinct logic for trade in high-technology sectors, emphasizing greater scope for gains under imperfect competition and downplaying potential venues for distributional conflict (see Venables 2000). My account above relies upon the oppositional nature of the HO model, which, by symmetry, implies conflict among agents of similar skill.

cultural and ethnic difference, a notable characteristic of post-1965 immigration and an independent axis of conflict in the contemporary immigration debate. The trade-based perspective suggests that race or ethnic-based anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to reflect differences in skills, yet a vast body of work on prejudice and discrimination provides an alternative logic (see Pettigrew 1998; Quillian 1995; Allport 1957). To the extent that preference formation is rooted in stereotypes and affective orientations toward specific ethnic groups, economic insecurity will be irrelevant or perhaps a mere rationalization for baser motivations.

Individual attitudes toward immigration policy are likely to reflect a combination of economic and non-economic motivations. The trade-based perspective offers a stark, political economy framework against which to consider competing arguments. Whether concerns over job security or ethnic animosity underlie policy preferences is likely to hinge upon an individual's position in the labor market, skill level, and evaluation of cultural difference. In the analysis below, I attempt to gauge the empirical import of each consideration.

Data and Methods

Variables and Hypotheses

The principal source of public opinion data for this study is the NES survey (Miller et al. 1993; Rosenstone et al. 1995, 1998; Sapiro et al. 1999; Burns et al. 2001).⁹ Administered biennially, the NES survey includes detailed batteries of standard demographic, socioeconomic, and political questions, and offers a uniquely comparable data source against which to gauge

⁹ NES surveys are multi-stage area probability samples designed to be representative of U.S. citizens of voting age. Full details and data are available on-line at <http://www.umich.edu/~nes/index.htm>

individual attitudes toward immigration policy. (NES variable names for items employed in the analysis are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.)

Immigration policy preferences, the dependent variable of concern, are gauged by responses to the following question, posed in the 1992 through 2000 studies.

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”

This question, which conflates legal and illegal immigration, nonetheless roughly captures a respondent’s general position toward immigration policy, with “increased a lot” indicating a preference for liberal policy and “decreased a lot” corresponding to restriction. I operationalize the dependent variable, *Immigration Policy*, by coding ordinal responses from 1 (for those responding “increased a lot”) to 5 (for those responding “decreased a lot”). Higher values of *Immigration Policy* thus indicate a preference for immigration restriction.¹⁰

Table 1 summarizes trends in responses and presents descriptive statistics for *Immigration Policy* by year. Several results stand out. First, as media and scholarly accounts of Proposition 187 in California and its wider impact on the national policy debate emphasize (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, 212-296; Reimers 1998, 131-150), opinion in 1994 is decidedly anti-immigrant. Whether public opinion drives or is driven by anti-immigrant discourse in the early to mid-1990s remains unclear. Results for 1994 do, however, deviate substantially from those for other years under review. Second, over the course of the 1990s, the level of support for increasing immigration remains demonstrably low, indicating that the public remains much

warier of policies of liberal immigration than characterizations of opinion as ambivalent suggest (Cf. Simon and Alexander 1993; Lapinski et al. 1997). Third, robust growth during the latter part of the decade is associated with a slight decline in support for decreased immigration but a more notable upsurge in sentiment for keeping immigration at extant levels. In general, trends in response and mean levels of support for decreased immigration at an aggregate level ebb and flow to some degree with economic conditions and the extent to which pro-and anti-migrant interests mobilize constituents for political action, though patterns of individual level preferences remain indiscernible from the summary data.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

To assess the determinants of individual policy preferences, I employ measures from the NES surveys and supplementary sources and estimate the impact of a range of independent variables on the probability of supporting various levels of immigration. The political economy framework posits that individual evaluations of immigration policy hinge upon both economic and non-economic considerations. Foremost among economic concerns are the distributional consequences of changes in the labor supply. Because the economic effects of immigration differ across individuals, respondents' preferences over immigration policy are expected to vary with their skill level and position in the labor market.

To test whether skill levels influence policy preferences, I employ occupation and education based skill measures. The first measure maps survey respondents' three-digit Census Occupation Code to Bureau of Labor Statistics average weekly wage data (by three-digit occupation) and is calculated from the Annual Demographic Supplement of the Current

¹⁰ This question serves as the standard gauge of immigration policy preferences in NES based analysis. Cf. Scheve and Slaughter (2001a), Gimpel and Burns (2000), and Citrin et al. (1997). Note that responses indicating "don't

Population Survey (CPS).¹¹ Assuming that average market remuneration for a given occupation reflects underlying skill requirements, as is common in economic work (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001b), this measure, denoted *Skill-Wage*, should be negatively associated with *Immigration Policy*. In other words, higher levels of respondent skill, gauged in terms of average occupational wage, are expected to reduce the probability of support for decreased immigration. A similar relationship is expected to hold between education, taken as a proxy for skill (see Katz and Murphy 1992; Betts and Lofstrom 2000), and immigration policy preferences. The NES measure of educational attainment, highest grade completed,¹² is employed as a second measure of skill and labeled *Education*.

In addition to variables intended to gauge the material basis of opinion toward immigration, measures of non-economic determinants of preferences are required. Of key concern are notions of political identification and affective orientation toward immigrant and minority groups identified in extant work. To assess the importance of political and ideological identification on attitudes toward immigration policy, I employ standard NES measures of partisan identification, *Party*, and political ideology, *Ideology*. Both variables are

know” are coded as missing data and dropped from subsequent analysis.

¹¹ I follow the approach of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a), though our sources for average weekly wages differ. Occupational wage measures are thus not strictly comparable across studies. I also employ alternative measures of skill. The first, based on CPS respondents’ total wage and salary income, is more truly tied to the labor market impact of immigration and is the indicator underlying the analysis in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b). The second, based on CPS respondents’ total personal income, combines wage and salary income with additional sources of income and is a more appropriate gauge of human capital differences or capital/labor endowments at the individual level. The two measures are highly correlated ($r=.96$) and yield roughly equivalent results. Results reported below utilize the total personal income measure, which arguably captures labor market and wealth effects underlying preferences toward immigration policy. Results employing the narrower wage and salary measure are available upon request. Either measure is preferable to the standard NES categorical income measure, which exhibits less variation and is divorced from survey respondents’ direct labor market experience.

Because NES no longer reports detailed three-digit occupation codes, Census occupation codes are aggregated to NES two-digit occupation codes and average weekly wages reduced to the 71 NES two-digit occupation categories. For a detailed list of two and three digit occupation codes, see Burns et al. (2001: Appendix).

¹² This measure ranges from 0, for no formal years of education, to 17, equivalent to a college degree plus additional schooling. Note that treating education as a continuous variable for purposes of analysis is problematic given that unit intervals between categories are not equivalent. Analysis employing a series of equivalently coded dummy variables (with one omitted category), however, does not alter substantive results.

operationalized as seven point scales, ranging from 1 (for “strong Democrat”) to 7 (for “strong Republican”) in the case of *Party* and from 1 (for “strong Liberal”) to 7 (for “strong Conservative”) for *Ideology*.¹³ Higher values thus indicate stronger identification with the Republican Party and a conservative political ideology, respectively. One might expect both measures to be positively associated with anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly in light of recent policy debates. Yet the extent to which partisan and ideological cleavages present in the national debate surface at the individual level remains unclear.

Measures of ethnic or racial prejudice are essential to assess the empirical basis of non-instrumental, ascriptive arguments about policy preferences. To evaluate the impact of prejudice as opposed to narrower conceptions of self-interest, I make use of NES dispositional measures designed to tap the role of value-based motivations in preference formation and subsequent political behavior (see Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman 1999; Traugott 1995). Specifically, I construct a “racial prejudice” scale denoted *Prejudice*, consisting of questions addressing a respondent’s underlying attitudes toward minorities, for each survey under review. The scale, details of which are presented in Appendix B, is not strictly comparable across years but does tap a common affective predisposition toward African-Americans.¹⁴ Questions included in the scale assess respondents’ views of 1) slavery as a barrier to advancement; 2) the work ethic of African-Americans; 3) the ability of minority groups to “work their way up without special favors”; and 4) the statement that “blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” Items are of comparable metrics and are summed to create an additive index, with higher numerical scores indicating

¹³ Mid-range values correspond, respectively to political independents and ideological moderates. Again, treating variables as continuous yields equivalent results to other possible transformations.

¹⁴ Value and predisposition measures are not “core” NES questions. The frequency with which “racial prejudice” questions appear (as well as the number and depth of the questions) thus varies substantially across surveys. These items do recur more often than distinct questions intended to assess respondents’ attitudes toward the intelligence, work ethic, trustworthiness, and violence of minority groups, however. My use of a race, as opposed to an ethnic,

greater prejudice.¹⁵ *Prejudice*, as proponents of non-economic accounts of immigration policy preferences contend, should exhibit a strong and negative association with the dependent variable.

In addition to key variables identified in trade- and ethnic/race-based arguments, demographic, socioeconomic, and contextual variables may prove significant determinants of policy preferences and are included as controls in the statistical analysis. To control for the impact of standard demographic considerations, measures for respondents' gender, age, race, and ethnicity are included in the analysis below. *Gender* is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for female and 0 for male. *Age* is a continuous variable, indicating a respondent's age in years. *Black* is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for African-American respondents and 0 for others. *Hispanic* is also a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for respondents indicating Hispanic origin. The NES survey does not include questions about citizenship or country of birth. A question about parents' place of birth is available, however, and a dichotomous variable *Parentage*, coded 1 if either parent is born abroad. A dichotomous measure for union membership, *Union*, coded 1 for union households and 0 for non-union households is also included in the analysis. Finally, group contact is often posed as an important basis for potential inter-group conflict. Though reasonable arguments posit that contact breeds either familiarity or contempt (see Krysan 2000; Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1971), the importance of the number of immigrants in a respondent's county of residence, *% Foreign Born*, is gauged as the foreign born share of county population.¹⁶

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables employed in the analysis. Note that the occupation based skill measure exhibits a secular increase over time due

based prejudice measure is thus justified largely on grounds of continuity and availability. Alternative measures of prejudice are highly correlated with the race prejudice scale and yield similar empirical results.

¹⁵ Cronbach's alpha for the 4-item race prejudice scale is .88 for 1992; .77 in 1994; .77 in 1996 (3-item scale); .64 in 1998 (2-item scale); and .89 in 2000.

in part to improved economic conditions but also reflecting changes in the CPS survey design.¹⁷ The mean level of education indicates approximately 13 plus years of schooling across sample years, equivalent to a high school degree plus some college for the “average” respondent. The race prejudice scale is not equivalent across sample years. Measures of affect toward ethnic groups, however, exhibit only marginal change across cross-sections,¹⁸ and other items included in the analysis are of roughly comparable magnitudes across survey years.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Econometric Specification

The empirical analysis aims to assess the importance of economic and non-economic considerations in determining individuals’ policy preferences over immigration policy, gauged in terms of support for various levels of immigration. Though the level of immigration favored by respondents is likely to vary widely, observed categories of the dependent variable take on one of five ordinal categories: increase a lot, increase a little, keep the same, decrease a little, or decrease a lot, coded one to five for purposes of analysis. Because there is little reason to believe that the intervals between these categories are equivalent, linear-regression models may produce misleading results and ordered regression models are the more appropriate estimation technique (Winship and Mare 1984; Long 1997).

For econometric specifications reported below, I estimate an ordered probit model in which the probability of supporting a liberal or restrictive immigration policy is hypothesized to

¹⁶ Data for the percent foreign born is from the U.S. Census Bureau’s *County and City Data Book* (1994) and *U.S.A. Counties 1998* (1999) CD-ROMs. I employ the log of percent foreign born as the contact measure throughout.

¹⁷ See U.S. Department of Labor (2000, H1-H5) on CPS sample redesign.

¹⁸ Measures of affect toward minority groups change little over the years examined. Average “feeling thermometer” scores, which range from 0 (negative affect) to 100 (positive affect), for African-Americans range from 65 in 1992 to 67 in 2000. Equivalent scores for Hispanics range from 61 in 1992 to 63 in 2000, while those for Asians are 60

be a linear function of a respondent's skill level, political identifications and values, and demographic characteristics.¹⁹ The key hypotheses under review examine the material and non-instrumental bases of policy preferences, with the trade-based perspective suggesting a negative relationship between skill and restrictionist sentiment and the race/ethnic-based posing instead a link between prejudice and immigration restriction. To first (re)assess the role of economic motivation in policy preferences, I regress immigration policy preferences on skill, political party, ideological orientation, and demographic characteristics. Following Scheve and Slaughter 2001, I estimate separate wage and education based skill models and report both sets of results below.²⁰ To next examine the effects of negative affect and stereotypes, I add the race prejudice scale to the equation's right hand side. The analysis is cross sectional, with similar models examined separately for the 1992 through 2000 year surveys.

Results

Summary and Discussion

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report results for the full ordered regression models for each survey year. In brief, negative and significant ordered probit coefficients for skill-based measures across survey years provide support for a trade-based account of policy preferences.

Respondents of low skill uniformly support more restrictive policies, while respondents of higher

and 64 respectively. The correlation between race prejudice scales and feeling thermometer scores are negative and significant in all years.

¹⁹ I use ordered probit estimation to facilitate comparison of results with those presented in Citrin et al. 1997 and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a. Results are robust to alternative econometric specifications. Ordered logit models yield coefficients of similar sign and substantive importance. All models are estimated via Stata's ordered probit and ordered logit routines.

²⁰ This is the appropriate estimation procedure under the assumption that occupational wages and education levels are proxies for the same theoretical construct, skill. If, however, one views education as an independent measure of knowledge or cognitive capability, it should be included as a separate regressor in a single model including *Skill-Wage*. The distinction is significant and does alter the substantive interpretation of the statistical results. Estimates for combined models that include both wage and education measures are available upon request.

skill tend to favor liberalization. At the same time, prejudice is strongly and consistently related to anti-immigrant sentiment, as proponents of value-based explanations contend. Statistical results thus provide ammunition for proponents of both trade- and race/ethnic based accounts of policy preference.

[TABLES 3.1 and 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

The significance of skill level and prejudice holds across a range of political and demographic controls. Partisanship, at the individual level, appears to exercise little independent impact on attitudes toward immigration policy during the various years under investigation. Ideological conservatism is related to anti-immigrant sentiment, but the results are not statistically significant when *Prejudice* is included in the model.²¹ *Gender* is significant and negative in the 2000 survey and *Age* is positive and significant in 1996 and 1998, but these variables appear to exert little systematic effect on attitudes toward immigration. Measures for race and ethnicity, somewhat surprisingly, also exhibit little systematic impact. The coefficient for *Black* is positive across survey years, perhaps suggesting that African-Americans tend toward restriction, but results are not statistically significant.²² The attitudes of Hispanic respondents toward immigration do not appear to differ from those of non-Hispanics (see de la Garza et al. 1992). Respondents with one or both parents born abroad are, however, consistently and significantly likely to oppose restriction. Union members appear no more likely to oppose immigration than non-members, though results differ across models with and without the prejudice measure. Finally, a higher concentration of foreign-born residents appears to dampen

²¹ When measures of prejudice are not included in the model, ideology is positive and significantly related to policy preferences. See Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the Appendix. This finding suggests that political conservatism may indeed mask more objectionable ascriptive motivations (Cf. Sniderman 2000; Sears 2000).

anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly in 1994, though results are for the most part not statistically significant.

A stark disadvantage of the ordered regression model compared to its linear counterpart is the difficulty of interpreting estimated coefficients. To facilitate translation of ordered probit coefficients into substantively meaningful results, I present a table of predicted probabilities of support for restriction below.²³ The table presents the predicted probability of restriction, that is the probability of a combined “decrease a little” and “decrease a lot” response, for each year under three simulated scenarios. First, an “average” scenario presents the predicted probability of restriction for models reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (left and right panel of the table, respectively) holding all variables at their sample means. Second, a “low” scenario, connoting an imagined respondent or public of low skill or low prejudice, presents results with these variables set at their sample minimum values and all others at their mean. Third, a “high” scenario sets skill and prejudice variables to their sample maximums and hold other variables at their means.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Though unwieldy, a cursory glance at Table 4 reveals a consistent conclusion: low (high) skill is consistently associated with support for decreased (increased) immigration while low (high) prejudice is associates with support for increased (decreased) immigration. Taking figures for 2000 as instructive, an increase in *Skill-Wage* from its mean to its maximum (\$901 per week to \$2575 per week), holding all other variables at their means, reduces the probability

²² Interestingly, the coefficient on *Black* is negative when *Prejudice* is not included in the analysis (see Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the Appendix).

of supporting immigration restriction by (.457-.185) .272 on average. An increase in *Skill-Wage* from its minimum to the mean (\$305 to \$901 per week) decreases the probability of supporting restriction by (.569-.457) .112 on average. Simulations for education reveal a similar pattern. Increasing education from its mean to maximum value (13.6 years of schooling to 17 years of schooling), with all other variables at their mean, yields a (.448-.347) .101 decline in probability of supporting restriction; raising education from its minimum to the mean (0 to 13.6) results in a (.823-.448) .375 decline. Results for prejudice can be calculated in a similar manner. Using the *Skill-Wage* ordered probit model for the year 2000, an increase in *Prejudice* from its mean to its maximum (13.5 to 20) results in a (.686-.457) .229 increase in support for restricting immigration. Reducing *Prejudice* from its mean to its minimum (13 to 4), however, yields a (.457-.121) .336 point decline in support for restriction.

Coefficient estimates and predicted probability scenarios establish that trade and race/ethnic based measures are important determinants of policy preferences. Consistent and significant findings on skill measures across NES surveys in the 1990s establish a key role for economic self-interest in preference formation. Support for restriction among workers at the low end of the occupational and educational distributions is consistent with arguments privileging economic insecurity as a basis for popular attitudes. Yet one might still legitimately question the link between labor market considerations and preferences, arguing that anti-immigrant sentiment stems from intolerance or lack of knowledge, rather than economic self-interest. This critique is particularly germane to the analysis employing education as a proxy for skill.

To provide a rough test of the claim that non-economic motivations underlie the proposed link between skill levels and policy preferences, I conduct a split sample analysis of the models

²³ A table of predicted probabilities for each ordinal outcome quickly becomes unwieldy. See Worksheet A6 in the Appendix for detailed results.

estimated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above. If skill measures capture economic considerations underlying attitudes toward immigration, then the relationship between these measures and preferences should be stronger for labor force participants than respondents not in the labor force. If skill measures instead reflect non-economic considerations, such as tolerance or knowledge, for example, then their importance and influence should remain similar across labor force and non-labor force samples (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a). Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the Appendix summarize the results. Coefficients are consistently significant for the labor force sample and typically less or not significant for the non-labor force sample, suggesting that labor market considerations are at play.

Missing Data and Robustness

Of potential concern when evaluating the models presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is the large number of cases dropped from the analysis.²⁴ A comparison of the sample size for each NES survey and the number of observations in the statistical analysis reveals a striking amount of missing data, ranging from 34% and 45% of total observations. While data missing at random poses little problem for statistical analysis, King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001) note that inefficiencies from loss of information and the potential for systematic differences between observed and unobserved data necessitate multiple imputation procedures. Accordingly, I follow their proposed imputation procedure to generate supplementary imputed data sets against which to compare listwise deletion results.²⁵

²⁴ Observations that are missing values for one of the variables in an estimated equation (typically occupation, education level, or ideology in the analysis) are simply dropped from the analysis by listwise deletion. On the potential problems of listwise deletion for statistical analysis see King et al. (2001).

²⁵ The imputation procedures are implemented using *Amelia: A Program for Missing Data* (see Honaker et al. 1999).

To generate “complete” data sets, I employ King et al.’s imputation algorithm and first generate imputations for data missing in the previous analysis. I base the imputations for the 1992 through 2000 data sets on 20 to 30 variables selected from each respective survey.²⁶ Ten complete individual level data sets are imputed for each year. Final data sets contain the non-imputed data employed in prior analysis but supplement missing entries with imputed data to yield data sets with no missing values. I next run various ordered probit models on each of the ten data sets for each survey year and then combine the ten sets of estimation results for each specification to obtain a single set of estimated parameters and variances.

Table A5 in the Appendix presents summary statistics for the multiple imputation data sets. Tables A5.1 and A5.2 repeat the analysis of trade and ethnic/race-based models presented above on the imputed data. Comparison of Tables 3.1 and A5.1 reveals slight distinctions in findings but the overall message remains the same. *Skill-Wage* and *Prejudice* remain of expected sign and significance. A similar conclusion emerges upon comparing Tables 3.2 and A5.2. *Education* and *Prejudice* remain powerful predictors of attitudes toward immigration. One interesting contrast does appear with imputed data in the education skill model. The sign on the coefficient for *Black* changes to negative in several years, suggesting that African-Americans may be less inclined toward restriction. Results do not achieve conventional levels of significance, however, and may simply be due to chance.

The correspondence in results between listwise deletion and multiple imputation models serves as a rough robustness check of the analysis. Tests including alternative skill and prejudice regressors yield similar results to those reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. To guard against

²⁶ Variables are selected on the basis of thematic and substantive links to *Immigration Policy*. To the extent that it is possible, similar variables oriented around demographic, economic, ethnic, and political correlates of immigration policy are included in each imputed data set. A list of the exact variables included in the imputation is available

potential non-linearities in the continuous education measure, I substitute a four-category education measure (less than high school education, high school, some college, college graduate) for *Education*. Dummy variables (with less than high school the omitted category) yield results of similar substantive import to the more continuous measure. I also employ the CPS total wage and salary measure and use annual as opposed to weekly wage figures as measures of *Skill-Wage* and obtain equivalent results. Alternative measures of prejudice, namely group oriented feeling thermometers and questions about the work ethic, trustworthiness, intelligence, and violence of minority groups, yield results similar to those obtained with the race prejudice scale.

I also check the robustness of the results by including additional independent variables identified as potentially important in prior work. Inclusion of various geographical measures for the South and Border States, that fail to attain conventional levels of statistical significance, do not alter the results. Prospective and retrospective assessments of the national economy are of expected sign but rarely attain standard levels of significance. Prospective and retrospective measures of respondents' personal finances are of expected sign in some instances but also do not meet standard criteria for statistical significance. Neither group of variables alters the reported results.

Tentative Conclusion and Implications

This paper has advanced a trade-based perspective through which to gauge public attitudes toward immigration policy. The simple empirical framework facilitates analysis of the role of labor market and ascriptive motivations in determining policy preferences and qualifies

upon request. I use King et al.'s *EMis* algorithm with a multivariate normal distribution and a slight ridge prior. I thank Kenneth Scheve for invaluable help in implementing the imputation analysis, though errors are my own.

the contention of extant work that economic motivations play little role in shaping policy attitudes. The results clearly establish a consistent and significant role for economic self-interest in shaping policy preferences over immigration policy. Measures of skill that appropriately link immigration induced changes in the labor market to wage and employment prospects of citizens are strongly associated with positions on immigration policy. The intuitive link between economic considerations and public opinion is thus more plausible than proponents of race-based or non-instrumental arguments suggest.

At the same time, proponents of non-economic determinants of policy are clearly correct in pointing to unsavory, prejudicial motivations underlying immigration policy preferences. Ideological conservatism and negative affective orientations, in both good economic times and bad, are significantly associated with opposition to further immigration. Whether prejudice in this analysis reflects the pernicious impact of socialization or instrumental calculation remains unclear. What does emerge from the quantitative analysis regardless is a consistent finding that prejudice exercises a strong, independent effect on attitudes – even among respondents of high skill.

Immigration policy preferences thus reflect a mix of economic and non-economic motivations. Though unsurprising, the obvious is often lost amidst polarizing theoretical and policy debates and the broader point is significant for understanding public attitudes toward immigration policy and the contours of the contemporary immigration debate. Consider the standard observation that American's are ambivalent about immigration – recognizing that immigrants likely contribute to the economy but holding reservations about their broader socio-cultural impact. In this context, ascriptive disparagement of immigrants and economic insecurity often underlie efforts to restrict immigration. Analysts emphasizing one component of policy

attitudes at the expense of the other risk lapsing into cultural essentialism or economic determinism, respectively, at either the individual or national level. Rather accounts of restriction, particularly when immigrant groups are of different race or ethnicity than the bulk of the population, must recognize the importance of economic interests and latent prejudice. The strong and consistent importance of race prejudice in this empirical work portends a potential “racialized” politics of immigration policy, though a case for redistributive policies designed to ameliorate concern among the low skilled arises as a reasonable competitor.

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In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?




Figure 1. Public Opinion toward Immigration Policy, 1946-2000

Note: Question wording varies over time. Figures for 1946-1993 are from Simon and Alexander (1993: 41). Figures for 1992-2000 are author's tabulations from NES data.

Table 1. Frequency Distribution (%) and Summary Statistics for *Immigration Policy*

Year	Increased a lot	Increased a little	Left the same	Decreased a little	Decreased a lot	Don't know	Mean	Std Dev
1992	2.24	4.6	37.52	22.54	20.24	12.85	3.62	0.98
1994	1.51	3.51	27.38	21.94	42.18	3.48	4.03	1.00
1996	1.77	2.98	32.11	26.54	23.58	13.02	3.77	0.95
1998	2.63	7.86	37.48	28.98	20.32	2.74	3.58	0.99
2000	3.45	4.82	42.73	14.31	30.84	3.86	3.67	1.09

Table 2. Summary Statistics for Independent Variables, by Year

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	625.14 (234.80)	676.77 (236.81)	770.12 (305.57)	822.85 (344.76)	866.15 (334.42)
<i>Education</i>	12.978 (2.733)	13.053 (2.560)	13.432 (2.581)	13.090 (2.577)	13.163 (2.571)
<i>Party</i>	3.727 (2.022)	3.955 (2.091)	3.735 (2.101)	3.650 (2.053)	3.693 (2.036)
<i>Ideology</i>	4.220 (1.423)	4.473 (1.364)	4.323 (1.404)	4.239 (1.338)	4.345 (1.610)
<i>Gender</i>	0.523 (0.500)	0.521 (0.500)	0.521 (0.500)	0.542 (0.498)	0.561 (0.496)
<i>Age</i>	44.271 (17.210)	44.674 (17.003)	45.529 (16.853)	45.196 (17.521)	45.552 (17.642)
<i>Black</i>	0.130 (0.336)	0.111 (0.314)	0.117 (0.322)	0.117 (0.321)	0.123 (0.329)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.087 (0.282)	0.082 (0.275)	0.095 (0.293)	0.119 (0.324)	0.082 (0.274)
<i>Parentage</i>	0.172 (0.378)	0.165 (0.371)	0.152 (0.359)	0.156 (0.363)	0.151 (0.358)
<i>Union</i>	0.175 (0.380)	0.179 (0.383)	0.181 (0.385)	0.167 (0.373)	0.153 (0.360)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	7.287 (8.177)	7.562 (8.269)	7.474 (8.237)	6.507 (7.991)	9.020 (8.383)
<i>Prejudice</i>	13.288 (3.886)	13.660 (3.682)	10.028 (3.404)	7.122 (2.081)	13.656 (3.866)
<i>N</i>	2485	1795	1714	1281	1807

Note: *N* represents sample size; estimated means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are for list-wise deletion estimates.

Table 3.1. Ordered Probit Models -- Wage Skill Measure

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	-0.308*	-0.457**	-0.381**	-0.240**	-0.439**
	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.097)
<i>Party</i>	0.012	-0.010	-0.026	0.004	-0.005
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.019)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.022	0.000	0.049	0.026	0.054*
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.024)
<i>Gender</i>	0.077	0.072	-0.070	0.014	0.139*
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.067)
<i>Age</i>	-0.003	0.001	0.007**	0.005*	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
<i>Black</i>	0.108	0.137	0.088	0.309*	0.166
	(0.105)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.141)	(0.121)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.153	0.116	-0.123	0.109	-0.077
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.139)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.109	-0.214*	-0.209*	-0.402**	-0.384**
	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.095)
<i>Union</i>	0.148^	0.097	0.031	-0.096	0.050
	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.094)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.036	-0.103**	-0.044	-0.024	0.049
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.039)
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.068**	0.074**	0.058**	0.131**	0.095**
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.009)
<i>_cut1</i>	-1.335	-1.657	-1.594	-1.059	-0.678
<i>_cut2</i>	-0.666	-1.067	-1.136	-0.303	-0.155
<i>_cut3</i>	0.774	0.209	0.430	1.067	1.475
<i>_cut4</i>	1.510	0.844	1.291	2.002	1.929
Log likelihood (I)	-1815.41	-1506.42	-1386.38	-1031.95	-1528.44
Log likelihood (F)	-1757.45	-1450.25	-1350.09	-992.424	-1428.48
Number of obs	1370	1184	1104	777	1193
LR chi2(11)	115.93	112.33	72.59	79.06	199.93
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.0319	0.0373	0.0262	0.0383	0.0654
Count R2	0.434	0.459	0.409	0.407	0.526

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors reported

in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (*_cut*) indicate estimated cutpoints.

Immigration Policy is the dependent variable, defined such that higher (lower)

values indicate a preference for restriction (liberalization).

**p<0.01 *p<0.05 p^<0.10

Table 3.2. Ordered Probit Models -- Education Skill Measure

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Educatio</i>	-0.036** (0.012)	-0.057** (0.014)	-0.057** (0.014)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.080** (0.013)
<i>Party</i>	0.015 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.018)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.022 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.028)	0.025 (0.029)	0.027 (0.030)	0.066** (0.022)
<i>Gender</i>	0.035 (0.057)	0.097 (0.062)	-0.040 (0.064)	0.008 (0.070)	0.164** (0.063)
<i>Age</i>	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Black</i>	0.100 (0.102)	0.135 (0.115)	0.067 (0.122)	0.325** (0.130)	0.112 (0.115)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.166 (0.136)	0.080 (0.130)	-0.119 (0.133)	-0.026 (0.128)	-0.151 (0.132)
<i>Parentag</i>	-0.162* (0.082)	-0.208* (0.090)	-0.198* (0.099)	-0.479** (0.106)	-0.367** (0.091)
<i>Union</i>	0.111 (0.077)	0.108 (0.084)	0.050 (0.082)	-0.104 (0.094)	0.098 (0.092)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.028 (0.028)	-0.095** (0.031)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.041 (0.037)
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.061** (0.008)	0.067** (0.010)	0.065** (0.011)	0.132** (0.019)	0.084** (0.009)
_cut1	-1.648	-2.188	-2.193	-1.502	-1.645
_cut2	-1.045	-1.612	-1.702	-0.769	-1.098
_cut3	0.404	-0.331	-0.146	0.591	0.546
_cut4	1.128	0.307	0.715	1.522	0.997
Log likelihood (I)	-1924.37	-1649.74	-1512.11	-1279.36	-1656.23
Log likelihood (F)	-1868.19	-1587.12	-1466.42	-1222.38	-1544.38
Number of obs	1454	1294	1200	954	1298
LR chi2(11)	112.37	125.23	91.38	113.95	223.7
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.0292	0.038	0.0302	0.0445	0.0675
Count R2	0.431	0.451	0.409	0.397	0.532

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors reported in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (_cut) indicate estimated cutpoints. *Immigration Policy* is the dependent variable, defined such that higher (lower) values indicate a preference for restriction (liberalization).

**p<0.01 *p<0.05 p^<0.10

Table 4. Estimated Effect of Increasing Skill Levels and Prejudice on the Probability of Support for Immigration Restriction by Year

Year	Scenario	Wage-Skill	Prejudice	Year	Scenario	Education	Prejudice
1992 n=1249	Low	0.539	0.256	1992 n=1385	Low	0.673	0.293
	Average	0.500	0.500		Average	0.506	0.506
	High	0.402	0.666		High	0.451	0.650
1994 n=1184	Low	0.750	0.401	1994 n=1294	Low	0.877	0.420
	Average	0.663	0.663		Average	0.660	0.660
	High	0.465	0.795		High	0.574	0.783
1996 n=1104	Low	0.658	0.423	1996 n=1200	Low	0.820	0.404
	Average	0.574	0.574		Average	0.579	0.579
	High	0.345	0.660		High	0.501	0.677
1998 n=776	Low	0.559	0.234	1998 n=953	Low	0.793	0.241
	Average	0.508	0.508		Average	0.504	0.504
	High	0.300	0.649		High	0.420	0.639
2000 n=1380	Low	0.569	0.121	2000 n=1380	Low	0.823	0.143
	Average	0.457	0.457		Average	0.448	0.448
	High	0.185	0.686		High	0.347	0.652

Note: Cell entries report predicted probabilities of support for immigration restriction for models estimated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 under three distinct scenarios. "Low" estimates predicted probability of restriction with variable of interest at its minimum, all others at their means. "Average" reports this predicted probability for all variables at their mean levels. "High" presents probabilities with variable of interest at its sample maximum and all

Table A1. NES Variable List, by Year

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Immigration Policy</i>	V926235	V941016	V961325	V980489	V000510
<i>Skill-Education</i>	V923905	V941206	V960607	V980574	V000910
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	V923945	V941255	V960675	V980638	V000979
<i>Party</i>	V923634	V940655	V960420	V980339	V000523
<i>Ideology</i>	V923513	V940839	V960365	V980399	V000446
<i>Gender</i>	V926246	V941434	V960066	V980672	V001029
<i>Age</i>	V923903	V941203	V960605	V980572	V000908
<i>Black</i>	V926247	V941435	V960067	V980673	V001006a
<i>Hispanic</i>	V924122	V941418	V960708	V980659	V001012
<i>Parentage</i>	V924120	V941416	V960707	V980658	V001007
<i>Union</i>	V924101	V941401	V960699	V980649	V000990
<i>Race Prejudice</i>	V926126-	V941048-	V961208-	V980513-	V001508-
	V926129	V941051	V961210	V980514	V001511
<i>Labor Force</i>	V0009209	V0009209	V0009209	V980579	V000920
	23915	41216	60616		
<i>Sample Weight</i>	V923008	V940004	V960003	V980002	V000002
<i>Personal Economic</i>	V923425	V940902	V960337	V980414	V000338
<i>Evaluations</i>	V923427	V940904	V960339	V980416	V000403
<i>National Economic</i>	V900422	V940908	V960385	V980418	V000491
<i>Evaluations</i>	V900424	V940910	V960387	V980420	V000499
<i>South, Border</i>	V900010	V940014	V960108	V980087	V000080

Source: NES codebooks (various years). Available on-line at:

<http://www.isr.umich.edu/nes/archive/studies.phtml>

Table A2. NES Dispositional Items: Prejudice Scale

Variable	Description	Alpha
V926126	Blacks should work way up without special favors	
V926127	Blacks have gotten less than they deserve	
V926128	If blacks tried harder could be well off as whites	
V926129	Difficult for blacks to work out of lower class	0.88
V941048	Blacks have gotten less than they deserve	
V941049	No special favors for blacks	
V941050	Blacks need to try harder	
V941051	Difficult for blacks to work out of lower class	0.77
V961208	R favor affirmative action in hiring and promotion	
V961209	R favor/oppose affir action strongly/not strongly	
V961210	R's position on aid to blacks - 7 point scale	0.77
V980513	Irish etc. no special favors--blacks neither	
V980514	Blacks have gotten less than deserve	0.64
V001508	Blacks should overcome prejudice without favors	
V001509	Blacks have gotten less than they deserve	
V001510	If blacks would try harder they could be welloff	
V001511	Past discrimination impacts blacks today	0.89

Note: Scales are additive sums of Likert type responses, coded 1 for low prejudice through 5 for high. Higher scores indicate greater levels of prejudice.

Table A3.1. Ordered Probit Analysis of Policy Preferences: Wage Measure

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	-0.432** (0.128)	-0.598** (0.143)	-0.400** (0.114)	-0.337** (0.107)	-0.464** (0.089)
<i>Party</i>	0.022 (0.016)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.019)	0.028 (0.022)	0.015 (0.018)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.067** (0.024)	0.040 (0.028)	0.092** (0.029)	0.060^ (0.033)	0.094** (0.021)
<i>Gender</i>	0.047 (0.059)	0.023 (0.066)	-0.059 (0.068)	0.000 (0.079)	0.082 (0.061)
<i>Age</i>	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
<i>Black</i>	-0.132 (0.100)	-0.072 (0.120)	-0.118 (0.120)	0.081 (0.135)	-0.065 (0.104)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.105 (0.138)	0.103 (0.138)	-0.129 (0.144)	0.031 (0.144)	-0.042 (0.119)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.081 (0.084)	-0.194* (0.094)	-0.211* (0.104)	-0.372** (0.114)	-0.436** (0.087)
<i>Union</i>	0.154* (0.078)	0.107 (0.087)	0.047 (0.084)	-0.102 (0.100)	0.145^ (0.087)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.050^ (0.028)	-0.118** (0.032)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.039)	0.024 (0.035)
_cut1	-2.048	-2.512	-2.049	-1.808	-1.691
_cut2	-1.392	-1.930	-1.598	-1.069	-1.210
_cut3	0.005	-0.689	-0.057	0.256	0.312
_cut4	0.722	-0.075	0.793	1.167	0.732
Log likelihood (I)	-1822.7	-1509.43	-1397.26	1034.827	1777.808
Log likelihood (F)	-1799.56	-1481.84	-1373.24	1014.414	1725.727
Number of obs	1376	1187	1113	779	1380
LR chi2(10)	46.29	55.18	48.03	40.83	104.16
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.0127	0.0183	0.0172	0.0197	0.0293
Count R2	0.422	0.44	0.402	0.416	0.475

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors reported in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (_cut) indicate estimated cutpoints.

**p<0.01 *p<0.05 ^p<0.10

Table A3.2. Ordered Probit Analysis: Education Skill Measure

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Education</i>	-0.056** (0.012)	-0.079** (0.014)	-0.064** (0.014)	-0.070** (0.015)	-0.107** (0.012)
<i>Party</i>	0.029^ (0.016)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.018)	0.012 (0.020)	0.014 (0.017)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.056* (0.023)	0.032 (0.027)	0.072** (0.027)	0.062* (0.030)	0.094** (0.020)
<i>Gender</i>	0.016 (0.057)	0.069 (0.062)	-0.038 (0.064)	-0.017 (0.070)	0.106^ (0.058)
<i>Age</i>	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
<i>Black</i>	-0.118 (0.098)	-0.063 (0.111)	-0.166 (0.115)	0.100 (0.125)	-0.116 (0.099)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.116 (0.135)	0.063 (0.129)	-0.152 (0.132)	-0.139 (0.126)	-0.098 (0.114)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.145^ (0.082)	-0.197* (0.089)	-0.202* (0.098)	-0.445** (0.105)	-0.436** (0.084)
<i>Union</i>	0.122 (0.077)	0.119 (0.084)	0.070 (0.082)	-0.106 (0.093)	0.202* (0.084)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.037 (0.027)	-0.105** (0.031)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.028 (0.034)
_cut1	-2.550	-3.181	-2.772	-2.475	-2.897
_cut2	-1.954	-2.613	-2.290	-1.766	-2.392
_cut3	-0.539	-1.358	-0.767	-0.451	-0.831
_cut4	0.170	-0.737	0.081	0.454	-0.406
Log likelihood (I)	-1932.52	-1652.76	-1523	-1283.95	1928.301
Log likelihood (F)	-1905.02	-1614.43	-1494.08	1251.655	1849.214
Number of obs	1461	1297	1209	957	1502
LR chi2(10)	55.01	76.66	57.84	64.58	158.17
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.0142	0.0232	0.019	0.0251	0.041
Count R2	0.426	0.446	0.397	0.412	0.48

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors reported in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (_cut) indicate estimated cutpoints.
 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 ^<0.10

Table A4.1. Ordered Probit Analysis of Determinants of Immigration Policy Preferences, by Labor Force Status

	1992		1994		1996		1998	
	LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	-0.111 (0.158)	-0.597* (0.303)	-0.490** (0.161)	-0.540 (0.358)	-0.497** (0.130)	0.169 (0.270)	-0.296** (0.123)	-0.044 (0.254)
<i>Gender</i>	0.127^ (0.073)	-0.104 (0.133)	0.055 (-0.076)	0.101 (0.146)	0.028 (-0.080)	-0.269^ (0.145)	-0.030 (-0.090)	-0.158 (0.176)
<i>Age</i>	-0.005^ (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006^ (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)
<i>Black</i>	0.192 (0.133)	-0.130 (0.211)	0.075 (0.143)	0.332 (0.263)	0.145 (0.155)	0.003 (0.241)	0.408* (0.164)	0.025 (0.293)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.065 (0.171)	0.378 (0.302)	0.037 (0.159)	0.357 (0.312)	-0.293^ (0.170)	0.254 (0.294)	0.055 (0.161)	0.533 (0.381)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.098 (0.108)	-0.155 (0.154)	-0.172 (0.119)	-0.277^ (0.166)	-0.197 (0.135)	-0.193 (0.175)	-0.458** (0.137)	-0.245 (0.224)
<i>Party</i>	0.027 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.023)	0.022 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.040 (0.035)	-0.038 (0.027)	0.087 (0.047)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.012 (0.031)	0.029 (0.053)	0.035 (0.034)	-0.138* (0.063)	0.029 (0.037)	0.027 (0.059)	0.061 (0.039)	-0.094 (0.071)
<i>Union</i>	0.107 (0.090)	0.289 (0.233)	0.136 (0.097)	-0.087 (0.221)	0.052 (0.096)	-0.077 (0.183)	-0.008 (0.111)	-0.531 (0.272)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.075 (0.062)	-0.105** (0.037)	-0.113^ (0.068)	-0.048 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.064)	-0.008 (0.044)	-0.109 (0.088)
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.062** (0.011)	0.074** (0.022)	0.073** (0.012)	0.057* (0.024)	0.052** (0.014)	0.029 (0.025)	0.125** (0.025)	0.154* (0.048)

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A4.1 Continued

1998		2000
LFP	NLFP	LFP
-0.296**	-0.044	-0.397**
(0.123)	(0.254)	(0.112)
-0.030	-0.158	0.099
-(0.090)	(0.176)	-(0.077)
0.006^	0.003	0.001
(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)
0.408*	0.025	0.296*
(0.164)	(0.293)	(0.144)
0.055	0.533	-0.056
(0.161)	(0.381)	(0.156)
-0.458**	-0.245	-0.387**
(0.137)	(0.224)	(0.115)
-0.038	0.087^	-0.016
(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.024)
0.061	-0.094	0.062*
(0.039)	(0.071)	(0.028)
-0.008	-0.531^	0.054
(0.111)	(0.272)	(0.103)
-0.008	-0.109	0.043
(0.044)	(0.088)	(0.046)
0.125**	0.154**	0.097**
(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.011)
605	171	886

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is Immigration Policy.

LFP indicates labor force participation model; NLFP indicates non-labor force participation model.

^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A4.2. Ordered Probit Analysis by Labor Force Status: Education Skill Measure

	1992		1994		1996	
	LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP
<i>Education</i>	-0.058**	-0.005	-0.085**	-0.076*	-0.076**	-0.010
	0.018	0.020	0.024	0.032	0.018	0.024
<i>Gender</i>	0.118	-0.083	0.018	0.359*	0.073	-0.305*
	0.073	0.109	0.103	0.156	0.078	0.123
<i>Age</i>	-0.005^	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.004
	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003
<i>Black</i>	0.184	0.005	-0.094	0.298	0.144	0.007
	0.134	0.175	0.200	0.287	0.155	0.210
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.036	0.416^	-0.164	0.315	-0.323^	0.216
	0.174	0.234	0.207	0.299	0.170	0.220
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.097	-0.252^	-0.138	-0.252	-0.189	-0.218
	0.109	0.134	0.171	0.183	0.135	0.151
<i>Party</i>	0.032	-0.017	-0.006	0.028	-0.027	-0.027
	0.022	0.027	0.031	0.039	0.024	0.031
<i>Ideology</i>	0.023	0.011	-0.047	-0.114	0.019	-0.022
	0.031	0.043	0.046	0.074	0.037	0.050
<i>Union</i>	0.095	0.139	0.011	-0.241	0.076	-0.034
	0.091	0.166	0.131	0.229	0.096	0.171
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.008	-0.057	-0.150**	-0.163*	-0.038	-0.034
	0.035	0.050	0.050	0.075	0.039	0.057
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.056**	0.055**	0.063**	0.053*	0.049**	0.070**
	0.012	0.017	0.016	0.026	0.014	0.021
Observations	931	454	800	233	828	372

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A4.2 Continued

1998		2000	
LFP	NLFP	LFP	NLFP
-0.049*	-0.056*	-0.091**	-0.067**
0.021	0.025	0.018	0.022
0.005	-0.011	0.129^	0.258*
0.089	0.121	0.076	0.121
0.005	0.006*	0.000	-0.002
0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003
0.413*	0.207	0.255^	-0.211
0.163	0.218	0.144	0.200
0.059	-0.130	-0.074	-0.357
0.161	0.221	0.156	0.259
-0.476**	-0.533**	-0.393**	-0.321*
0.137	0.173	0.115	0.157
-0.036	0.013	-0.011	-0.004
0.027	0.034	0.024	0.033
0.062	-0.045	0.064*	0.071^
0.039	0.052	0.028	0.041
0.005	-0.383*	0.112	0.098
0.111	0.189	0.102	0.220
-0.004	-0.012	-0.042	0.016
0.044	0.058	0.046	0.065
0.119**	0.138**	0.087**	0.066**
0.025	0.033	0.011	0.018
604	349	886	410

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is Immigration Policy.

LFP indicates labor force participation model; NLFP indicates non-labor force participation model.

^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Multiple Imputation Summary Statistics

Table A5. Multiple Imputations Summary Statistics, by Year

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Immigration Policy</i>	3.605 (1.023)	3.996 (1.021)	3.780 (0.980)	3.556 (0.990)	3.608 (1.100)
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	607.39 (236.50)	661.31 (236.68)	748.87 (301.78)	827.84 (367.69)	892.26 (346.07)
<i>Education</i>	12.907 (2.814)	13.075 (2.528)	13.328 (2.661)	13.418 (2.563)	13.616 (2.569)
<i>Party</i>	3.705 (2.030)	3.912 (2.104)	3.677 (2.101)	3.654 (2.052)	3.730 (2.065)
<i>Ideology</i>	4.201 (1.390)	4.439 (1.338)	4.269 (1.389)	4.235 (1.341)	4.315 (1.625)
<i>Gender</i>	0.534 (0.499)	0.534 (0.499)	0.552 (0.497)	0.551 (0.498)	0.563 (0.496)
<i>Age</i>	45.755 (17.711)	44.264 (17.646)	45.527 (17.405)	45.770 (17.248)	47.204 (16.960)
<i>Black</i>	0.129 (0.336)	0.115 (0.319)	0.122 (0.327)	0.120 (0.324)	0.117 (0.321)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.087 (0.280)	0.079 (0.269)	0.109 (0.282)	0.109 (0.311)	0.073 (0.261)
<i>Immigrant</i>	0.178 (0.382)	0.163 (0.370)	0.144 (0.352)	0.146 (0.353)	0.150 (0.357)
<i>Union</i>	0.163 (0.370)	0.168 (0.374)	0.173 (0.378)	0.152 (0.359)	0.139 (0.346)
<i>Ln(% Foreign Born)</i>	1.346 (1.149)	1.379 (1.103)	1.344 (1.098)	1.283 (1.066)	1.829 (0.909)
<i>Prejudice</i>	13.273 (3.907)	13.641 (3.706)	9.894 (3.452)	7.067 (2.103)	13.556 (3.911)
<i>N</i>	2485	1795	1714	1281	1807

Note: Summary statistics are multiple-imputation estimates based on ten imputed data sets per year. Cells report the variable mean and standatard deviation (in parentheses).

Table A5.1. Multiple Imputation Probit Model: Wage Measure

Variable	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Skill-Wage</i>	-0.110 (0.112)	-0.440** (0.131)	-0.340** (0.101)	-0.150* (0.075)	-0.360** (0.084)
<i>Party</i>	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.017)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.013 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.027)	0.011 (0.028)	0.027 (0.032)	0.054* (0.021)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.006 (0.046)	0.077 (0.057)	-0.001 (0.062)	-0.023 (0.063)	0.112* (0.057)
<i>Age</i>	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
<i>Black</i>	0.018 (0.077)	0.044 (0.095)	-0.023 (0.107)	0.219* (0.108)	-0.013 (0.090)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.082 (0.098)	-0.018 (0.109)	-0.131 (0.120)	-0.039 (0.110)	-0.085 (0.113)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.159* (0.073)	-0.178* (0.083)	-0.168 (0.095)	-0.411** (0.092)	-0.435** (0.082)
<i>Union</i>	0.113 (0.063)	0.029 (0.073)	0.076 (0.078)	-0.084 (0.084)	0.155* (0.079)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.090** (0.027)	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.026 (0.031)	0.037 (0.033)
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.051** (0.007)	0.067** (0.009)	0.039** (0.010)	0.139** (0.017)	0.080** (0.009)
_cut1	-1.437 (0.250)	-1.908 (0.295)	-2.182 (0.320)	-1.177 (0.280)	-0.957 (0.340)
_cut2	-0.870 (0.251)	-1.381 (0.290)	-1.648 (0.316)	-0.443 (0.275)	-0.454 (0.333)
_cut3	0.476 (0.252)	-0.137 (0.286)	-0.297 (0.313)	0.886 (0.276)	1.046 (0.337)
_cut4	1.191 (0.251)	0.479 (0.285)	0.504 (0.313)	1.760 (0.277)	1.493 (0.336)

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients based on the ten imputed data sets for each year, with standard errors in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (_cut) indicate estimated cutpoints.

Immigration Policy is the dependent variable, defined such that higher (lower)

values indicate a preference for restriction (liberalization).

**p<0.01; *p<0.05; ^p<0.10

Table A5.2. Multiple Imputation Probit Model: Education Measure

	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
<i>Education</i>	-0.023* (0.010)	-0.042** (0.012)	-0.049** (0.012)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.062** (0.011)
<i>Party</i>	0.002 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.017)
<i>Ideology</i>	0.012 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.027)	0.006 (0.027)	0.026 (0.032)	0.057* (0.021)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.002 (0.045)	0.113* (0.055)	0.035 (0.061)	-0.034 (0.062)	0.149* (0.056)
<i>Age</i>	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Black</i>	-0.005 (0.078)	0.045 (0.094)	-0.035 (0.107)	0.209 (0.107)	-0.042 (0.090)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.044 (0.097)	-0.030 (0.109)	-0.179 (0.120)	-0.066 (0.109)	-0.094 (0.112)
<i>Parentage</i>	-0.159* (0.073)	-0.179* (0.082)	-0.163 (0.095)	-0.429** (0.092)	-0.452** (0.082)
<i>Union</i>	0.120 (0.062)	0.038 (0.073)	0.097 (0.077)	-0.072 (0.084)	0.188* (0.079)
<i>% Foreign Born</i>	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.086** (0.027)	-0.028 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.031)	0.040 (0.034)
<i>Prejudice</i>	0.049** (0.007)	0.064** (0.009)	0.039** (0.010)	0.134** (0.017)	0.075** (0.009)
_cut1	-1.711 (0.269)	-2.215 (0.335)	-2.683 (0.365)	-1.527 (0.341)	-1.499 (0.362)
_cut2	-1.144 (0.274)	-1.687 (0.330)	-2.151 (0.362)	-0.795 (0.337)	-0.995 (0.356)
_cut3	0.204 (0.270)	-0.443 (0.326)	-0.801 (0.361)	0.536 (0.336)	0.509 (0.358)
_cut4	0.920 (0.272)	0.172 (0.326)	0.003 (0.361)	1.411 (0.337)	0.959 (0.357)

Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients based on the ten imputed data sets for each year, with standard errors in parentheses. Ancillary parameters (_cut) indicate estimated cutpoints.

Immigration Policy is the dependent variable, defined such that higher (lower) values indicate a preference for restriction (liberalization).

**p<0.01; *p<0.05; ^p<0.10

Predicted probability value work, NES 1992-2000

Predicted Probabilities for Skill-Wage Model

1992					
n=1249	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.018	0.056	0.432	0.265	0.229
wage +1	0.02	0.061	0.445	0.26	0.214
wage +2	0.023	0.066	0.457	0.254	0.2
wage -1	0.016	0.051	0.418	0.269	0.245
wage -2	0.0141	0.046	0.405	0.273	0.261
min	0.015	0.048	0.41	0.272	0.255
max	0.03	0.077	0.479	0.241	0.173
1994					
n=1184	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.011	0.034	0.295	0.248	0.411
wage +1	0.015	0.042	0.325	0.249	0.368
wage +2	0.02	0.052	0.355	0.247	0.326
wage -1	0.008	0.027	0.264	0.244	0.455
wage -2	0.006	0.022	0.234	0.237	0.5
min	0.006	0.022	0.238	0.238	0.494
max	0.032	0.071	0.402	0.236	0.258
1996					
n=1104	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.014	0.026	0.392	0.326	0.241
wage +1	0.018	0.032	0.424	0.316	0.21
wage +2	0.023	0.039	0.454	0.302	0.18
wage -1	0.01	0.021	0.359	0.333	0.276
wage -2	0.008	0.017	0.326	0.336	0.312
min	0.008	0.017	0.326	0.336	0.312
max	0.051	0.038	0.536	0.243	0.102

Predicted Probabilities for Education Model

1992					
n=1385	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.02	0.052	0.429	0.265	0.232
edu +1	0.025	0.061	0.453	0.256	0.204
edu +2	0.031	0.071	0.474	0.244	0.179
edu -1	0.016	0.044	0.404	0.273	0.261
edu -2	0.013	0.038	0.378	0.278	0.292
min	0.007	0.023	0.308	0.283	0.379
max	0.028	0.065	0.463	0.251	0.193
1994					
n=1294	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.011	0.033	0.295	0.249	0.411
edu +1	0.017	0.044	0.335	0.25	0.354
edu +2	0.024	0.057	0.373	0.245	0.3
edu -1	0.008	0.025	0.254	0.243	0.469
edu -2	0.005	0.018	0.216	0.233	0.528
min	0.001	0.006	0.112	0.175	0.706
max	0.021	0.051	0.356	0.248	0.324
1996					
n=1200	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.013	0.027	0.386	0.326	0.247
edu +1	0.018	0.035	0.426	0.313	0.207
edu +2	0.025	0.045	0.463	0.296	0.171
edu -1	0.009	0.021	0.345	0.334	0.291
edu -2	0.006	0.016	0.303	0.336	0.339
min	0.002	0.006	0.188	0.309	0.496
max	0.02	0.039	0.441	0.307	0.192

1998						1998					
n=776	1	2	3	4	5	n=953	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.018	0.071	0.421	0.321	0.168	base	0.019	0.07	0.417	0.321	0.172
wage +1	0.022	0.082	0.442	0.307	0.147	edu +1	0.025	0.085	0.444	0.303	0.143
wage +2	0.027	0.094	0.46	0.291	0.127	edu +2	0.033	0.101	0.467	0.281	0.118
wage -1	0.014	0.061	0.399	0.333	0.192	edu -1	0.014	0.057	0.387	0.337	0.204
wage -2	0.011	0.052	0.375	0.343	0.217	edu -2	0.01	0.046	0.355	0.349	0.24
min	0.013	0.059	0.392	0.336	0.199	min	0.003	0.021	0.246	0.354	0.376
max	0.054	0.144	0.501	0.228	0.073	max	0.028	0.091	0.454	0.294	0.132
2000						2000					
n=1191	1	2	3	4	5	n=1296	1	2	3	4	5
base	0.022	0.047	0.489	0.168	0.273	base	0.021	0.047	0.492	0.167	0.274
wage +1	0.032	0.06	0.523	0.157	0.225	edu +1	0.033	0.066	0.54	0.151	0.209
wage +2	0.044	0.075	0.554	0.143	0.183	edu +2	0.052	0.088	0.573	0.132	0.155
wage -1	0.015	0.036	0.447	0.175	0.325	edu -1	0.012	0.032	0.432	0.176	0.346
wage -2	0.01	0.027	0.401	0.179	0.381	edu -2	0.007	0.021	0.367	0.179	0.425
min	0.012	0.029	0.415	0.179	0.365	min	0.001	0.004	0.167	0.139	0.689
max	0.101	0.125	0.584	0.099	0.091	max	0.038	0.072	0.552	0.146	0.191

Note:

base holds all variables at their means

variable +1 indicates 1 Std Dev above mean all other variables at mean

variable +2 indicates 2 Std Dev above mean all other variables at mean

variable -1 indicates 1 Std Dev below mean all other variables at mean

variable -2 indicates 2 Std Dev below mean all other variables at mean

min sets variable at maximum level all other variables at mean

min sets variable at minimum all other variables at mean