

Culture and Empathy

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Editorial Remarks (Vol. 3, No. 1-2)

According to Slavoj Žižek, “pandemics” is a global situation where “we are all bombarded precisely by calls not to touch others but to isolate ourselves, to maintain proper corporeal distance.” In the end, however, Zizek ascertains that “there is a hope that corporeal distancing will even strengthen the intensity of our link with others.” The photos of French neighbors sharing wine bottles through adjacent windows are one such example of deepening our human relations amid pandemics. However, Žižek does not give us an exact indication of how our love of neighbors will pan out after social order is restored back to normal. Nor does he explain sharing wine bottles will deepen our humanitarian link with our neighbors. Instead, the first thing we hear after lockdown is lifted in many cities in the U.S. is a massive citizen outcry against racism after the death of George Floyd by the apparently suffocating “touch” and brutality against that poor African American soul by the police. *Culture and Empathy* could not publish our first issue of Vol. 3 in March this year due to the pandemic, and the current issue is filled with sadness and anger against human absurdity that hardly shows the silver lining after the pandemic.

The current issue (Vol. 3, No. 1-2) presents three articles and three book reviews. Charles Hampden-Turner, Raymond Ferris Abelin, and Chris Rowley provide twenty illustrative examples to show how innovation has been a fundamental force of movement in economic history where culture has continued to play pivotal roles. Their theoretical focus is on “the informal” that operates outside of the established formal and more organized methods of innovation. The paper argues that the dynamics between the informal and formal is particularly challenging to Western cultures due to increased competition outside of the well-defined rules, regulations, and guidelines intended to sustain organizational development. Innovation therefore is a key driver of the informal economy, a conclusion that is radically different from conventional economics. The authors contend that the resulting rapid, sometimes radical, systemic changes are the result of informal economic forces, because formal economies have become heavily reliant on technological innovation. Each illustrative example analyzes how the informality comes to the rescue of the formality within the context of culture and innovation.

Ingyu Oh and Wonho Jang present the “glocal” aspect of the K-pop revolution in the 21st century pop culture in South Korea. They argue that K-pop is a result of the glocalization of Western pop music first by importing it from the West, localizing it in South Korea, and exporting it back to the West. Simply put, glocalization refers to a successful localization of a foreign global product so much that the original developers of that product want to import the local variations instead of their original version. The paper argues that glocalization is therefore a highly proactive countermeasure to globalization. Hallyu’s success with glocalization demonstrates that the domestic Korean demand for high quality pop culture has brought about

new types of competition that call for importing global pop content and simultaneously aiming to produce better quality versions than the originals. They also clarify that the content localization in South Korea promoted “female universalism” vis-à-vis male universalism to promote K-pop mostly among female fans of the world. These views are radically different from some of the ongoing misunderstanding about K-pop, which asserts that it is a copy of J-pop or American hip hop with few innovations.

Yin Li and DongGen Rui compares border areas between North Korea and China on the one hand and between San Diego and Tijuana on the other. The paper highlights the fact that the cross-border cities in China, especially the Tumen River area, has been confronted with two main issues: “stability” and “security.” The dichotomized role the borderland plays includes “blocking” foreigners and “connecting” them with the Chinese. This paper therefore provides interpretations of the multifunctional aspects of borderlands by introducing various theories of border region studies. It analyzes the opportunities and challenges and that the administration of the border is facing, such as mutual cooperation, transnational migrations, social disintegration, and self-identification, among others. The authors argue that these cross-border cities should not be considered as politically or socially sensitive zones but instead bridges that promotes the development and the communication of communities on both sides of the border, drawing on the advantages and avoiding the disadvantages.

Three book reviews deal with empathy, K-pop, and the philosophy of emotion. Keith Jackson reviews a book on intercultural empathy and human resource development; Xosé Crisanto Gándara Eiroa provides his review of two books on K-pop in Spain; and Mark Lovas shares his thoughts after reading a book on the history of emotions.

We hope Vol. 3, No. 1-2 will help scholars and students of innovation, K-pop, and cross-border cities obtain valuable information on each topic. *C & E* will continue to strive to provide ambitious and meaningful contributions for each fresh issue amid the pandemic.

John Lie, Ingyu Oh, and Wonho Jang

How Might Culture Hinder or Help Innovation?

The Culture Clash between the Formality and the Informality Needed to Innovate

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Abstract

The informal operates outside of established formal and more organized methods of innovation. The dynamics between the informal and formal is particularly challenging to Western cultures due to increased competition outside of the well-defined rules, regulations, and guidelines intended to sustain organizational development. Innovation is a key driver of the informal economy, but we contend that, since formal economies have become heavily reliant on technological innovation, the resulting rapid, sometimes radical, systemic changes are the result of informal economic forces. We provide 20 illustrative examples and different approaches to the clash of formality and informality to analyze how the latter comes to the rescue of the former within the context of culture and innovation.

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Introduction

The origins of all human culture are informal. Behavior, whether human or organizational, becomes codified and formalized over time. As a consequence of successful practice, it is repeated and after repetition it also becomes habitual and formalized. Anything new, creative, innovative, or experimental is informal by definition in these earliest stages. To the extent that formal systems are experienced as unsatisfactory, informal activities will qualify them and render these more palatable. Some formalities become obsolete and informalities may cut them back. Formalities tend to be overruled by the exercise of commonsense and personal judgement and if reimposed, reduce output.

We examine several different approaches to this clash of formality with informality to analyze how the latter comes to the rescue of the former within the context of culture and innovation. When the formal and informal converge, as they do in many of our illustrations and

examples, they can become cultural and social change agents. With a focus on innovation, we address the role of informal processes in establishing effective formal procedures. These are seen as the informal preludes to more systematic conduct. We will trace some major conflicts between informality and formality in the field of management studies, cite some relevant theories, and discuss the work needed to help address the research gap.

Our research question is broad: What is the role and importance of informal social processes in innovation? There is mounting pressure on developed economies to innovate. Innovation has very informal, difficult to verify, origins. There is a research gap as many researchers prefer phenomena that stand still and have clear definitions, while informal processes are dynamic and blur at the edges. The closer we come to the innovative fountainhead, the harder it becomes to grasp what is occurring. Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) work on flow states is the exception. This shows that when the *challenges* faced by a group almost exactly match its *skills*, then these competing processes suddenly join in a rush of excitement and high performance as they synergize. Hampden-Turner (2009) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2009) show that laws and exceptions typically "annoy" each other and conflict, but there comes a moment of mutual engagement wherein the exception (im)proves the rule and the rule is successfully revised.

Culture and Innovation

Culture has been seen in a variety of ways (see Hofstede, 1980; Redding, 1990; House et al., 2002). For example, six of the seven culture value dimensions articulated by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) can lead to *both* adversarial debate and conflict *and* to reconciled integrity. Deming (1982), for example, showed that errors and corrections led to continuous improvement, with each error corrected in turn and the whole organization learning. Yet how often is error abused by those eager to correct? Hudson (1966) detailed the endless rivalry between the two cultures of the liberal arts and the sciences and pointed out that in an innovative breakthrough, science joins with art in a single thrust. Kohlberg (1981) showed that confronting a moral dilemma stimulated higher stages of moral development, and he posed several dilemmas to those he was researching. Innovation, integrity, and development occur when values suddenly fuse and integrate, but there remains the danger that they will come apart.

The Origins of Informality: 20 Illustrations

The informal economy is both a prelude to and a corrective impulse to the formal economy. It asks whether existing procedures are fit for human beings and contribute to their happiness and development as people. When people engage in informal activities, this is done to restore conviviality and creativity, which may otherwise be missing. Activities found to be valuable will be formalized over time but will lose their spontaneity.

We now list, with short descriptions, our 20 illustrations, examples of how informality originates, criticizes, and modifies new formal systems so as to renew these and render them more effective. Following this, we detail each of them. The rest of our paper will probe more deeply into the claims made above and will cite research that supports this.

Informal System as a Critique of the Formal System in the Factory

As early as the 1930s, Mayo and his colleagues drew attention to the clash of the formal with the informal system within the factory (Roethlisberger, Dickson, and Western electric company, 1934). While the formal system individualized each employee, offering them piecework incentives for meeting and exceeding standards, workers devised an informal system whose function was to subvert these aims and substitute preferred norms. This took the form of work restriction norms aimed at “rate-busters,” those who exceeded standards and might lead these to be raised in future. They came under informal pressure to slow down and protect the jobs and comfort of fellow workers.

The researchers regarded this informal system as a *critique* of the formal system. While the formal system was manual, the informal was verbal. The former was competitive, the latter cooperative. The formal system was individualized and motivated by fear. The informal system sought solidarity and security through socialization. In many factories, piecework has been long abandoned, and time and motion studies are described as the problem. Worker participation and problem solving is today’s so-called “best practice,” together with quality circles with workers thinking and improving on the job in one continuous process of learning.

Trade Unionism as a Response to Formal Industrial Management

Great Britain and the U.S. were the first to industrialize, but as others followed with lower wage rates, wages were held down or even reduced (Blackford, 1988). One result was bitter industrial strife and use made of Pinkerton detectives and industrial spies so that workers spoke in a so-called “Ford whisper” to avoid being denounced to managers (Meyer, 1981). Industrial relations became politicized with the U.S. Democratic Party and the U.K. Labor Party allied with the union movement and the Communist Party tracing its origins to the revolt of the industrial proletariat.

Part of the problem lay in the way industrial disputes were formalized. In the U.S., the National Labor Relations Act gave unions the right to bargain over pay and conditions of work, enshrining the zero-sum conflict between management and labor. Today, manufacturing constitutes only about 11%-12% of the U.S. and British economies and a major source of faster economic growth may have been lost. In contrast, China’s manufacturing expansion has rescued some 600 million people from poverty.

What unions stood for, higher degrees of participation in the workplace, workers’ rights and social engagement with their fellows, have been adopted by some major competitors and harnessed to productivity. For example, when Japanese managers rehired workers fired by

General Motors for the joint venture NUMMI in the U.S., the plant went from the company's worst to the best with most of the same workers. Similarly, Nissan's car plant in Sunderland, U.K. is one of its most productive. The U.S. and the U.K. have repeatedly failed to offer workers the psychological satisfactions their unions gave them. In contrast, in Germany unions are a major source of inspiration on what cooperative industrial relations can accomplish. Management provides them with offices, and they have legal representation on company boards.

Immigrant Communities and the Informalities of Networked Relationships

One of the abiding puzzles of innovation is the extraordinary, but rarely explained, contribution of the networked families of recent immigrants. The Chinese *diaspora* would, if combined, constitute the fourth largest economy in the world, ahead of Germany. In the Philippines, a Chinese population of around 3% contributes about 70% of wealth, which is similar in much of the Asia Pacific (Chen, 2001). When Indian immigrants were expelled from Uganda, the economy came close to collapse and the U.K. benefitted from giving them refuge. As recently as 2000, one-third of Silicon Valley's entrepreneurs were found to be Chinese and Indian immigrants entering the U.S. since 1971 and who contributed U.S.\$50 billion to the economy (Saxenian, 1999).

It is not simply immigrant groups, but minority sects and groups within the nation which are important. The English Quakers contributed to the industrial revolution 40 times more than their numbers warranted (Hurst, 1995). Over half of Britain's great entrepreneurs were nonconformists in a nation where only 6% were thus affiliated (Everett Hagen and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies, 1962). French Huguenots, although only 10% of the population, were at one time forbidden to emigrate so substantial was their economic importance.

Why this outsize contribution by foreigners, dissenters, and informal rebels against the nations' formal rules? What is it that "strangers-in-a-strange-land" possess which is so precious? One reason is that in order to survive, such people need products in addition to their personalities. The latter will not suffice among strangers. Another reason is tightly networked communities as there are only a few others on whom their economic survival depends. Were they to cheat any of these or even get into a dispute, it would quickly be all around the community? It is for such reasons that debts incurred by a Chinese father will be paid off by his children; the honor of the family is at stake. Furthermore, such networks may have their own credit unions and highly respected elders to resolve disputes, thereby saving on lawyers and bankers. The discrimination such groups suffered served to tighten their bonds and increase the fairness of their dealings with each other.

In some cases, group norms seem to have made much difference. Quakers refused to shed their hats to dignitaries, tithed themselves to train apprentices, had women run meetings, and declared: "My word is my bond." This allowed them to found many financial institutions, where Barclays and Lloyds were Quakers, as were Cadbury, Rowntree, Fry and Terry in a

virtual monopoly of U.K. confectionary, Bryant & May matches, Clarks shoes, and the biscuit firms Huntley & Palmers. and Carrs. Yet less than 0.1% of British people in 1851 were Quakers.

Family as the Origin of New Business and Its Guiding Metaphor

Most new businesses originate with families and they are the means by which families survive. Companies started by individuals with the help of venture capitalists are a small, even if important, minority. Even where a company is publicly owned, its family origins may loom large and its norms may be those of a family. Companies like DuPont and Johnson & Johnson retain family-type cultures, as do many of the large *chaebols* in South Korea and companies in other parts of Asia (Rowley, 2013). In Asia especially, the family spirit is a major source of informality (Redding, 1990). In Chinese and Japanese companies, the metaphor of the family is everywhere with elder and younger “brothers,” “fathers,” “uncles,” and “aunts,” etc. Indeed, the nickname of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is “worried auntie.”

One advantage of informal family networks is that they greatly reduce the role of the welfare state and cultures of entitlement in much of Asia. Communities arrange for members who would otherwise be destitute to supply them with some useful service and coach them into doing this well so as not to become a disgrace to their family. The isolated dependent person is rare. Cross-shareholding in your neighbor’s business is common and so there are many with a stake in your survival that will help if needed.

The idea that business is an exercise in impersonal and calculated rationality, made famous by Weber, turns out to be a largely Western conviction (Weber and Parsons, 1930). The contrast between *gemeinschaft*, the primary group of intimate, informal, family cooperation and *gesellschaft*, the secondary group of detached, strategic, formal competitiveness, is a stereotype largely confined to Europe and North America. While much of the West regards innovation as being motivated by the desire for gain and personal fulfillment, for much of Asia it is a matter of family survival.

Informalities of Lending Relationships

Such popular movies as “It’s a Wonderful Life” reveal that lending relationships in an intimate community were once the bedrock of retail banking. The lender needs to know and care about the borrower and whether they are able to repay the loan plus interest. Personal knowledge as to the good character of the borrower is a vital ingredient without which systemic collapse occurs, as happened in the post-2008 subprime mortgage disaster where lending relationships were predatory and deceitful and led to the Global Financial Crisis. As Tett (2009) reminds us, the word “credit” comes from *credire*, to believe and without genuine belief the system cannot stand. The fact that formal relationships are rooted in informal knowledge and in mutual understandings, has rarely been better illustrated.

In large parts of the developing world, banks cannot afford to deploy loan officers. There is not the volume of business to pay their salaries, the lending is too little, and the information

too sparse. What has happened instead is that local members of the community organize networks of borrowers and recommend these to the bank as a group of persons prepared to underwrite each other's debts and guarantee the integrity of their membership (see Prahalad, 2005). Similar informal groups of guarantors were organized by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and became the basis of microfinance (see Yunus and Jolis, 2001). This went to considerable lengths to persuade poor Muslim women to take out microloans in a country where even approaching them is taboo. However, the informal support group of local women plays an active role. If the first woman to borrow repays on time, then others in the group will become candidates for similar loans. The money is only given to those who keep their dwellings in good repair, provide outdoor toilets, and send their children to school. It is very much in the interest of these groups of supporters to ensure the loan is repaid on time and 97.5% of loans are repaid, allowing the bank to profit, award scholarships, distribute mobile phones, etc. However, much microlending can fail, especially where these informal relationships are not in place and where the bank's chief concern is to make money, rather than "right wrongs."

Role of Human Emergencies in Formal Wealth Creation

Developing countries face a constant stream of emergencies with which both communities and authorities must try to deal with on an urgent basis. Such desperate expedients nearly all start as informal reactions. In large parts of India, sizable numbers suffer from cataracts and the lack of iodine in sea salt, which is lost during distribution. Yet, if we look at Prahalad (2005), we find opportunities even here. As the bottom of the pyramid is very broad and consists of millions, a product affordable to this group is affordable to everyone else and has near universal appeal. Since a few seconds of laser surgery can remove cataracts, India now does this on an industrial scale, using thousands of surgeons and charging U.S.\$50 to those who can afford it, while those who cannot are treated free. There is huge "profit" in this to the nation, if not to shareholders, since those formerly blind and dependent on others are freed to work, which also frees their careers. Similarly, Hindustani Lever treats sea salt to preserve its iodine, and inexpensive ice cream nourishes the calcium in the bones of millions of children.

Indian pharmaceutical companies are in many cases the world's chief bastions against pandemics which North American middle-class medicine is not geared to meet. Getting enough generic drugs to enough people in time is the aim of public policy. Once again, the looming threat of global epidemics has triggered formal profit-generating activities.

Town and Village Enterprises (T.V.E.s) in China

The real success story for China since the mid-1980s was not the State-Owned Enterprise sector that shrank and struggled (although a handful deemed strategic have prospered) nor transplanted Western companies, but T.V.E.s. These began as informal trading relationships at the level of the small town or village, which then grew larger and were legitimized, after the fact, by local officials who frequently acquired stakes in them and awarded contracts to them on behalf of the

community. In this way, enterprises tend to shape regulations rather than regulations shaping enterprises. What is convenient for the family and locality comes first.

The process began when families of farmers wrote a petition in their own blood (or perhaps red ink) and offered to face punishment rather than continue with collectivization. Local communist officials backed them, and the Confucian family ethic resurfaced after years of suppression (Chang, 2011). That businesses were established before they were regulated and taxed meant that informal, spontaneous, family-based initiatives were in the driving seat of the burgeoning local economy. This is a very similar process to which Chinese ethnic communities faced in many other countries. Most got on with business in a social context that was grudging at best. In many cases such businesses are partly owned by their customers who guide the nature and quality of what is supplied, while local officials help with governance. As new and unregulated traders are constantly joining, every company must remain flexible and agile since resourceful, would-be competitors are everywhere. Shareholding is widely distributed through the neighborhood to keep customers and suppliers loyal. The secret of economic achievement has always been family nurturance in which you are loved if you excel, as pointed out many years ago (McClelland, 1958).

Academic Entrepreneurs - A Roundabout Route to Riches

One major flaw in the conventional wisdom that the world belongs to those inducted into high finance is that an increasingly important source of industrial knowledge is largely informal and derives from education, not the machinations of “moneymen.” In order to profit from science, it is usually necessary to immerse yourself in it for decades or more and exploit this knowledge. Of course, knowledge taught in universities is a formal, not an informal, activity, but in practice very few projects started within a university are spun out from there. In fact, most new enterprises originate not from *inside* a university, but from *outside* and its vicinity. Academic innovators cherry pick from neighboring universities the cross-disciplinary teams required. Most universities lack such teams, organized as they are into narrow, inward looking disciplinary silos, often with increasingly tall and thick sides, despite the rhetoric of the opposite (Rowley, 2014). It is the informal mixing and matching of different disciplines that drives innovation. Universities have the knowledge, but rarely deploy it in ways that might solve problems, although the new Allston campus at Harvard plans to change this, as does Oxford’s Martin School.

In the meantime, the growth of science-based enterprises around universities is largely an informal, emergent development. Only 75 of the 1,400 enterprises around Cambridge University are formally sanctioned university spinouts, the rest “just happened” to people who saw the chance to make ideas come alive.

Cooperating with the Critics of Business

Another kind of spontaneous informality, stimulating new business, derives from criticism by environmental campaigners. Markets are not very effective at solving environmental problems because they tend not to see much further than the short-term costs of reducing energy, pollution, and waste. Required to compete rather than cooperate, firms are unable and unwilling to meet with competitors and share the costs of complying with targets. Indeed, those who renege on promises may steal a march on rivals, as in the “Prisoners’ Dilemma” game that rewards cheating (Cassidy, 2009).

Indeed, what criticism about the limits to growth can do is to uncover ways of innovation and growth that enhance the environment. For example, it has become possible to separate organic from physical waste when a product is returned to its maker and recycled separately (McDonough and Braungart, 2002). The organic waste can be fed to microorganisms, which return it to the environment, while the physical waste goes into new, recycled products. If the ownership of the product remains with the suppliers, they can sell the use of the product by lease or rental and then have these returned to them at the end of their lives. This system is dubbed “Cradle to Cradle” as opposed to “Cradle to Grave.” The product is reborn and such products could be cheaper for the customer in addition to being less wasteful.

Another example is that while harnessing energy from the wind, sun, and tides are costlier today, the price in the future will fall as these sources are inexhaustible and renewable. So, the means of harnessing such energy can only improve over time. Energy prices, once they dip, will reduce so that we are in a race to the “tipping point” (Gore, 2009). The critics of waste, of an automobile that expends 99% of its energy moving itself, are in reality the midwives of a new generation of planet-saving products. Although it is not easy, we must detect new ways of turning crisis into opportunity amid these noisy denunciations. Once again, the informal noisemakers are an incentive to innovate.

Bath Time for Archimedes

One of the oldest stories of scientific inventiveness tells of Archimedes, scientist to the King of Syracuse, confronted by his sovereign with the problem of discovering if the gift of a crown was silver or base metals. He knew the cubic weight of silver but could not melt the crown without spoiling its filigree ornaments. How could he estimate its volume? He pondered long and hard and growing weary by the end of the day decided to take a bath and go to bed. As he immersed his body in the water, the level in the tub rose and in a flash he saw the solution to his problem. He could immerse the crown and measure the volume of water displaced and then estimate what the crown should weigh were it pure silver. He jumped from the bath shouting “Eureka, I have found it.” This story, retold by Koestler (1964), prompts us to ask if creativity is not in some part an informal activity. Archimedes could not solve his problem by staring at it in his laboratory, only by relaxing informally and taking a bath. It was when he ceased to focus on his problem in a formal manner and took time out that the answer came to him.

Claxton (1999) cites research showing that we have a clever, quick, “hare-like” brain comprised of the neocortex and a slower, ruminative, “tortoise-like” brain stem below and behind this. The relaxed, more informal brain can solve problems while we relax, sleep, or bathe so that the answer suddenly surfaces. Einstein reported cutting himself while shaving when an idea suddenly popped up. John Cleese, the actor and comedy writer tells of numerous cases where inspiration came as he and his colleagues relaxed (Cleese, 2009). You must in some degree share the mood of your audience, which is one of informal enjoyment.

Playing Very Seriously

If seriousness has everything to do with formality, then surely play is informal, fun, and indulged in for sheer enjoyment. To play at something is not to confront its reality, but to simulate it. According to Schrage (2000), innovation is all about “Serious Play” or as we prefer to call it “Playing Seriously” because the play comes first. Play has a second meaning, one which is less childish and frivolous, which is play as if in a theatre or on stage. This may be one of the hallmarks of civilization since it enables us to examine matters of life and death without the reality of dying. Events that might traumatize us were they real can be examined without suffering, save vicariously. We can see appalling scenes and ask how and why these happened and consider how best to avoid them. Tragedy evokes protest against certain aspects of the human condition. This process examines some the deepest questions of human existence.

What playing does is permit us to rehearse for “the real thing.” What might we do if faced with this situation? It also enables us to prepare a new product or service and see if we would fail if we launched it without further alterations. It is much better to fail while simulating than during the final launch and having customers reject you. Not only should playing be fun, mistakes should also be as inexpensive as possible. Simulating reduces this cost. At the rehearsal stage, mistakes can be instructive and teach you much.

Playing and watching plays allows us to learn from mistakes others have made. Since only a few new businesses make it to success, learning why most failed can prevent repeating at least the more common errors. To experience these in our imaginations may be to avoid committing them. Reportedly, the Dyson vacuum cleaner went through 2,000 prototypes until James Dyson was satisfied. Also, Thomas Edison is credited with the remark about his light bulb: “I have not failed. I have discovered one thousand ways in which it will not work.” Failures are the informal preludes to success.

Errors that Precede Corrections

One way in which the logic of business differs from science where propositions are tested and face falsification, is that business cannot avoid making mistakes. Business is forced to take action before all the information is in and then corrects errors after-the-fact. Business cannot afford to await the certainty of what it proposes and must risk being wrong and then pick up the pieces afterwards. If you wait until you are completely sure, then a competitor may make the

first move and gain advantage. Even an imperfect product may mean you win over competitors and are seen as leading the industry.

The process of making errors will inevitably be seen as informal. You err privately in order to be correct before the public gaze. No one rejoices in being wrong yet being confounded may be a vivid and memorable way of learning. To be surprised, even shocked, by events is a mind-altering experience. “We only learn from negative feedback” (Hampden-Turner, 1981) is a statement not without insight. While being vindicated can be satisfying, it is our mistakes which alter our perspectives. There is a lot to be said by increasing the number of events described as “errors.” If your mistakes are one in a million, you may fall asleep before an error is encountered. If your mistakes are one in three, you are constantly struggling to reduce these and remain fully alert to the challenge.

It is a simple matter to increase the number of “errors.” You can raise your standards so high they are difficult to attain consistently. Also, you can innovate constantly, which means you are rarely right the first time. Indeed, the process of continuous improvement advocated by Deming (1982) and his followers requires continuously raised standards and unending experiments aimed at improvements. There is no end to quality improvement. Shrage (2000) quotes the verse.

“The road to wisdom, yes it’s plain
And easy to express
You err and err and err again
But less and less and less.”

This is the logic of successive informal approximations to an ideal. Yet, we must be careful not to assume that the ideal is always right and the deviation always wrong. Maruyama (1963) speaks on a deviance amplifying feedback. In this event, you introduce a random element to produce a scattershot of evolutionary differences, some of which may be selected by customers, a deliberate introduction of informality into the system.

Happy, Informal Accidents and Formally Prepared Minds

Yet another source of informality that shapes innovation is sheer chance. The Theory of Evolution has impressed upon us “chance” through the random mutation of genes and accidents. Except that it is not accident alone. Beautiful and powerful creatures are selected as mates. Darwin was more comfortable with selection by tooth and claw than selection by sexual appeal, but the latter is decisive. It makes as much sense to say we choose as that our fates are decided. In practice nature throws up myriad forms from which we are enabled to choose “the best,” so that fate and choice complement each other, thus we formalize the informal through selection.

However, there is a tendency to downplay the role of chance, especially in the West. Here we tend to think that free choice should take all the credit and that we denigrate this by

emphasizing fate. Yet, if chance enriches variety and variety stimulates choice, then both these values promote each other. Once we choose our most attractive companions, their genes are likely to be passed on to offspring so that chance becomes choice, nature and nurture intertwine. This is never truer than when we are innovating. If we examine accounts of how new ideas were hatched and products developed, the role of sheer luck looms large. You are in the right place at the right time, a book falls open on just the right passage, an investor helps you start your car on a cold night, you sit down on a test tube by accident and it sizzles, a reaction you have long sought.

However, these random and informal events are not the sole reasons for success. You must know what you are looking for. “Fortune favors the prepared mind” as Pasteur put it. You need to recognize luck when it arises and unless you are alert to its significance it will pass you by. We often see things without discovering them. In one sense we make our luck through our determination and the lucky break comes only to determined persons. Yet, there is no doubt that innovation is messy, and the mess derives from a host of fortuitous circumstances.

Reconstructed Logic Versus the Logic of Discovery

Kaplan’s (1964) classic work contrasts two logics, a very formal one and a quite informal one. The scientific method, or hypothesis and deduction, are not in his estimate how things are actually discovered. They are reconstructed *after* the fact in order to *verify* that what we believe we have discovered is actually true. Our discovery must meet the test of falsification and be capable of replication by others so they can see for themselves the claims made and achieve the same results.

Nevertheless, many write Ph.D. theses as if the scientific method were the only way to proceed and cold precise logic and procedure our only guide. Some books expose the truth, such as Watson (1968), which tells of the workplace culture, with all its backbiting and petty jealousies, which discovered the DNA molecule. This revelation was deemed so shocking that even 10 years later the President of Harvard prevailed on Harvard University Press not to publish it. Among the controversial issues the book exposed was that the double helix was a vision in the minds of the model makers some time *before* it was proved to account for all the observations. Insight, guesswork, faith, belief, and aesthetics had all played a part in the discovery. It was not a simple extrapolation from the facts. It was an intuitive leap, an inspired hunch.

Many useful products are never properly formalized in scientific terms and when or if they are formalized, this used as an excuse to take them away from 800 years of practice by folk practitioners as an infringement of patents. We may know that something works, like aspirin, but not know *why*. Too often we confuse verification with discovery and because holistic medicine is very hard to verify, since there are too many variables, it tends to be discounted despite centuries of use.

Diverging Informally and Converging Formally

The psychological researchers Getzels and Jackson (1962) compared the thought processes of students and discovered that “creative” students *diverged* in their thinking processes. Asked about “the uses of a brick,” those thinking in convergent styles would give formal answers like “building a house or wall” while those thinking divergently would respond “a tombstone for a mouse.” It was among divergent thinkers who *later converged on something new* that innovation was found. If we examine a problem-solving team, their members first brainstorm or free associate with multiple ideas and then reach a solution before the time runs out. This is a process of diverging informally and then converging formally.

Hudson (1966) traced this difference to the “two cultures” described by C.P. Snow. Students of liberal arts tended to diverge in their thinking and students of the sciences tended to converge. This was because there were known answers in the hard sciences, but not in the liberal arts. However, innovation requires both kinds of thinking, reformulating basic questions to derive new answers. Nevertheless, it is clear that informal divergence must *precede* formal convergence in the same way that discovery preceded verification in our previous point and accidents preceded seizing upon these in the 13th illustration. Informality comes first.

Formal Economies of Scale and Informal Economies of Scope

Economies of scale have had a large influence and produced huge payoffs through the formal design of the workplace as a giant machine. The more products that could be mass produced and mass marketed, the lower their costs and the more people could afford them. Ford said famously that customers could have any car color so long as it was black. By doubling wages, his workers could afford to buy the cars they made. China’s competitive national advantage is not unconnected to its mass market of 1.2 billion people. It is a low-cost producer, but this is not the only competitive advantage.

There is a second, more informal advantage, that of producing a unique premium product that no else can match (Porter, 1980). Here the supplier creates something so rare, personal, and customized that its equivalent exists nowhere else and the supplier has a virtual monopoly. This is accomplished through economies of scope. While Porter (1980) urged us not to confuse these two but to concentrate on one or the other, closer examination shows that they can be advantageously combined with one another. Standardization is, indeed, powerful, but so is customization and personalization.

The first point to grasp is that economies of scale do not necessarily obviate economies of scope. These operate at different levels of abstraction. At the *component* level it is possible to order standard components by the million and standard bricks for a house and build these into unique architectural designs. The fact that the pieces are uniform does not mean that the completed structure at the level of *configuration* cannot be original, unique, and customized.

Indeed, were the components not standardized, this customization would cost the customer considerably more.

The finished product may be the only kind in the world and so completely informal, while the bits and pieces from which it is made are all formal routine items that can be picked up from most distributors. An example of this process is Dell, which does not make computers but assembles them to order. It orders components in huge quantities to keep costs low and a complete IT system monitors its strategy, every part having been joined to this larger, purposive system, with websites that record and describe all transactions and inventory levels replenished just-in-time. Economies of scale and scope have been fused in an informal synthesis of formalities. Production of a Toyota Lexus follows a similar procedure. The basic chassis and wheelbase are mass produced and standardized for all its vehicles, but the Lexus is customized after being ordered from a showroom. The precise combination of optional features is assembled to order within days and then delivered, a near unique synthesis of standard components.

Shock of Recognition - Freshly Configured Formalities

Koestler (1964) famously observed that innovative and creative activities give to us a *shock of recognition*. This is a paradox, but an important one. At one level we get a shock because this has never been seen before, and at another level we recognize its value and, therefore, wish to acquire it. Without the shock, our interest would not be aroused and without the recognition, our wallets would not be opened. Were it something wholly new, the chances are we would not recognize it at all as being of value and were it wholly familiar we might not notice it at all.

We provide another example of this. Suppose a few years from now an electric car came on the market with the range, speed, and performance of a piston-engine car, but at significantly lower cost to the environment. The recognition would come from these equivalent performance characteristics; the shock would come from the fact that an electric car can now deliver this with significantly lower pollution levels. If we did not know what an electric car was or could do, this lack of recognition would kill it. Part of the recognition comes from knowing yourself. If saving the planet is important to you, then this is part of the recognition. Innovation is in part strange and in part familiar.

Informalities of the Creative Class

There is a growing body of evidence that North America and some other parts of the world are developing informal cultures that support a creative class of innovators and high tech industry generally (see Florida, 2004). About one dozen urban centers provide around 70% of North America's innovation. Without Seattle, Silicon Valley, the Bay Area, Cambridge-Boston, Austin-Texas, Boulder, Colorado, New York City, and parts of Los Angeles, there would be very little innovation.

What characterizes these parts of North America are highly informal, liberal-minded, egalitarian and cosmopolitan, diverse and highly educated, urban environments. Toleration and

equality are high among these cultures. Without these values, people will not want to inhabit such areas and there will be no high-skilled creative workforce from which companies could recruit. The companies appear to be following the people, who mostly eschew formalities, save those of education and professional skills. There is a tendency to tolerate new ideas and lifestyles in general and on principle as a prelude for evaluating them.

What is increasingly clear is that values originate within key clusters in the vicinity of certain urban centers and that creatively oriented companies are obliged to locate in such communities to attract the right people. These in turn know their value and demand informal kinds of management, which encourages high freedom of expression. Loyalty is less to companies than to sets of ideas informally shared. It is “coffee bar creativity,” wherein people meet in coffee bars, share experiences, and decide to go into business together on the spur of the moment because their visions are similar.

Startups of the kind around Cambridge in the U.K., Boston-Cambridge, and Palo Alto in the U.S. are of course informal by definition. Employees may have no salaries and simply share the fate of a new technology they are each taking a part in. People in such companies are typically on a first-name basis and cohere informally through personal knowledge. It is no coincidence that these are much more innovative than larger companies.

It is widely canvassed that Silicon Valley grew out of the Berkeley student revolt of 1964. Certainly, Steve Jobs made no secret of his hostility to IBM and its mainframe computer. The Apple 1 was a tool of personal liberation that gave power to the person, as was “management by wandering about” in Hewlett Packard, a process of canvassing the best ideas among creative employees. Once again we see that informality is a major seedbed of innovation.

Closed, Internal, Formal, R&D Versus Open, External, Informal Relations with the Wider Ecosystem

The conventional view of innovation is via R&D. This made a lot of sense when IBM employed the majority of computer scientists in the U.S. and could afford to pay them better than anyone else. It makes less sense when 95% of the experts are outside. Formal R&D grows out of formal education and tries to extend this. To call this “closed innovation” is perhaps unfair since all innovation is open at the moment of conception. However, closure comes soon after the innovation because the company wishes to keep its new developments secret from competitors. Even suppliers may not be told what will be done with what they supply, lest information leak out. The result is that they can do little to help customers who have kept them in the dark about daring plans.

There are several problems with innovation driven largely by R&D. One is the “Not Invented Here” syndrome, a tendency to overvalue what is done internally and undervalue what is done externally. This is particularly serious where the output of small creative companies is ignored. These are usually more generative of innovation than larger companies, as we noted

earlier. A second problem is that R&D comes to be regarded as the sole repository of “genius” in the company, with everyone else in a supportive role. R&D may even forbid entry by other members of the company. The third problem is that innovation is seen as something pushed inside out, not outside in. A fourth problem is the relative neglect of *process* innovation, making the same product but in better, cheaper ways. R&D typically concentrates on product innovation alone.

In contrast to closed innovation is open innovation (see Chesbrough, 2003). This is far more informal and may include numerous suppliers who are told what the company plans do in enough detail to know what they might contribute to this, including their own R&D expenditures. For example, a manufacturer of solar roof panels needs to know the prospects for greatly improved photovoltaic cells or a new form of heat-absorbing raw material better able to convert sunlight. Contributions from suppliers are especially important where these are in electronics since many innovations in many different industries derive from new electronic devices. New robotics or LEDs may also revolutionize the appeal of a product. To keep suppliers in ignorance is to miss many opportunities for product improvement, even radical transformation, and innovation.

If we define innovation as a novel combination among components, then a supply chain provides hundreds of these and their numbers greatly increases the chances of new combinations being found. The place to innovate is where all these ingredients meet. Suppliers cannot know of their potential to assist unless they are informed of their customer’s vision, however risky this might be.

Open innovation is much more than opening up to members of the supply chain. Proven innovators may be allowed to examine patents, as Philips did with thousands of its unexploited ideas. Small, innovative companies may be acquired and supplied with patents. The company may agree to co-invest or act as a customer of the products developed or simply charge a royalty. It is better that something be done with these ideas than nothing. In addition, co-creation with customers may be proposed. Plotting the future with customers tends to bind them to the organization. Even joint ventures with competitors may be tried. In all such cases the most valuable resource is the wider ecosystem, not the R&D department, although the latter may be rejuvenated by a development outside that is brought back in-house.

An increasing number of companies have directors of internal and external innovation who meet regularly to cross-fertilize ideas. The point is that new opportunities may arise from anywhere in the ecosystem and many consultants have arisen. These arrange informal meetings, interactions and build new bridges between ever wider memberships.

Advent of Crowdfunding for New Ideas

A relatively new and informal way of investing in companies is by crowdfunding. Internet based platforms like Kickstarter inform their followers of a new idea and the crowd either subscribes

startup funds or declines the offer. The medium of this exchange is creative ideas. The proposer can seek support for an environment-saving device, for employing environmentalists, for paying suppliers within a week, for training and developing its own employees, for co-creating with its customers, and generally conferring upon the community multiple benefits. Since investors were initially attracted by these promises, they can be expected to keep the company up to the mark.

Such movements emerge from informal discussions of what is right and wrong and what more a company might do for its society. It is completely open-ended and stands to discover that where stakeholders are well-treated, a company will prosper. The wealth creating unit has expanded. Originally individual proprietors created most wealth. Then came the age of the corporation where cooperating people were found to better generate wealth. Today is the age of the industrial ecosystem wherein all stakeholders are needed to generate profits while sustaining the environment. Informal relationships among these “crowds” are what is urgently needed. Their motives are informal, prosocial, and passionate. You do well by doing good. The B-lab or Benefit Corporation is an example as is the “Conscious Capitalism” movement wherein companies pledge themselves to serve in exchange for investor and customer support (Mackey and Sisodia, 2013).

Discussion and Conclusion

Virtually anything that is innovative, which is corrective, which aims to qualify the *status quo* of a culture or an organization in its early manifestations, also represents the informal. These informal currents constitute a powerful aspect of socioeconomic development even where conditions display a lack of direction or leadership or seem to offer no clear solution. We now look for sustainable development, but we can find the opposite. The anger often displayed by developing nations and the world’s poor, should be enough to tell us something is wrong. Sooner or later this informal, free-flowing lawlessness of regions under development, or in decline, will be formalized and the skill with which this is done will prove decisive in remedying or perpetuating our malaise.

We have noted that the emergent norms of factory workers were remedial and constructive in their impact, that trade unions created systems, that the networked survival systems of immigrant and sectarian communities may create new wealth on an unexpected and prodigious scale, and that the ethic of the extended family can boost rather than detract from wealth creation. We saw that bank lending relationships require an active concern and caring for the borrower and for repaying the lender or these fail, and credit is exhausted. All this draws upon on informal relationships of affection within communities. Predatory lending from exclusively selfish sources is corrosive of trust. Many opportunities to render aid both effective and profitable are possible. There are potential fortunes to be made even at the base of these pyramids and remedies there can elevate millions in dire want. Examples of what is possible

are exemplified by the success of T.V.E.s in China as well as the millions rescued from poverty by manufacturing expansion. We also considered the role of academic entrepreneurs whose knowledge-intensive innovation could yet rescue advanced and affluent economies from the cost-cutting strategies of developing nations and their low labor costs. The challenge now is to *listen* to those critics of business and devise ways of rescuing the planet. The first companies to achieve this will prosper. It is a race to the tipping point of declining energy costs. The key is to innovate.

Innovation has always had major informal components. Archimedes had to relax informally before he could solve his problem. Innovators play informally and in rehearsals for so long as this is the preparation before they finally succeed and so many errors must they correct along the way. Accidents, which are manifestly informal, are seized upon by prepared minds and discovery is a messy process. It is verification that is formulaic. Those who would create must diverge beyond the formal boundaries of their region, discipline, or profession, yet they will later converge on a new solution, which is formalized in its turn.

Of the two socioeconomic paths to wealth creation only economies of scale, with characteristic falling costs, is formal. The economies of scope, rather than scale, of the enterprise seek after the uniqueness of the customized product and cost savings (Panzar and Willig, 1981). They possess characteristics associated with the informal. So-called novelty is rarely new in its entirety since innovation needs to be recognized and must be partly familiar. Like a grammatical English sentence, old words may take on new meanings in a “shock of recognition.”

There is increasing evidence that more innovative aspects of the North American culture draw on a set of norms high in informality and liberality in which great diversities of values are still tolerated and sampled. This seems to be an essential prerequisite for an innovative mindset. Innovation today is advanced less by formal R&D and more by exploiting the hundreds of cross-connections within the industrial ecosystem in a series of fortuitous encounters. We appear to be entering an age of informality.

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From Globalization to Glocalization: Configuring Korean Pop Culture to Meet Glocal Demands

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Abstract

Despite the influx of Hollywood films and Japanese pop culture throughout the 1990s as well as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, K-pop and K-dramas have now successfully attained fame domestically and have even spread commercially to Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North America. This process of localizing Hallyu and then subsequently globalizing it is what we call glocalization. Simply put, glocalization refers to a successful localization of a foreign global product so much that the original developers of that product want to import the local variations instead of their original version. Glocalization is therefore a highly proactive countermeasure to globalization. Hallyu's success with glocalization demonstrates that the domestic Korean demand for high quality pop culture has brought about new types of competition that call for importing global pop content and simultaneously aiming to produce better quality versions than the originals.

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Introduction

In 2013, we founded the World Association for Hallyu Studies (WAHS; www.iwahs.org) to connect the growing global community interested in Hallyu. This creation of WAHS has resulted in the development of Hallyu Studies, which we have envisioned as an independent discipline apart from Asian Studies or Korean Studies. The rationale for such an assemblage was not immediately apparent to many scholars in Asian Studies who had all too easily bought into a general, though not necessarily well-informed, view that Hallyu would disappear in less than three to five years. To them, Hallyu's sudden popularity was only accidental and therefore, the cultural history of East Asia would quickly rescind back to its normal state of the Chinese, Japanese and Western pop culture domination. Indeed, up until this point, Korean pop culture had never been popular in the form of massive followings and fandom by non-Koreans in the past, which seemed to reinforce their prediction of a quick Hallyu doom.

WAHS is now planning its 8th World Congress at the University of Oxford in September 2021, which suggests that Hallyu has not only become a global phenomenon but has survived as one as well. The very fact of its global nature attests to the justification that Hallyu Studies should be independent from Korean or East Asian Studies. So far, the specialists of the traditional and regional purviews of Korean Studies and East Asian Studies, , have not been able to fully address why Hallyu is global to begin with and why it is predominantly an entertainment form for female audiences (see *inter alia*, Oh 2009, 2011, 2013; Kim 2011; Lie 2014; Otmazgin and Lyan 2014; Lyan 2019; Oh and Kim 2019).

In our fourth congress held at Oxford University in September 2016, several noteworthy papers were presented addressing the theme of “What is the ‘K’ in K-pop?” The basis of this theme was a paper with the same name by our brilliant colleague at WAHS, John Lie from the University of California at Berkeley. Lie published his seminal work on K-pop in a special issue that we edited for *Korea Observer* back in 2012. There, Lie argued that the “K” in K-pop, in fact, denotes anything but “Korea” as its success is derived from its non-Korean or non-Asian (especially Japanese or Chinese) musical elements, specifically its incorporation of European and American dance music styles with fast beats and gyrating dance moves not easily found in the Asian music scenes (Lie 2012, 2014). This paper of his, which was later published into a book, ignited much debate among the congressional participants at Oxford at the time. The whole scholarly interest in Hallyu then was whether Hallyu was Korean in its nature or a form of hybrid culture, epitomized by such concepts as “no nationality” or *mukokuseki* (Iwabuchi 2004). These scholars, however, did not pay attention to a third possibility of Hallyu – its glocal nature.

In this chapter, we turn our attention to the concept of glocal pop culture in the 21st century world. Using K-pop as an example, we define what glocal pop culture is and how it is manufactured in Korea, paying close attention to what content is sold glocally and what kind of people love to buy K-pop. In doing so, we provide reasons why K-pop is not merely a hybridized cultural form and why it is distinct from other forms of hybridized pop music or mere copies of Western pop. Unlike previous studies, we therefore focus on why Hallyu and K-pop are predominantly feminine in their fandom structure and why they are global.

Theoretical Backdrop

Lie’s paper and book on K-pop upended the conventional understanding of East Asian pop culture that was previously shaped by specialists of Japanese or Chinese pop culture (including pop music, films, manga/anime, TV dramas and others). The reason for this was his bold argument that the key to any commercial success on a global scale for the Asian cultural industries, like K-pop, was to steer clear of China or Japan and instead copy U.S. and European culture directly (i.e., not through the two Asian super giants).

Prior to this point, the dominant explanation of the global K-pop phenomenon was largely the cultural hybridity perspective. This perspective advances a liberal argument about Chinese, Japanese and Indian cultures as a grand Asian Culture (AC) that may countervail the dominant Western Culture (WC) as a whole (Chua, 2004, 2012; Iwabuchi, 2004, 2013). The word “countervail” here means the sustained success and continuity of local cultures despite the encroachment of Anglo-American cultural hegemony that has accompanied globalization. This is partly because AC has incorporated WC to the point that it can nurture itself and not be overtaken by WC through a process of total assimilation. As Huntington (1993) has acknowledged, Japan is a model country that had mastered the art of mixing AC and WC together, which has resulted in it becoming an extremely successful modern nation without fully assimilating to WC. Authors of this dominant view including Iwabuchi (2004) conclude that the rise of K-pop therefore was to be expected, given that it has successfully incorporated both AC and WC in a fashion that can please not only Asians and but Westerners as well. K-pop has successfully ridden the wave of AC expansion vis-à-vis WC. In this sense, K-pop is not a new cultural force in the global cultural domain as long as it originates from Japan and/or China (i.e., hybrid), both of which have already hybridized their pop culture with WC since the 19th century (Iwabuchi 2004, 2013; Park 2006; Hirata 2008; Ryoo 2009; Shim 2011).

Lie’s contributions to the expanding literature of Hallyu served as a *coup de main* to the notion of cultural hybridity that was prevalent in the mainstream Hallyu discourse. His argument ran counter to that of Iwabuchi’s because he contended that shying away from both China and Japan was a critical factor of Korean pop culture’s success. Lie (2012, 2014) uses examples of both K-drama (e.g., *Winter Sonata*) and K-pop to demonstrate that the drama has nothing that is ordinarily Korean or Chinese in its entire episodes, whereas K-pop uses much faster beats than J-pop.

In this chapter, we provide reasons for departing, to some degree, from both contentions. The hybridity thesis has holes from several points of consideration. First of all, hybridity is an obscured concept based on a kind of circular logic. Why is Japanese culture globally popular? Because it is hybrid. How do we know it is hybrid? Because it is globally popular. Hallyu’s popularity can be linked to its hybridity in a similarly fallacious manner. Meanwhile, it is awfully difficult to know how much ratio of native to foreign a successful hybridization involves. Is it 50/50, 70/30 or something different? It is also virtually impossible for Korea to emulate Japan, perhaps the most well-known case of hybridity in the world. Despite modernization and development, Japan has long been recognized for its global success in maintaining both Japanese and Western cultures simultaneously. With this in mind, there is not enough consideration of what exactly the secret of the Japanese formula of hybridity is, what should be abandoned in the process of importing outside culture, and what should be preserved. It is only natural therefore for any average Japanese or Korean to be appalled at how culturally the two countries are different despite the supposed similarities or hybridity.

At the same time, the hybridity explanation does not provide an explanation for failures. Why did Hallyu succeed while Taiwanese pop culture failed, for instance, despite similar degrees of hybridity of Japanese, Chinese, and Western cultures? What did Taiwan do wrong in its hybridization approach? No one among the strong believers of the hybridity tenet seems to have an answer to this question. Finally, this conventional explanation fails to account for the similarity between Japanese pop and Hallyu despite the different degrees of their global success. What is a common hybridity between these two cultures that made them consistently successful? Is this commonality, if it even exists, absent in Taiwanese or Chinese pop culture? In short, the hybridity thesis raises more questions than it answers when considering matters related to globalization and glocalization.

Despite moving beyond the hybridity thesis and providing an enlightening explanation of K-pop's global success, Lie's analysis lacks insight into the anatomy of the production process of the K-pop industry as a whole. Without knowing how to construct a black box of K-pop production, has simply copying Anglo-American culture wholeheartedly led K-pop producers to the global success they have attained? Instead of mixing cultures, there is a new requirement to master the mimicry of the Anglo-American cultural symbols, their syntax, and their semantics. How can that be done without developing a local system of production that can learn WC and reproduce it in a flawless fashion? To provide an example, Japanese car industries have dominated the global car market due to several externally crucial and timely factors, including their precision of mimicking Western cars. However, endogenous factors are just as important as exogenous ones. If global factors are significant for an export industry like car manufacturing, there is also a need to understand why automakers such as Toyota created the Just-in-Time System (JIS) or *Kanban*, the two most famous cost saving and quality improving organizational means developed by Toyota (for JIS and *Kanban*, see Monden 2011). As Lie (2012) himself has succinctly put it, if SM Entertainment is "the single most important" factor behind the global success of K-pop, a meaningful analysis calls for an understanding of the inside organizational dynamics of an industry dominated by firms like SM or Toyota, but not by Cube Entertainment or Isuzu Motors.

Furthermore, a firm-level analysis of the successful Japanese and Korean entertainment companies that have exported cultural content cannot be found in either explanation of cultural hybridity or Anglo-American cultural hegemony. In a previous study, Oh and Park (2012) focused on export management, characterized by SM's business focus shifting from B2C (business to customers) to B2B (business to business, namely SM Entertainment to YouTube). SM Entertainment's core business competence therefore was bifurcated into creativity and export management components. This transformation of SM's international strategy from B2C to B2B necessitated competent international managers like Youngmin Kim, SM's CEO, who was pivotal in successfully introducing BoA and TVXQ to Japan. Kim had considerable experience with Japan, having spent his primary, middle, and high school years there before coming to Korea University for undergraduate studies. While SM founder and chairman Soo

Man Lee solely managed the creativity management side, Kim had full freedom and power to direct the entire firm's export operations. The connection between YouTube and SM, something that Japanese and Chinese entertainment managers have not sought to utilize, was first mapped out by Kim, who accidentally discovered the YouTube icon, pre-installed on a Japanese iPhone that was first released in 2008.

The inside story from SM's perspective therefore adds richness and flesh to the theoretical skeleton presented by Lie (2012). Furthermore, the SM story provides insight into how firms are proactively managing and implementing their policies of cultural mixing in a way that has led to idiosyncratic outcomes of hybridity. In other words, no universal or common formula of cultural hybridity has been conducive to global success. For one thing, the idea of shying away from Japan or China as a part of the cultural hybridity process has been a valuable discovery by Lie (2012) in the study of cultural globalization. Nevertheless, it is also meaningful to divulge the actual process of hybridization between local (either Japanese or Korean in this case) and Western cultures within the cultural industries. Therefore, those who are interested in finding a common factor of success for cultural exports in the global markets need to look elsewhere away from the topics of hybridity or Anglo-American cultural mimicry. The actual proactive process of hybridization and mimicry varies from firm to firm and from country to country. Throughout this chapter, we will elaborate on this in a thesis of our own.

As we noted above, Hallyu's two main features are (a) its global spectrum and (b) its feminine fandom. If (a) is an outcome of (b), we believe that Hallyu's idiosyncratic method of either cultural hybridity or mimicking the Anglo-American culture derives from its (c) female universalism, which is realized by female Hallyu fans through proactive Hallyu consumption (e.g., listening to K-pop, watching K-dramas, taking part in Hallyu pilgrimages in Korea, learning the Korean language and experiencing Korean culture as a way of routine life in general). Therefore, an evolutionary process of (c) female universalism → (b) female fandom → (a) global spectrum can be conceptualized. This evolutionary process has made Hallyu distinct from Japanese or Chinese pop, not to mention its Anglo-American counterparts (although one can find elements of all of them embedded within Hallyu). Nonetheless, Hallyu will share the same consequences of its global success with other pop culture products that are based on female universalism. Neither Iwabuchi's argument regarding hybridity nor Lie's emphasis on Anglo-American cultural hegemony explains how a feminine fandom has been established for Hallyu, as both authors opted for a cultural-mixing explanation. Our understanding of female universalism, briefly outlined in this paragraph, will be the focus of the second part of this chapter.

Not Globalization but Glocalization

Most scholars working in the field of globalization have widespread misunderstandings regarding globalization, localization, and glocalization. Most scholars seem to agree with the

textbook definition of globalization as the process of integration on a global scale, yet they have enormous difficulties coming up with agreed concepts of localization and glocalization (Jang and Lee 2015; Roudometof 2016). In studies of pop culture, we might as well define globalization as the worldwide domination of one hegemonic culture such as the Anglo-American one (e.g., English, music, dramas, films, food and beverages, fashion, etc.). A component of this Anglo-American globalization can be thought of as a kind of Western male “scientific” universalism, as clearly depicted in such globally popular cultural products as *Sherlock Holmes*, *Superman*, and *Dr Who* (O'Neill 1994; Siegel 2002; Georgiou, M. 2005).

Localization, on the other, refers to the modification of global cultural content in accordance with the demands of local consumers (for localization, see Roudometof 2019). For example, *Sherlock Holmes* became *Aibō* in Japan, whereas *Superman* turned into *My Lover from a Star* in South Korea. However, there is a big difference between Japanese and South Korean localization. For instance, whereas *Aibō* is more popular than *Sherlock Holmes* among the general Japanese public, the former is not popular among Westerners or other Asians, except for a very small number of Japanese drama buffs in Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Whereas *My Lover from a Star* is not as popular as *Superman* among the general Korean public, it is very popular among female fans of Hallyu all over the world (roughly, 100 million as of 2019, according to the annual survey of global Hallyu fans conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea). Japanese localization is so perfect and authentic that no foreign competitor can easily please the Japanese general taste, whereas Korean localization is meant to be re-exported to other parts of the world. Thus, a Koreanized image of a superman, regardless of whether it is “better” than the original superman, has attained global fandom. This is what we call “glocalization”—viz., high quality localization that is meant to be re-exported to other countries to overcome the small size of the domestic market (for glocalization, see Roudometof 2016). All other low-quality localizations would simply remain in their home countries, not being able to be exported to other markets even if some of them would outperform K-pop or K-dramas at home. What matters the most in glocalization therefore is the quality of the cultural product for targeted fans, such as the female fans of K-pop and K-dramas. For these female Hallyu fans, K-pop and K-dramas are “better” than any other competing cultural genres from Korea, even if the latter has outperformed the former at home among general audiences. This can also be considered a reason why the Korean *teuroteu* or Trot genre (an older Korean popular music form similar to Japanese *enka* and based on the two-beat foxtrot rhythm) would never be exported to K-pop fans in particular or general Western markets. To global K-pop fans, K-pop is better than J-pop, Chinese pop, Anglo-American pop, or European music. In fact, the Korean localization of Anglo-American pop music is so perfect that no other competitor can please the female K-pop fans.

We are not arguing that Japan cannot glocalize their cultural products. Japanese products of localization, for example, can also be re-exported back to the originating country, as Japanese cars and cameras have already dominated the U.S. and other global markets for many decades.

Japanese animation, too, which originated from Disney for mass consumption, is currently competing neck and neck with Disney in the global market. What we are arguing, however, is that Japan at the moment is satisfied with the mammoth size of its domestic market, especially when it is difficult to export or license, for example, a Japanese TV drama series to other countries (Lie 2014). Japanese pop culture certainly has its own niche market in the world, but it would not be considered “better” than Korean competitor goods to the members of the massive K-pop and K-drama fanbase.

Be that as it may, what remains striking is the story of Hallyu: how could its localization be so successful that it has readily been re-exported to many different countries in the world. In 2017, a total of US\$362 million worth of TV dramas and formats have been exported all over the world including Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America, and South America. In the same year, the export revenue for K-pop rose to US\$513 million (KOCCA 2018). Along with the domestic revenues, the total size of the Korean pop culture market puts it in the top five list of competitors in the world. This is a miraculous phenomenon to have taken place in the less than twenty-five years since the liberalization of the South Korean popular culture industries.

Like the precedent case of Japan, the prodigious success of Korean localization involves an array of tacit knowledge that Koreans possess innately and can master more easily than foreigners who find it initially unnatural or awkward. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), the working definition of tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another person by writing it down or verbalizing it. Therefore, tacit knowledge is the opposite of explicit knowledge that is easily codified and transferred to other people by means of writing or verbalization. Making good sushi dishes is one example of tacit knowledge while producing good animation movies is another. When it comes to tacit knowledge for sushi, few non-Japanese sushi chefs can produce the sushi that the most discriminating Japanese taste experts are pleased with and want to pay big money for. This is not because of a lack of explicit knowledge about making sushi, but rather an absence of sufficient tacit knowledge that would perfect the authenticity of sushi’s taste, which only the most local and highly trained Japanese taste buds can detect. In a similar vein, few non-Korean actors can masterfully reproduce the subtle emotional expressions freely and fitfully shown on Korean women’s faces in Korean dramas. Nor can non-Korean singers easily emulate the highly synchronized K-pop gyrating dance moves in a collective dance format without long periods of dedicated training.

Therefore, tacit knowledge is hardly able to be explained clearly to outsiders in the localization (or hybridization) process that local manufacturers have proactively initiated. This is the same reason hybridity alone as a loose concept cannot explain the success of Japanese anime or K-pop (i.e., glocalization, a form of localization with deep tacit knowledge for innovative improvements from the original import). To understand the glocalization of Hallyu, we therefore need to know what the Korean tacit knowledge (i.e. proactive reaction to globalization) is in addition to the practice of hybridity (i.e. passive reaction to it). Although all

of these K-drama and K-pop genres were not Korean in terms of their origin, they have been exported back to Europe, North America, South America, and Japan by means of tacit knowledge and glocalization.

Table 1 Examples of Korean Glocalization

	Global Brands	Local Brands	Glocal Brands
Car	Ford	Hyundai	Hyundai (N America, S America, China, Vietnam, Middle East)
Instant Noodles	Nissin	Nongshim	Nongshim (N America, S America, China, Japan)
TVs	SONY	Samsung	Samsung (N America, EU, China, SE Asia)
Coffee	Starbucks	Twosome Place	Twosome Place (China, N America, SE Asia)
Cosmetics	L'Oreal	Amore Pacific	Amore Pacific (China, Japan, N America, SE Asia, S America)
Rice Cooker	Jojirushi	Cuckoo	Cuckoo (China)

Source: Various Korean newspapers

As Table 1 shows, the examples of glocalization are not limited to the cultural industry. Following the era of development booms, Korea, like Japan its neighbor to the Southeast, has successfully built up glocal industries that have exported locally hybridized goods to global centers, including North America and the EU. We can list several examples of successful glocalization in Korea, such as Hyundai Motor, a leading Korean car manufacturer that has exported glocally branded automobiles to North America, South America, the Mideast, China, and the ASEAN countries. Nongshim and Samsung are the first two Korean companies that have outperformed Japanese instant noodles (Nissin) and TV (SONY) manufacturers respectively in the global markets. Having explained globalization, localization and glocalization using Hallyu and Japanese pop culture as examples, we will now explain the case of K-pop and its “tacit” glocalization process.

The Glocalization of K-pop: A Tacit Knowledge Model

Globalization in the music industry has progressed rapidly since the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc. The wholesale change within the music industry amid globalization implies several things. Firstly, it can refer to a situation where music from the centre can dominate the peripheral music markets (i.e., music imperialism) (Black 1994; During 1997; Fine 1997; McChesny 2001). Secondly, it can mean cosmopolitanism, where a diverse mix of center, peripheral, and semi-peripheral music is sold in the market to sizable groups of fans and “buffs” in each subculture market (Cho-Han et al. 2003; Iwabuchi 2004, 2013). This cosmopolitanism is close to an ideal type of a multicultural music market. Third, globalization can allude to a new global division of labour in music production and dissemination. In the past, for example, Japan exported vinyl American popular music LPs back to the U.S. due to their high quality and cheap prices (i.e., production outsourcing). In another case, European singers and artists went to New York and Hollywood to record and release their albums due to the sheer size of the pop music market in the U.S. (i.e., production and marketing outsourcing). In the new global division of music production, the music products sold in each subculture market are produced by a new system of global division of labour that involves European, Asian, and American music talents, venture capital firms and distributors (Oh and Park 2012). K-pop belongs to the third type of global division of labor. Under this new division of labor, both cosmopolitan and transnational characteristics of the entire industrial ecology loom large for quality and cost requirements (Dunning 1992).

Global consumers, now more than ever, demand cheaper and higher quality goods and services that are easily procurable from the virtual or real global market. It is here where glocalization is an important strategic choice for many multinational corporations, including pop culture manufacturers and distributors. K-pop, by definition, entails the export of music “made in Korea” to global consumers because the domestic music market is drastically hampered by its limited size and rampant, albeit diminishing, piracy. However, before the current K-pop export boom, the Western network of music producers and distributors had neither spotted nor recruited Korean musical talents into their production and distribution systems. Korean popular music was simply not Western at all, as the traditionally popular trot or kayo songs with pentatonic scales had dominated East Asian popular music (Lie 2012, 2014). The export of Korean music on a global scale has only taken place in the 21st century, mainly because of: (1) Korea’s economic ascendance to the semi-periphery of the world system; (2) the massive immigration of Koreans into countries of the centre (Japan, the U.S., Western Europe, etc.); (3) the active participation of the Korean and overseas Korean population in the global cultural industries; and most importantly, (4) the proactive participation of South Korean entertainment firms in the global division of labor system of the music manufacturing and distribution systems.

The glocalization process of K-pop, following its entry into the new global division of labor system, is not as complicated as it may sound. First of all, Korean firms in the semi-

periphery of the world system have to import or outsource raw materials from the periphery while also licensing or learning advanced technologies. At the same time, they borrow financial resources from the center. Like the famous Korean electronics company, Samsung, and automobile manufacturer, Hyundai, which borrowed money and technology from both Japan and the U.S., K-pop companies have outsourced original music scores to Western (notably Swedish, American, and British) music composers. This is the first stage of the globalization of Korean pop music, which had long been dependent on domestic or Japanese musical creativity.

Mere participation in the global division of music production and distribution, however, does not necessarily guarantee the global success of K-pop. For one thing, this participation itself is extremely difficult to engage in, given the domination of European, North American, Central and South American and Japanese music producers and distributors. Equally challenging is the need to sustain popularity in the global music market. K-pop producers and exporters need tacit knowledge about how to glocalize the music they bought from Europe and North America. This is the tacit knowledge that Koreans would naturally acquire in the process of improving the quality of foreign imports before re-exporting them back to Japan, Europe, and North America. We call this localization (see Table 2). This is why the entire process of Global (G) → Local (L) → Glocal (GL) is untenable if the “L” component of the global division of labor is not creative or unique (i.e., product differentiation) enough to attract producers and distributors, not to mention the targeted global fan groups. To repeat, hybridity (i.e., borrowing and mixing) alone is not enough.

K-pop’s differentiation strategy to make the “L” process attractive to global audiences is threefold: (1) numbers; (2) physique; and (3) voice-dance coordination. At a first glance, K-pop’s product differentiation lies in the number of singers on stage at one time. Unlike Chinese popular singers, J-Pop bands, or Michael Jackson, K-pop’s success initially came from the large number of performers singing and dancing simultaneously on stage. TVXQ, Girls’ Generation, Big Bang, Super Junior, 2PM, SHINee, BTS and others feature a special Korean staging formation unmatched by any entertainment experience in the postwar years. Peculiar only to K-pop, singer-dancers on the stage continue to change dancing formations with strict and perfect synchronization (i.e., a similar case found in North Korean mass games with card stunts). From the beginning to the end of a song, singer-dancers take turns occupying the spotlight center stage, as if there were no lead vocalist for the group (Jang and Kim 2013). Everyone in the group highlights supposedly the same vocal and dancing talent in a synchronized gyrated movement sequence.

The number factor alone, however, is not enough to command attention from international audiences. Japan’s top girl bands, AKB48, SKE48, and HKT48, feature up to 48 singers and dancers at the same time, making them constantly the most popular on the Japanese Oricon music chart. However, they have not had any global success akin to that of K-pop girl bands, such as Girls’ Generation or Twice, which feature only nine members. K-pop’s “physique” factor therefore must also be taken into consideration in its differentiation strategy

because any competitor like AKB48 can match the number factor. To take a representative case, Girls' Generation and Wonder Girls members are at least 5 inches taller than AKB48 or HKT48 members, let alone the fact that they show off much sexier and sophisticated looks and bodies than their Japanese counterparts. The five members of Japan's top male idol group, Arashi, also pale in comparison with their Korean counterparts in terms of their physique features. Singers from the K-pop boy bands TVXQ, originally featuring five members, and SHNee, also featuring five members, are at least 10 inches taller than the Arashi members. As a result, to loyal fans, K-pop music videos and concerts are much more visually appealing than those of other Asian (especially Japanese or Chinese) counterparts.

Table 2. K-pop's Glocalization Process (White Cells)

	Global	Local	Transnational
Input Process	European, American, Japanese composers Selling music globally	Competing local composers	Songbay Online original music stores
Manufacturing Process	SONY Universal Warner Related A&Rs	Education & Training Producing in Korea Big 4 K-pop Firms	Global Music Records Online music producers
Distribution Process	MTV SONY, Universal, Warner Global Labels	Korean radio TV networks, Mnet, Korean labels	YouTube iTune Spotify Online streaming sites

Glocal

Finally, even though other non-Korean competing bands may want to rely on the physique factor for their immediate rise to stardom, they often fall short of fans' expectations in terms of their dance-singing coordination in large groups. This voice-dance coordination is the third feature predominant among globally popular K-pop idols. The "L" process within the K-pop industry involves a high level of specific in-house investments provided by entertainment companies themselves that act like venture capital firms. The learning process of mastering how to sing and dance in a synchronous fashion is crucial in the Korean "L" process of the entire global division of labor. Particularly, the length of the learning period is noticeably long often ranging from five to ten years. The three major K-pop managing firms select potential idols through internal auditions and/or their K-pop cram schools. Trainees go through vocal, dancing,

language, and theatrical acting lessons for at least five hours a day in the evening after school and on weekends. They must undergo regular physical fitness training as well as receive skin and other beauty therapies.

The entire program resembles that of a total institution, as trainees are sometimes banned from using cell phones during training (Ho 2012; Lie 2014; Lie and Oh 2014). This is why some critics call the learning process very abusive to the trainees although K-pop managers defend their training programs by arguing that K-pop cram schools are no different from college prep schools, exam cram schools, golf schools, and other similar institutions. K-pop managers emphasize the fact that they pay for all of the K-pop education and training, unlike other private educational institutions in Korea.¹ After the entire period of training, K-pop idols possess very different skills from their Chinese and Japanese competitors; not only of singing and dancing but also of speaking foreign languages and acting. From the training process, they also look much sexier and sophisticated with trimmer bodies than competing singers from other countries.

When most of the system of “L” is completed, distribution, the final stage of K-pop glocalization is carried out. As we have mentioned earlier, the “GL” process is not complete without the product’s export and delivery to foreign consumers in massive quantities for a revenue level that is sustainable. What has distinguished the previous Korean pop music from K-pop is the fact that none of the previous Korean popular music genres were able to successfully meet the demands of foreign consumers. This is because the Korean indigenous music distribution companies could never really export and sell their music products overseas. Industries promoting K-pop initially attempted localization strategies of relying on Japanese and Chinese music distributors for their local niche markets of Korean pop music. In Japan, for example, SONY Music Japan and AVEX licensed K-pop music in a way that was localized for the Japanese markets (e.g., BoA, TVXQ, Super Junior, SNSD, etc.). To shy away from Japanese and Chinese distributors and become truly glocal (i.e., distributing K-pop outside of East Asia) however, would require SM Entertainment to embark on a transnational strategy.

A transnational strategy in music distribution involves the revolutionary idea that music can now be distributed beyond the boundaries of nation-states, regions, or economic blocs, thus bypassing all domestic, regional, or even international laws of distributions. Under this bold rubric, music is a free-flowing entertainment content anyone from anywhere can purchase by downloading it from a platform that either distributes music (legally or illegally) or streamlines it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, transnational music distribution entails a truly revolutionary idea of artists and distributors uploading and offering music and music videos themselves for free with the hope of promoting themselves for future returns on investment in the form of domestic CD/DVD sales, concert tour ticket sales, and product endorsements (Oh and Park 2012). Simultaneously, this distribution strategy is open to underdog artists who have neither a domestic market that is huge enough for them to reap massive profits from nor foreign distributors who want to offer contracts to them. Instead of profiting directly from CD and DVD sales, these artists who rely on transnational online distribution must rely on secondary or

tertiary revenues from related products, such as commercial endorsements, royalties from YouTube clicks, royalties from downloads, concert tours, and fan merchandizing goods.

Table 2 captures the basics of the K-pop glocalization process. Each of the three stages of the value chain (input, production, and distribution) has three types of participants (global, local, and transnational). Firms of countries in the center usually choose the global strategy of opting for all three global firms of input, production, and distribution (the Global column). Traditional local firms solely for the domestic market, on the other hand, rely on all three local suppliers, local producers, and distributors (the Local column). Firms engaging in passive hybridity mix global and local firms usually in a top-down fashion according to the order of the global center's mandate of importing finance and technology while at the same time importing raw materials from the periphery. Production and distribution can also be outsourced under the passive hybridity strategy. Transnational firms in the music industry are newcomers who mostly use web/app-based music platforms for input, production, and distribution. However, proactive glocal firms carefully mix global, local, and transnational firms in a bottom-up fashion to engender the glocal effect (the diametric combination of three white cells). In the case of K-pop, K-pop producers like SM have chosen global input firms, local production firms, and glocal (transnational) distribution firms.

Having recapitulated the inside workings of glocalization in the case of K-pop, we move on to the second part of the chapter, namely the topic of female universalism, in order to answer the question of why the majority of the Hallyu fans are women whose ages range from their teens to their 70s.

Female Universalism and the Gender Divide

The “K” in K-dramas and K-pop is now obvious to us: the Koreanness represents female universalism that is vividly conveyed in all major works of Hallyu that are exported all over the world. The “K” deliberately targets a female fandom that appreciates female universalism, which can be considered a ubiquitous value shared by most women in the world (i.e., gendered melancholia). This is the area where Korean tacit knowledge is most present and where it performs the most effectively. The subtle emotional actions that Korean TV drama actresses engage in are the best example. Often, these actresses do not receive any prompting and sometimes adlib on their own while showing a wide range of emotions including impromptu tears without the help of artificial tear drops. Female K-pop singers in the capacity of dancers blend difficult aerobic movements with the facial expressions of K-drama actresses—full of subtle facial and body expressions even including tears. What is pervasive among Korean actresses and girl band singers is that their pure physical beauty has become a female universality—viz. all women in the world feel Korean beauty as their ultimate desire to mimic (Epstein and Joo 2012). Here, the physique is not for the sake of sexual suggestiveness but an

ultimate tool with which women can overcome their gender limitations they feel daily in the harsh real world.

The gender divide that facilitated the rise of Hallyu in the world came about from three factors: gendered melancholia, racial melancholia, and post-colonial melancholia (Oh 2011; Oh and Kim 2019). For one to be a Hallyu fan means she has at least one of these three types of melancholia. Melancholia is defined as an emotional outcome from the suppression of sorrow caused by the lack or loss of something or someone to cherish (Butler 2011). Gendered melancholia is an archetypal form of all kinds of melancholia, which arises out of the mournful realization that a woman cannot “weep” openly about the natural sex she is born with. Her duty as a woman is to denounce her mother, sisters, and other girl friends as lifetime sexual companions in order to accept male partners instead. Thus, her adult or sometimes even adolescent sexual partners force her to live with gendered melancholia (Butler 2011). We can also ascertain that males who go through similar gender “troubles” can also experience gendered melancholia, as many gay men cannot openly bemoan the fact that they are born male.

Racial melancholia occurs to men and women who are not born as members of the desired racial group in their society. The fact that one cannot openly lament about the racial category she was born with constitutes the beginning of her melancholic experiences (Eng and Han 2000). Finally, postcolonial melancholia refers to the suppressed sorrow imperialists feel when they lose their colonies back to the people indigenous to the region (Gilroy 2005). Postcolonial melancholia is felt among former imperialists and then re-manifests itself as racism against their former colonial subjects who are living in their former imperial motherlands, such as the U.K., Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the U.S. and so on. Victims of racism, who are minorities living in the global cities of former imperialist countries, therefore feel enhanced racial melancholia that leads to a collective urge of seeking cultural and emotional comfort from their strong ties with their homelands (Appadurai 1990). When myriad minority women find cultural content from their homeland are also filled with sexist, racial, and postcolonial biases, they turn to Hallyu’s female universalism.

Hallyu’s glocal ascendance as an important female entertainment genre in the world is due to its female universalism, which appeals to women all over the world. Particularly important is K-drama’s femininity that espouses heroines who represent wisdom, rationality, tenderness, care, and scientific reasoning along with active social participation, all of which were once considered characteristics of Western male universalism. In Hallyu dramas, it is these heroines who assume the roles of attorneys, prosecutors, politicians, medical doctors, artists, and struggling unemployed ordinary college graduates who want to realize their Cinderella dreams. Female universalism is therefore a universal message of the gendered melancholia and struggle shared by all women in the world who want to break free from their chains to the traditional and male dominant communities of Confucianism, Catholicism, and Islam. It is the will among women to explore the possibilities of building and eventually realizing equal communities where they can freely relieve their gendered, racial, and postcolonial melancholia

without fears of social or state violence against them. Like K-pop, K-drama's success lies in its portrayal of how Korean women can break free from the yoke of Confucianism and other oppressive local values in order to embrace Western values and create a free and inclusive global humanity.

For the first time in Korean pop history, K-pop girl bands have elevated their corporeal beauty to the level of acceptable defiance to the Confucian repression of Korean women. Their dancing and singing have also appealed to many female fans from traditional Catholic, Islam, and Confucian backgrounds in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Unlike the typical phenomenon of female fans loving boy bands, in the K-pop scene, female fans provide enormous support to girl bands. Girls' Generation, for example, has the most YouTube views among all K-pop singers and in 2017, Red Velvet garnered the number one spot on the K-pop charts for the greatest number of weeks.

Put together, Hallyu cultural content, in its K-pop and K-drama forms, has captured the attention of global female fans, as it is the only truly postcolonial cultural industry (*vis-à-vis* the so-called conviviality cultural industries of the U.K., the U.S., and Japan). Hallyu as a whole deals with gendered and racial/ethnic melancholia on a global scale. Its success is now corroborated by the ongoing observation and empirical evidence that Korean entertainers have excellent tacit knowledge in mixing Western cultural content with Korean-style female universalism. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that it can attract the most female fans in the world who are tired of pop culture from Japan and/or Hollywood (Oh 2011).

Gender Fluidity and Androgynous Men – A Glocal Phenomenon within the K-community

Within the world of female universalism, how does Hallyu package and market Korean males? Are they scientific and rational universal men like white males or their Japanese variations? What value do Korean men have in the world of K-drama and K-pop? These are our final questions in the second part of this chapter.

In both K-pop and K-drama, male actors and singers tend to present a very fluid nature of their gender identities, an appalling exposé in the South Korean cultural community where traditional male and female gender roles have been strictly upheld up until the rise of Hallyu. In order to compete with local and global celebrities and cater to female fans all over the world, both K-pop male singers and K-drama actors have undergone a rapid evolution from macho characters to very feminine figures that promote images of androgynous males who are very feminine in their facial looks and body shapes with shaved six packs (C. Oh 2015).

“Beautiful boys” [*misonyeon* or *bishōnen*], however, has been a universally popular term in the West and East Asia for literary and opera characters. In Renaissance Italy, beautiful boys were often perceived by artists as modern manifestations of beauty, whereas in Japanese *kabuki* plays, beautiful boys as *yakusha* wheedled enormous fan support mostly from older women

(Rocke 1998; Fujitani 2006). Beautiful boys, along with beautiful girls [*bishōjō*], also occupy lots of significant positions in modern Japanese *manga* or comic book stories. However, in Korea, such a concept did not exist especially because of the strict Confucian values that distinguished men from women dichotomously by sex from the age of seven. It is only in Korean TV dramas and K-pop scenes that the concept of beautiful boys has emerged and later proliferated in Korea through a careful use of Korean tacit knowledge. Since Koreans had not really been familiar with the Renaissance and Japanese concept of *bishōnen* before, it may seem unlikely that they would possess any tacit knowledge of how to manufacture pretty boys. Yet the reality has proven otherwise. In the Hallyu industry, pretty boys were manufactured according to the demands of the female beholders who knew how to create them.

Korean drama and K-pop producers use enormous means of beauty techniques either through cosmetic products and makeup skills or through outright cosmetic surgeries (Epstein and Joo 2012). Most beauty technicians are of course women who define what constitutes the K-drama or K-pop “pretty” boys. Korean boy bands and actors maintain Renaissance style facial and body compositions (i.e., golden ratios), rarely found in Japan or other Asian countries. Korean beautiful boys, therefore, have garnered enormous fan loyalty from both Chinese and Japanese women, which has resulted in an outbreak of global female fan support from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, North America, and Europe.

In this sense, the K-community, where global fans of K-dramas and K-pop interact either offline or online, is filled with glocalized beautiful boys. These males serve the demands of female universalism shared among female Hallyu fans who want to defy traditional gender roles. Physical beauty is not a given trait but something that has been manufactured in the K-community through proactive applications of beauty and athletic techniques. The modification of their bodies is not to improve their physical appeal to the opposite sexes, but to relieve Hallyu fans of their gendered, racial, and postcolonial melancholia. If 20th century Europe and North America embodied white male universalism, East Asia in the 21st century epitomizes female universalism in the form of gendered melancholia. In a nutshell, female entertainers in Hallyu constitute the Other whom female fans want to become or emulate, whereas the Korean male actors and singers represent their ideal “gender neutral” sexual partners. Often, it is also observable that many of these female fans want to be bewitched by the androgynous male idols who can be both males and females (Oh and Kim 2019). All these gender bending techniques are part of the mental side of Hallyu glocalization, which attests to how the Korean Hallyu industry has perfected its tacit knowledge for creating and manufacturing beautiful boys and girls for the new world of female universalism. It is therefore only natural that female universalism in K-pop and Hallyu has promoted proactive fandom including Hallyu pilgrimage tourism to Korea, Korean culture and language learning, K-pop cover dance video production, participation in K-pop auditions, and ultimately joining the K-pop industry as production staff and singers (see *inter alia* Oh 2009, 2011; Kim et al. 2013; Madrid-Morales and Lovric 2015; Otmazgin and Lyan 2019).

Conclusion

In our analysis of Hallyu, using the concepts of gloclaization, female universalism and gender fluidity, three findings about Hallyu from the producers' perspectives (i.e., Koreans) are possible. Firstly, Hallyu is not really about Koreanness or Asianness but instead entails the global cultural values of female universalism. Female universalism does not intend to replace white male or scientific male universalism but rather aims to liberate women from the yoke of gendered melancholia, a suppressed desire to identify one's self distinctly from her prescribed gender identity. In so doing, some of these women also suffer from racial and postcolonial melancholia, both of which can be liberated by the same worldview of female universalism. In short, female universalism is the realization of female identity by people who generally possess the problem of gendered melancholia, but not necessarily the other two forms of melancholia.

Secondly, the gender divide in the appeal of Hallyu is not an accidental occurrence but is instead the product of a long period of planning and experimentation by Korean drama writers (mostly women), K-pop producers, K-pop choreographers, voice coaches (mostly women), and Hallyu artists. In hindsight, appealing to female universalism has turned out to be much more successful than appealing to male scientific universalism. The gender divide has created an uneasy outcome for Hallyu, as its fandom is predominantly female with only a small fraction of male followers. One estimate by WAHS is that that more than 90% of the 100 million registered fan club members in the world are female.

Thirdly, Hallyu's success is based entirely on its glocal strategy of business expansion in a way that has bypassed the lures of globalization and localization strategies. However, the glocal strategy will find it difficult to sustain its "L" (i.e. localization), for such a process necessitates the employment of Korean talents. As the global popularity of Hallyu expands to Europe and North America, more fans, most of whom are proactive learners themselves, will likely demand the opening of the "L" to international contenders. When Hallyu opens up its "L" to global contenders, it will have to abandon its glocal strategy in favor of a global strategy, where "L" itself will have to be globalized or transnationalized, just like its input and distribution. If BTS one day were to feature global and transnational boys other than Koreans, would its female universalism be sustainable? Or on the other hand, could it attract more male fans than females? These are some of the immediate futuristic questions we can raise about Hallyu based on the glocalization framework it has maintained so far.

Notes

1. Based on the interviews with the CEO Youngmin Kim and the A&R Manger Chris Lee at SM Entertainment on Nov. 13, 2012 and Dec. 20, 2012, respectively.

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Game of the Development of Cross-Border Cities in the Minority Area of China: Analysis of Openness and Closeness, Taking San Diego-Tijuana as an Example

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Abstract

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the cross-border cities in its minority area, especially the Tumen River area, has been confronted with two main issues: "stability" and "security." However, the long borderline not only plays a role of "blocking" but also "connecting." This article aims to understand the multifunctional aspects of borderlands by introducing various theories of border region studies. It analyzes the opportunities and challenges and that the administration of the border is facing, such as mutual cooperation, transnational migrations, social disintegration, self-identification, etc. Taking San Diego-Tijuana as an example, these cross-border cities should not be considered as politically or socially sensitive zones but instead bridges that promotes the development and the communication of communities on both sides of the border, drawing on the advantages and avoiding the disadvantages.

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Introduction

During the process of globalization, China has achieved great development and Chinese cities have changed dramatically in the last thirty years. Some small villages have become international metropolises, and some cities have become world cities of more than ten million people. However, compared to these developed coastal cities, municipalities or provincial capitals, other cities still lag behind. Shenzhen is one of the best examples of a cross-border city in China. Shenzhen is interconnected with Hong Kong, which is an internationally famous port city that belonged to the United Kingdom from the early 1980s to 1997. Because of the expansion of Hong Kong, manufacturing and other industries are badly in need of being transferred. Thanks to the support of the government's incentive policies, Shenzhen, which is close to Hong Kong, is developing gradually and has become the symbolic city of the Reform and Opening-up policy. Much research about border cities often takes Shenzhen and Hong Kong

as successful cases of border cities, but Shenzhen is an exception among most Chinese border cities. On the one hand, most Chinese border cities are interconnected with underdeveloped countries' cities. These cities are under-populated, inconvenient and economically backward, so their development is subject to various restrictions. On the other hand, considering issues of territorial sovereignty and national security, cross-border cities (except for ones in coastal areas) are required to be intensively guarded. Security and stability have become dominant concerns. Moreover, the international environment and the relationship between China and its neighboring countries can easily affect border cities in the minority areas of China, so it's difficult to copy the Shenzhen model. Under the premise of a continuous emphasis on national sovereignty, research on Chinese border cities has mainly focused on security and administration overlooking the importance of the interaction between secure administration and economic development.

Tumen River Area and Its problems

Frontier borders have a duality of openness and closeness connecting and disconnecting two cities at the same time. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, most border cities have experienced a process of connecting – disconnecting – connecting. Border cities in northeastern China for a long period of time have been open to the cross-border cities in Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea. Taking the Tumen River area as an example, the relationship between the cross-border cities in this area is deeply affected by the relationship between China and North Korea. Although the mainstream direction is positive, the relationship has experienced interruption, deterioration and restoration. As part of the trend of the reform and opening-up, the Chinese cross-border cities continue to improve their openness, strengthen their economies and cultural communication processes, and consolidate the friendship and trust among the people in the cross-border cities, producing a positive impact on the stability and security of cross-border societies. Therefore, it is important to abandon the mentality of the Cold War when it comes to the security of border cities, since the so-called security should not be considered a static state but instead a dynamic process.

The cross-border cities in the Tumen River are also facing many opportunities and challenges regarding comprehensive development. First of all, the position of the cross-border cities in this area has undergone a qualitative change. In the 1970s, these cities were mainly defensive cities. With the rapid growth of the economy in the 1990s, the scale of urban development and the economic level have exceeded the cross-border cities of neighboring countries. As a result of the concentrated human, material and capital flows, these border cities have transformed from marginal Northeast Chinese cities to the front doors of an export market and the core cities of international cooperation in the Tumen River area. Secondly, cross-border cities, such as Yanji and Hunchun, have been converted from inland towns into semi-inland, semi-marine cities. Utilizing borrowing ports as these cities are less than 60 to 150 kilometers

from harbors. Since the implementation of China's Belt and Road initiative, the Changcun-Yanji-Tumen Area has put into place a strategy of development of building a high-speed rail with Hunchun as its destination, which has greatly improved the speed of departure. Thirdly, in the context of globalization, there is an unbalanced flow of human capital among the cross-border cities. When a city's development reaches a certain level, the core competitiveness will be gradually transferred into talent. All the northeastern provinces including Yanbian are suffering from the serious problem of brain drain and depletion of the labor force, which to a certain extent affects the autonomy of the minority areas in China. Fourthly, the crime rate of cross-border cities has generally increased, involving international drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigration. China has many neighboring countries, so the governance and development of cross-border cities will continue to be an important issue in the future for China.

Considering the issues above, this paper aims to understand the game of the development of cross-border cities in China, taking the case of San Diego-Tijuana as an example. This paper consists of three parts. The first part will introduce the theories and definitions of cross-border region studies, revealing the differences between Western society and Chinese society for understanding borders. The second part will analyze the urban relationship between San Diego and Tijuana in order to construct a framework of studies for cross-border cities in the minority areas of China. The last part will put forward some reflections and suggestions in regard to the governance and development of the border cities in the northeast cross-border minority areas of China.

Literature Review

Although the first research on the cross-border regions can trace to the 1950s, it is until the beginning of this century that the bulk of the related research has appeared. Among them, those who focus on the European and American cross-border areas have occupied the majority, such as the Polish-German border, Danish-German border and U.S.-Mexico border, mainly taking the regional integration and its elements (historical background, existence of agreements, diplomatic exchanges, partnership, financing policies, etc.) as the main concerns (Slusarciuc, 2015). The same trend can also be observed in terms of Chinese cross-border regions studies, in which the scholars have emphasized the interactive relationship between governments, enterprises and local inhabitants for cross-border cooperation (Jiang et al, 2018; Xu et al, 2015).

However, little attention has been paid for the consideration of the essential nature of the border when talking about the development cross-border regions all around the world. In view of this, major models of cross-border regions around the nature of the so-called "border" and its extended theoretical perspectives will be mentioned and analyzed before getting into the discussion about San Diego-Tijuana cross-border cities.

Single Models of Cross-Border Regions

August Lösch explored the impact of the border on the commodity circulation and put forward the relevant location model. According to this model, the economic distance between consumers and the main center can explain border separation. If we do an analysis of the relationship of the products' circulation between two cross-border cities in the view of the location theory, the separation strength of the border can be examined by comparing the distance to the central place from both sides of the border for the same classes. Custom duties can also affect circulation around the border. Adopting a quantitative method, Lösch for the first time converted the boundary impact into a measurable distance. A smaller distance from the boundary can create profit from a product and can be an advantage for the supplier (Lösch, 1959). Lösch's model that examines economic impacts is based on economic geography, which has become a pioneer for the subsequent theories of borderlands.

Martinez (1994) deduced a model of borderlands interaction from the case of the Mexico-United State borderlands, which has provided a valuable framework for all the research of cross-border areas. Martinez proposed four paradigms of borderlands interaction: alienated borderlands, co-existent borderlands, interdependent borderlands, and integrated borderlands. Different borderlands milieu makes it possible for the border people to gain more benefits from the borderlands than other inhabitants of the same country.

Lezzi (1994) considered the border as a barrier, a filter, and a contact zone, which may lead to a fusion or a structure of supranational integration. The leading forces behind her model are related to the political-administrative arena. Kratke (1996) focused on economic integration in the German-Polish cross-border region. According to his theory, there is a differentiation of regional development paths in East Central Europe, a contrast between a high road and a low road to development. A high road involves innovative and technological linkages and a low road relies on an asymmetrical divide in income, prices, wages, and employment standards. As a result, the high road approach is more desirable to long-term development.

The above models can be summarized as single models of the function of borders. Lösch's model emphasizes the separating function of borders. Lezzi and Kratke's models examine the level of integration in borderlands in order to achieve its development. Martinez' model classifies borderlands on the basis of their integration.

Comprehensive Model of Cross-Border Regions

Although there have been a number of cross-border studies from the point of view of the market economy, government activities and socio-cultural communities, it is still necessary to understand the difference of boundaries, borders and borderlands particularly. In other words, because of the complexity of borders and borderlands, those models mentioned above fail to explain its authentic meanings.

Burnet-Jailly (2007), who has published work about borderlands, discusses four basic elements to prove his border theory: market forces and trade flows, policy activities of multiple levels of government, local cross-border political clout and local cross-border cultures. According to his theory, borderlands' development depends on the politics, markets, policies, and socio-cultural communities.

A borderland refers to a territory of which a sovereign state possesses and also constitutes one of the focuses of nationalist agendas and democratic development. The division of borders should be institutionalized, since the border is considered to be the result of an international agreement based on the mutual understanding between countries. The border acts as a line of defense against military aggression and the entry of illegal goods such as drugs, thus protecting national security, migrant workers, and trade. The border also serves as the boundary of governments (or institutionalized systems). Therefore, people living within a certain government's borderland are subject to its regulations and rules concerning the education system, labor laws, market systems, welfare system, etc.

Some radical theorists who believe in a borderless world insist that with the integration of the world economy, the concept of the national state will gradually disappear. Kenichi Ohmae (1990) argues that when borderlands begin to develop into economic regions, the participants in the world economy no longer play the roles of nations. The market is able to create profits making use of economic inequality. Thus, borderlands can constantly increase the value of a market that is bound to be diversified due to the movement of people and materials.

Cascadia is a bioregion and proposed country located within the western region of North America, which may consist of Washington, Oregon, portions of other U.S states and British Columbia, Canada. A coalition government is one characteristic of Cascadia. Border policies became a trade-off taking account of political impact, economic development, local culture, security and so on.

Social science scholars have found that, in addition to the state system, the social community of borderlands has its own organizational system that emphasizes the importance of regional cultures. Although borders separate nations of different countries, the social community of borderlands shares the same ethnicity identity, culture and religion, which gradually integrate the imagined community (Anderson, 2006).

Based on Burnet-Jailly's theory, the concept of borderlands can be understood in three ways. First of all, borderlands politically divide two sovereign states, two jurisdictions and two economic circles, etc. Secondly, borderlands are the third space of cultural mixture, where people from different cultural circles gather to form a unique socio-cultural region. Finally, borderlands' economic integration can create many opportunities for jobs, communication, shopping, travels, etc. As a result, a more comprehensive understanding of border regions or borderlands helps us to build a fundamental framework, within which we could find reflex the

development of border cities in the minority area of China through the case study of San Diego-Tijuana.

San Diego-Tijuana border cities and its implication

San Diego-Tijuana has always been a hot point of border studies. San Diego is the second city in California, United States, which is famous for its mild climate, beautiful beaches, and comfortable lifestyle. Located on the northwest part of Baja California, Tijuana is just 19 km from San Diego and at the same time, is notorious for drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The daily average number of floating populations crossing the border can reach more than 250,000 and its size and frequency rank number one in the world. The huge income gap between both sides of the border makes San Diego-Tijuana's Border Economy a distinctive phenomenon. San Diego and Tijuana have become twin cities during a process of interaction and mutual penetration. Although there are a great number of Mexican Americans living in San Diego, it does not have a negative impact on the development of this city. On the contrary, San Diego, well-known for its low crime rate, having become one of the most livable cities in the United States. Relying on San Diego's economic circle, Tijuana also has achieved rapid development due to its superior geographical location and cheap labor.

Compared to San Diego-Tijuana, what are the capacity and quality of the governance in Chinese cross-border cities like, especially in minority areas? Tijuana is not safe, but why is San Diego able to remain a relatively safe city? How does the United State govern its border and how has Mexico responded? This paper aims to deepen the understanding of the relationships of cross-border cities in China's northeast region and its developmental possibilities through the case of San Diego-Tijuana.

Historical Background

The history of San Diego-Tijuana can be traced back to the colonial period in the 18th century. In 1772, the Spanish conquistadors divided the province California into Upper and Lower California. In 1846, as a result of the United States' territorial ambitions, the Mexican American War broke out and ended in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which marked the current governance and development of the Mexico-United States border. Mexico agreed to cede or sell cheaply most of the territories of today's four states in the Southern United States (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas), which included Upper California that belonged to Mexico at that time. In 1850, San Diego was established. A series of population and economic policies promoted the quick growth of San Diego. Since the Mexican collective ranch named Rancho de Tía Juana benefited from the population boom in California, United States and its frequent communication with Mexican province of California, the ranchers built the city of Tijuana with the official approval of Mexican government (Ramírez, 1995). Since then, the San Diego-Tijuana cross-border city relationship has been shaped.

Changes in territorial ownership not only split California into two completely different states but also broke the continuity of the Native American culture of this land. In the process of the Trail of Tears, the Native Americans who had been the major ethnic group were expelled from California, United States or even killed. Anglo-Saxons kept moving westward until they became the mainstream ethnic group. A small number of Mexican people left became the ancestors of the Mexican Americans, today known as Chicano. After several centuries, the total length of the current Mexico-United States border is 3,141 km. This border is a territorial boundary of two countries, the psychological cutting line of European Americans and Latin Americans and the frontier of the largest economic difference in the world (Aldama, 2001: 66).

Cross-Border Communities and Twin Cities

In spite of the huge economic gap between San Diego and Tijuana, the degree of openness between these two cities is quite impressive. Over the interaction and communication of more than 100 years, ethnic groups and cultures have been mixed, exercising a profound influence on the social structure in the borderland. The concept of “Mexamerica,”¹ also known as “Mexican-American Society,” has been built at the interchange of these two different cultures. Mexican immigrants who cross the border frequently are called Mexican Americans hold a dual ethnicity. They speak Spanish with their families and English with their friends and colleagues. As a successor of both Mexican and American culture, this group of people can be assimilated by neither of these two cultures. The “Mexican American” identity is more associated with cultural or social factors than political or geographic factors. Therefore, most of the residents in the borderlands have the characteristics of duality and superposability.

Throughout the whole Mexamerica region, the most dynamic Twin Cities should be San Diego-Tijuana. The total population of two cities is more than 5 million and the relatively high degree of openness has provided the impetus for mutual development. In 1994, the United States, Canada and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in order to promote the economic integration of the three countries. Thanks to NAFTA, Mexican cross-border cities, such as Tijuana and Mexicali, benefit from the great increase in Mexico exports, especially the company Maquiladora built inside the Mexican borderland. In 2015, San Diego-Tijuana constructed the Cross Border Xpress that connects Tijuana International Airport and the United States. Visitors can utilize this terminal to arrive at more than 30 destinations inside Mexico, which has increased the size and the frequency of the flow of human and material resources. Nowadays, the San Diego-Tijuana cross-border cities have become important cores of economic integration of the United State and Mexico, which have also formed a convenient channel for the growing cooperation and communication of manufacturing, transportation, finance, education, health care and tourism between two cities.

Bundled Development of Cross-Border Cities

An exponential explosion of the population characterizes the development of San Diego-Tijuana. In 1900, the population of San Diego was 18,000, while Tijuana was nothing but a

sparsely populated village. In 2000, the population of San Diego and Tijuana increased to 2.81 million and 1.12 million, respectively. In 2020, the total population of San Diego-Tijuana is expected to double (as shown in Table 1). The data does not include the illegal immigrants, most of whom are not Tijuana residents, but are from other Mexican states or Central American countries (Bae, 2005). Another characteristic of the population movement is the phenomenon of transnational migration which refers to the people who live in a country and cross the border every day to work or study in another country.

Table 1 Population trends in San Diego and Tijuana Region, 1900-2020 (in millions)

Year	San Diego County	Tijuana	SD-TJ regional Total	% in San Diego
1900	18	242	18	99
1930	210	11	221	95
1940	289	22	311	93
1950	557	65	622	90
1960	1,033	166	1,199	86
1970	1,358	341	1,699	80
1980	1,862	462	2,324	80
1990	2,498	747	3,245	77
2000	2,814	1,211	4,025	70
2010	3,437	2,256	5,694	60
2020	3,853	3,822	7,675	50

Source: Chang-Hee Christine Bae, 2005

San Diego is the number two city in California with abundant opportunities for higher-paying jobs. Tijuana is the largest city in Baja California with plenty of cheap labor. Based on this reality, the Mexican government made a series of economic policies, including IMMEX, bonded area, etc., to attract foreign investment. Today, Maquiladora has become a major economic pillar of the San Diego-Tijuana cross-border cities. Mexican residents who hold U.S. visas choose to cross the border to work in the service industries. These jobs may not be decent, but the huge difference in minimum wage is the fundamental reason for the transnational migration. In addition, expensive medical costs and high consumption levels in the United States also make Tijuana an ideal destination of medical treatment, weight-loss, plastic surgery, entertainment and other consumer behaviors, among which “medical tourism” can create nearly 500 million dollars per year for Mexico. This mode of complementary economic development has not only combined the resource advantages of two cities but has also eliminated the psychological impact of the huge developmental gap between both sides of the border.

To a certain extent, economic development and cooperation can stabilize the cross-border society. There is a difference in crime rates between San Diego and Tijuana, but compared with the horizontal dimension, they are not the cities with the highest crime rates in California, United States and Baja California, Mexico. According to the data of Crime in the

United State 2015 released by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, there were 5,582 violent crimes in San Diego, which means a violent crime rate of 398 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, lower than the total violent crime rate (426.3 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) of California. Calculated on the basis of the 2015 Crime Report published by the Secretary of Public Security of Baja California and the population data of Encuesta Intercensal 2015 conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), Tijuana's crime rate is about 2,167 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, lower than 3,161 crimes per 100,000 of Baja California. The innovative pattern of bundled development in San Diego-Tijuana has laid the foundations for the social stability of the two cities, at the same time breaking the myth of giving priority to security when it comes to the governance and development of cross-border cities (especially in China).

Being a famous tourist destination in Baja California, Tijuana's slogan is "La Ciudad sin Frontera" (in English: a city without borders), which fully emphasizes its openness and inclusiveness. If we witness the thousands of people crossing the border every weekday on foot or by car, we will feel surprised. However, for many people living in San Diego-Tijuana, this lifestyle has been the norm. At four o'clock in the morning, some Mexican students living in Tijuana must take the bus to the international school in San Diego. Around 5 o'clock, workers² begin to cross the border to go to San Diego. Furthermore, there are a small number of businesspeople or professionals living in San Diego that go to Tijuana to work. The border is open 24 hours a day and seven days a week.

Shops, churches, pharmacies, and clinics can be found around the border and many Mexican people tend to cross the border on weekends to go shopping in the outlets in San Diego. From midnight on the weekend to 5 o'clock in the morning, more than four thousand 25-year-olds or younger Americans go back to San Diego from bars in Tijuana (Lange et al., 1999). The legal drinking age is 18 years old in Mexico and the consumption level is much lower than in the United States, which are the main reasons why American youth or students go to Tijuana for entertainment. Many American elderly people choose to spend their lives in Tijuana in their old age. Because of the strict control of pharmaceuticals in the United States and the high medical costs, Tijuana has also become an ideal place to purchase medicine or to see a doctor. In Tijuana, both the US dollar and the Mexican peso are the currencies used.

Despite the high degree of integration in economic and consumptive aspects in San Diego-Tijuana, it turns out that it is difficult to transcend the barriers of race, culture, and identity. The border exists as a visible wall that separates the United States and Mexico and an invisible cultural fence for the residents in the borderland. As a Mexican chef Emilio, who works at a local high-class restaurant in San Diego says, "I have a U.S. permanent resident card. Every day at 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning, I cross the border to work in San Diego and at 11 or 12 o'clock at night I am back in Tijuana." At present, Emilio and his girlfriend rent a small apartment near Tijuana's beach. He says that although he has adapted to his life in San Diego,

he never thinks about settling down there because he belongs to Mexico and he loves his country.

Tijuana, adjoining California, United States, is the largest city in Baja California and the fourth largest city in Mexico. Making use of its strategic location and industrial resources, Tijuana has attracted investors to set up transnational factories, develop transnational tourism and export transnational labor, which has contributed greatly to Mexico's economy. However, when we turn our attention to the origin of the inhabitants in Tijuana, we will find that a lot of villages or towns in Baja California and even in southern Mexico are experiencing problems such as depopulation, economic stagnation and social disintegration. Mexico is a big agricultural country, while the large-scale nature of rural transnational migration to some degree has been collapsing Mexican agriculture. According to a Mexican transnational migration research study conducted in 1994, the village A had 163 families and 31 families of them immigrated to the United State, which means the immigration rate in village A was 1.71 persons per household. In 2006, a survey that aimed at the same group showed that 73 families (194 persons) were immigrants in village A and the immigration rate was 2.14 persons per household. Until 2010, this number increased to 92 families (231 persons), with an average of 2.51 persons per household.³ There are many villages in the south of Mexico similar to village A. The phenomenon of "transnational immigration" not only has caused the hollowing-out of the rural areas and the collapse of the rural economy, but also has led to the accelerated disintegration of rural families, further shaking the foundation of rural society. The negative impact of immigration is relatively slow, but long and permanent. San Diego and Tijuana are two cities divided by a frontier, between which there is a close economic relationship but lack of cultural and social fusion. We might say that the degree of integration between San Diego and Tijuana is far less than many European trade zones or countries. The construction of a social relationship between cross-border cities is with the purpose of economic interests, not for friendship or trust. From this point of view, the San Diego-Tijuana cross-border cities should not be considered as twin cities or binational cities (Sparrow, 2001). Consequently, we need to understand cross-border cities from both the economic and social point of view, since the game of market and society always exist, which sometimes may have a direct impact on the political environment.

Discussion and Conclusion

To understand China's cross-border cities, it is essential to learn from foreign cases. We should reflect on the problems of cross-border cities in minority areas of China based on both universal and particularistic characteristics. Minorities and local residents are not the causes of China's cross-border cities' problems, and how to resolve these problems and to administrate the city more scientifically is the most important thing to keep in mind. The case of San Diego-Tijuana can help us to deepen our understanding of the cross-border cities in the Tumen River area, which allows us to reflect more about the scientific governance of the borderlands.

From the economic point of view, the development of cross-border cities is often based on mutual cooperation and communication. Cross-border cities ought to utilize the advantages of their resources to maximize the interests of both cities through a complementary economic mode. The huge difference between two cities might make the less-developed city more dependent on the more-developed city, so it is important to improve the industrial chain in cross-border cities to create their unique competitiveness.

From the perspective of industry and agriculture, transnational immigration might have a negative impact on the rural society. The immigration between the San Diego-Tijuana cross-border cities is similar to what is happening in Yanbian area. Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, transnational immigration from northeast China to South Korea has increased greatly, evolving from the individual as the unit to the couple, family and even the entire village. If we only focus on the prosperity of cities in the Changcun-Yanji-Tumen Area the large-scale of the rural contraction over the Tumen River area will be neglected. In response to this problem, cross-border cities should improve the asymmetry of the population movement and make up for the possible shortage of labor in many ways.

From the cultural and social point of view, the growing number of transnational migrants can promote understanding between two cultures. But it will also weaken the continuity of Mexican culture and values, causing the loss of self-cognition and identity. Communication between cross-border cities should be based on respect and the protection of the duality and legitimate rights of transnational migrants and local inhabitants. The border needs to be a bridge of economic, social and cultural communications, rather than a sensitive zone of national security and ethnic relations.

When it comes to the governance and development of cross-border cities, we need to acquire a multi-faceted understanding of the border. Because of history, culture and other factors, borders have characteristics that are over-lapping, multi-layered and bidirectional, which should not be examined and comprehended from a single dimension.

Notes

1. Joel Garreau, in his book *Nine Nations of North America*, reclassified the North American region into nine different nations according to the economic, cultural, historic and other facts: New England, The Foundry, Dixie, Breadbasket, The islands, Mexamerica, Ecotopia, Empty Quarter and Quebec. Mexamerica refers to the Mexican American Society that includes southern California and northern Mexico. Casagrande divided Mexico into five nations among which Mexamerica contains the land from Valle de San Joaquín to Mazatlán and has a population of about 38 million (Garreau, 1982; Casagrande, 1987).

2. A small number of these workers have American citizenship or U.S. permanent resident cards, while most of them go back and forth between San Diego and Tijuana with a tourist visa. Foreigners holding travel visas are not allowed to work in the United States, but the customs at the border always turn a blind eye to these Mexican workers. This is a common phenomenon in the San Diego-Tijuana region.

3. The survey was conducted in the village A of the San Juan del Estado, which is 30 km from the city of Oaxaca. From the beginning of 1980 to 1990, immigrants were mainly made up of young people. With the progression of time, the number of immigrants and groups has gradually expanded. Until 2000, the type of immigrations of this village was mainly due to family-based immigration (Joo, 2011).

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Book Review:

Intercultural Empathy and Human Resource Development: An Ageless Aspiration

The Routledge Companion to Human Resource Development, edited by Rob F. Poell, Tonette S. Rocco, and Gene L. Roth, Abingdon, Routledge, 2015, xxxv + 694 pages, 978-0415820424, \$265.

Keith Jackson, SOAS, University of London and Kobe University

The Routledge Companion to Human Resource Development is one in an expanding series of “companions” in business, management and accounting offered by this UK-based publisher. The series combines expected themes such as “human resource management” (HRM) with some surprising titles: for example, edited books on “creativity,” “identity and consumption,” and “visual organization.” The title reviewed here focuses on human resource development (HRD) and mirrors its HRM companion in that the insights it presents along with the questions it poses are likely to resonate among researchers of international management for years to come, during which time we hope that a more affordable paperback version of this book will become available.

What does the book offer? First of all, it offers an example of crisp editing and layout. The editors – Rob Poell of Tilburg University in The Netherlands, Tonette Rocco of Florida International University, and Gene Roth of Northern Illinois University – have combined to assemble contributions by ninety-eight authors of fifty-four chapters organized into nine major sections of themed discussion. These are: Origins of the field; Adjacent and related fields; Theoretical approaches; Policy perspectives; Interventions; Core issues and concerns; HRD as a profession; HRD around the world; Emerging topics and future trends. With over 700 pages and over fifty main chapters, there is limited space here to detail the book’s wide-ranging contents in depth. Consequently, the following review is designed to give context to selected extracts from this book’s contents and thereby gives readers pointers to themes that appear of direct relevance to research and discussion about people and our human capacity to express and record empathy. Specifically, the focus for this review is on the concept of “intercultural empathy” - for which, some brief context is provided.

It has become common in contexts for the research and practice of “working with” or “managing” people to distinguish between business and organizational management interventions that emphasize either an HRM or an HRD paradigm or approach: HRM generally assumes that hiring and managing people generates costs – costs that, ideally, should be controlled and or reduced where possible; costs, like employees, are transferable, replaceable. In contrast, HRD practitioners are assumed to look beyond cost and seek to identify the potential in people (employees) to perform productively and thereby add competitive and perhaps non-substitutable value. In increasingly globalized contexts for business and management, where uncertainty and complexities of risk abound, there is an argument that

organizations wishing to remain competitive should seek out people with potential for development as opposed to relying on people with tried and tested skill sets which can be readily trained up and, when necessary, substituted. One emerging and often cost-reducing trend in international HRM is towards substituting human skill sets with artificial intelligence (AI) along with other “non-human” solutions.” Can AI replicate intercultural empathy?

In HRD terms, increasing numbers of global employers are looking for people with competencies: that is, people whose demonstration of skills is underpinned by attitudes that not only generate required levels of performance in the here-and-now; they offer promise of value-adding performance in situations that have not yet arisen or perhaps even been imagined. Indeed, in chapter fifty-two of the Routledge Companion to Human Resource Development Katherine Rosenbusch makes the point succinctly and forcefully in her appeal (p. 602) for greater researcher and practitioner attention to be given to conceptualizations of “intercultural competence”: “As interactions between individuals from different cultures increase, the complexity of workforces will intensify. Organizations need to examine and act on how they develop and grow their people to work in dynamic and culturally diverse societies.”

From a global HRD perspective, “intercultural empathy” can be regarded as one such competence. The term “intercultural empathy” appears in the influential “global mindset” model proposed by researchers and practitioners at Arizona University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, whose conceptualization of the term encompasses an individual’s ability to: “work well with people from other parts of the world; understand nonverbal expressions of people from other cultures; emotionally connect to people from other cultures; engage people from other parts of the world to work together” (www.thunderbird.asu.edu, accessed 10th January 2020). In HRM terms, skills that underpin or facilitate these “abilities” can be trained and then managed or supervised – albeit, at a cost. Emphasizing an HRD perspective, these ‘abilities’ can be assumed to reside latently in individuals until they can be identified, encouraged, and even led such that their individual and collective demonstration and application of combined “abilities” renders a given organization more globally competitive.

So, how might this “Companion to HRD” guide us towards developing a finer conceptual and practical appreciation of ‘intercultural empathy’? The first of the abilities highlighted in the aforementioned ‘global mindset’ model invokes an individual’s ability to “work well with people from other parts of the world.” In chapter fifty-two under the section heading “merging topics and future trends,” Kyoung-Ah Nam, Yonjoo Cho and Mimi Miyoung Lee discuss “cross-cultural training and its implications for HRD.” They make the case that, as Asian multi-national corporations (MNCs) continue to expand their share of global markets, there is reason to address established and commonly “Western” biases that appear still to bias contexts for cross-cultural training (CCT): for example, with regard to how MNCs invest in preparing expatriate managers (expats) for international assignments. The authors do well to combine and summarize concisely from current research and practices in CCT. Of special note is the attention they give to the problem of how to measure or ascertain the relative ‘effectiveness’ of CCT. A further dimension to this problem is developed as the authors recognize the “explosion of social networking technologies” before concluding that intercultural competence “is no longer a recommendation but a means of survival for responding to the complexities of globalization” (p. 587). This conclusion suggests several relevant pathways for future research: for example, into how the aforementioned social networking technologies might be impacting how people might communicate or share

intercultural empathy across virtual spaces – spaces that, as the authors suggest here, might appear a priori biased in their conceptualization.

A second ability identified explicitly with intercultural competence in the global mindset model is how to demonstrate an appreciation or understanding of nonverbal expressions used by people from diverse cultural backgrounds. The emphasis given to “nonverbal expressions” connects with many contributions to this book that discuss the complexities of communication. To illustrate, Seung Won Yoon, Doo Hun Lim and Pedro A. Willging compare and discuss (in chapter ten) approaches to “performance improvement” (PI). From an employer perspective, any investments in HRD should offer some promise or prospect of improved productivity – an issue the authors address during their critique of existing PI methodologies and practical approaches. They offer a concise and current diagnosis of the impact of – and prospects for – increased use of advanced communication technologies in the form of “smart devices” such as mobile phones, sensory recognition and web-enabled projects, each of which promise ever greater efficiencies of global business and management communications. The authors offer thought-provoking insights into possibilities for applying augmented reality (AR) and similar emergent technologies in contexts for PI before concluding that PI and HRD must be discussed and combined in their status as both process and outcome. This insight might be applied towards HRD interpretations of intercultural empathy: i.e. empathy as both process and outcome.

A third ability associated with people with competencies relevant towards developing and expressing intercultural empathy concerns how individuals might emotionally connect to people from other cultures. In chapter forty-nine, Paul Nesbit discusses “emotions and self-development.” His focus is on processes of self-development, and specifically in contexts for leadership development. After offering a definition of the self-development process, Nesbit draws our attention to the influence of an individual’s emotions within the self-development process, explaining how these can lead to development outcomes that might appear more or less effective: for example, more or less open with regard to recognizing the relative strengths and weaknesses of an individual’s performance potential. A salient and ever-present factor in processes of self-development and self-assessment of development is “culture.” As Nesbit explains: “culture influences emotions because it shapes understanding and interpretation of social experiences and these cognitions in turn impact on the emotions felt” (p. 567). Viewed in this manner, intercultural empathy might be conceptualized as an on going process of sense-making and interpretation: unlike a skill, it might not be feasible repeatedly to ‘do’ empathy; claims that “it” can be “done” (easily) appear to lack credibility.

One further ability associated with intercultural empathy relates to how individuals appear to engage people from other parts of the world and collaborate effectively with them. In a novel “Epilogue” to this book, the three editors combine to offer “a synopsis of the present, future and intrigue of HRD.” Here, individual contributors provide updated comments on their own chapters into a “conceptual matrix” that the editors formed for each section of the book. The flow of ideas brings a freshness of perspective to the earlier submitted chapters, for in this Epilogue, the authors’ contributions appear in an unedited form. To illustrate, sharing further thoughts about their chapter on the theme of “employee engagement and HRD” (chapter forty-six), authors Brad Shuck and Sally Sambrook call for more research towards a establishing a “unifying theory of engagement that explores the psychological phenomenon as it relates to the whole person” (p. 648). They furthermore call for more research into processes of

“disengagement,” investigating its sources and impact on employee and organizational performance.

Given the scope and complexity of the many themes presented in this book, it is difficult to give a full picture of the insights that the authors and editors offer readers. In line with other “Companion” titles in the Routledge series, this is very much a book that reader-practitioners and HRD researchers are invited to “dip-into”: most likely, each readership will find examples and insights that prompt further thought. Overall, the book is a success, and the editors are to be congratulated for their efforts.

As suggested in the title for this review, the aspiration to develop and express empathy between people of differing social and cultural backgrounds - the aspiration to think and behave humanely and expect similar treatment in return – has existed for as long as civilized societies have existed: the aspiration to empathize is ageless. To paraphrase from the great Master Kong (Confucius): “None of us is born humane: we must each learn to become so.”

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Book Review:

De Seúl al cielo and Luces en el cielo

De Seúl al cielo, by Silvia Aliaga and Tatiana Marco, Nocturna Ediciones, 2018, 605 pages, 978-84-16858-77-4, \$25.40.

Luces en el cielo, by Silvia Aliaga and Tatiana Marco, Nocturna Ediciones, 2019, 332 pages, 978-84-17834-19-7, \$18.00.

Xosé Crisanto Gándara Eiroa, Conservatorio Superior de Música da Coruña

In the last three years, the available literature on K-Pop in Spain has increased considerably. At around the same time as the publication of the pioneering work of Fernando San Basilio, *Crónicas de la era K-Pop*, in 2015, 2018 and 2019), the first two biographies devoted to groups of this genre have been released, specifically, BTS. *Iconos del K-Pop*, and EXO (in November 2018) and K-Pop superstars (in October 2019). Both are written by Adrian Besley and both are Spanish translations of original English editions published in London a few months earlier.

The two translated works described here constitute the joint work of two young female authors from Zaragoza, habitual consumers of K-Pop since 2009, and are part of what is known as Young Adult literature. They are the first Spanish novels set in the world of K-Pop, and the common places of this genre appear throughout the fictional story. With this approach, the young female readers i.e., the niche to which they are destined, in their vast majority fans of the genre, identify themselves within this context and build the imaginary, i.e., the places in South Korea known through K-Pop songs, K-Drama and K-Movies, by means of the “real” places and “fictional” events.

In *De Seúl al cielo*, the story is developed through R*E*X, a Boyband of great success in East and Southeast Asia, who had debuted seven years before, having completed their training with the company WIMTS. The band consists of four artists: Jay, Hyunsoo, Alex, and Young. Through the activities of the band, a narrative is drawn with parallel stories in which four more characters participate: Paula, a Spanish dancer who travels to Seoul with the aim of meeting Jay, Cris, an English girl who lives in Seoul who soon becomes friends with Paula, Minwoo, a young owner of a trendy café in the Yeouido district, and Dani, another Spaniard who after meeting Cris in England during his student period, moves with her to Seoul and ends up working at Minwoo's café.

Luces en el cielo is the prequel to *De Seúl al cielo*, and takes place seven years earlier, during the summer before R*E*X's debut. In this case, there are three areas where the narrative develops: Seoul, Jeju Island, and several cities in Europe. Jaehwa (Jay), born and raised in Jeju, spends the summer on the island with his friend Hyunsoo, who he is a trainee with at WIMTS. At WIMTS, they interact with two former classmates of his Yuna and Siwon. Alex travels through several places in Europe where he meets Andrew, another young Englishman with whom he ends up having a romantic relationship. The novel concludes with the end of summer holidays and the return of the R*E*X artists back to Seoul for their debut.

Both books are indisputably aimed at a young and undoubtedly female audience, the profile of the genre's target audience. The fact that there are common places, such as the most emblematic areas of Seoul related to K-Pop, Jeju Island, its production, training system, agencies, debut, fandom, K-beauty, K-food, coffee shops, fashion, etc., and even sentimental relationships, both heterosexual and homosexual, points to a very specific audience, and allows the reader to use their imagination to recreate the universe of K-Pop. Both books include illustrations by Inma Moya as well as QR codes that allow readers to access the story's soundtrack, which consists of Spotify links to pieces by BTS, EXO, Gfriend, TEN, Wonder Girls, BLACKPINK, Girls Generation, Twice, Super Junior, SHINee, Red Velvet, Seventeen, MONSTA X, Mamamoo, and NCT: a very varied selection of the best known groups that reflects the authors' predilections.

Undoubtedly, this work should be taken into account when considering what it means to be a pioneer in the genre of the novel set in the K-Pop universe in Spain. It will apparently have continuity with a third volume in the future.

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Book Review:

The History of Emotions: An Introduction

The History of Emotions: An Introduction, Jan Plamper, (Translated by Keith Tribe), Oxford University Press, 2015, 352 pages, 978-0199668335, \$37.83.

Mark Lovas, University of Pardubice

The History of Emotions is a work of great erudition. It surveys a great deal of research from anthropology, brain science, history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology. There is a valuable critique of hasty borrowings from neuroscience, and a lengthy critique of Paul Ekman's research. This book is a translation from the German original and contains numerous references to research in German (as well as some in French) and suggestions about specific places where historical research needs to be done. Although the reviewer cannot claim to possess the erudition of this book's author, where he was familiar with the literature being reviewed, the summaries were perceptive and clear. Where the reviewer had no prior acquaintance with the literature surveyed, the summaries were often mysterious.

Early and late into the book, Plamper alludes to his own research into military fear. Two of the most lively and engaging pages occur when, near the end of the book, he discusses his own methodology when dealing with a text containing a logical gap. The description of a battle suddenly loses coherence. The researcher discovers what was unsaid, but essential for understanding: the soldiers were frightened and fled.

In this example, fear is primarily viewed as an interfering factor. Consider an alternative analysis: The soldiers' flight was not evidence of an interference from outside the domain of Reason (or Authority). Individual soldiers reassessed the situation. They had a new judgment or a new perception of the overall situation. The battle began with soldiers saying to themselves, "Best just to follow orders." However, as the battle proceeded, each individual soldier now said to himself, "No, it's not best just to follow orders." This potential for reanalysis brings to light the deepest flaw of this work: Plamper does not attempt to set out a basic theory or view about basis of emotion.

The author does set out (on p. 39) a list of basic questions about the nature of emotion, but then begs off attempting to answer them. Even there, his formulations are not always clear. I choose two questions as illustrative. First, what are "the emotional components of judgment or evaluation?" This formulation is unclear. It would be clearer if the author explained the term "component." As it stands, Plamper might have in mind that emotion distorts judgment or that it aids judgment. Recent work in "analytic" philosophy has often aimed to show that the emotions

provide essential insights, and Aristotle thought having the right sorts of emotions was key to living well. It's not clear where exactly Plamper stands on the question. Plamper also adds a separate question: whether a historical individual's social role influenced their self-interpretation. This is a fascinating question, but distinct from the question whether or to what extent emotion influences judgment.

Plamper's last question urges researchers to consider how emotion connects to morality. He goes on to write a complex sentence laden with presuppositions: "If historical actors give ethical reasons for their actions, expressing in this way the interconnection between feeling and morality, this lends their emotions a meaning distinct from that in societies where emotion and morality are treated as unrelated" (p. 39). Why should giving an "ethical reason" mean there is a connection between feeling and morality? Which societies are those in which morality and emotion are unrelated? Presumably the author has in mind his earlier discussion of Maori warriors, but he does not pay the reader the courtesy of saying as much. Among the Maori, fear is connected to supernatural forces, and that may absolve actors of agency; but, even there, the emotions and actions they lead to have consequences for the happiness of individuals—and, that, too, is one notion of morality.

The most ambitious goal of the book is to lay to rest a dispute between two strands of thinking about emotion—the Social Constructivists of Chapter Two (also described as "Relativists") and the Universalists of Chapter Three. In her research about Pashtun women in Pakistan, Benedicte Grima found their reaction to marriage is a public display of sadness. Moreover, when a family member or friend suffers misfortune, sadness is expressed only in private. What conclusion does Plamper draw on the basis of this research? "As in Chapter Three we once again see that studies like that of Grima overturn the idea that emotions are universal" (p. 251).

Even Paul Ekman, an arch universalist, won't simply topple over when hearing of this study. As Plamper himself knows, a universalist can concede there is cultural variation in the expression of emotion. So, there is no overturning to be found in this example. In the language of appraisals, one might say that among these Pashtun women, events which would warrant an appraisal of happiness for North American or European women, warrant an appraisal of sadness. Not the emotion itself, but the appraisal varies. When Plamper goes on to give a fuller explanation, we learn that the Pashtun women are not actually appraising the very same event as North Americans or Europeans. For the Pashtun women, marriage means being dominated and oppressed by female relatives. If marriage had that consequence everywhere, then Europeans and North Americans would most likely be saddened by the prospect as well.

Plamper looks to William M. Reddy to dissolve the conflict between Universalists and Relativists. Reddy's overarching purpose was to let anthropologists provide insights about other cultures, while making it possible at the same time to evaluate a culture—thereby violating the anthropologist's relativism. Grima wanted to say that Muslim culture oppressed women. A consistent relativism would have prevented her from saying that. Reddy wants to restore the possibility of a "normative" point of view and allow Grima to criticize another culture.

Plamper explains Reddy's proposal (he calls it an "argument"): "by describing a condition of the world using emotion we also seek to influence this condition; thus, we are adopting an evaluative stance" (p. 234). He provides an example: "I am sad." It is, he tells us, partially a description of a condition (of how I feel), but also "the intensification of one among several emotions and so a diminution or overwriting of other emotions." One chooses to say that it is this emotion, not another which one feels. There seems to be the suggestion that one might (with equal justification or right) have chosen to describe one's emotion differently. Other emotions are "overwritten." What is the metaphysics here?

We seem to have the clearest rejection of any objectivism about emotions. If my choice of language is so decisive, then there is no fact of the matter about how I really feel. It appears that no one knows what he or she really feels because there is no such thing as what we really feel, what our real emotions are. Are our choices about how to describe our emotions totally unconstrained?

Later we are told that we are constrained by the danger of "overheating" or by contradiction. There is as well the danger that our society limits our choices so that we suffer from a too narrow realm of choices, leading to "emotional suffering." Plamper correctly observes that there is a problem here with "truth and objectivity" (p. 262). Indeed, there is such a problem, and it would have been worth spelling it out in more detail. The sort of constraints Reddy places upon emotion and emotion language are not of the right sort. What would an alternative view look like? Suppose emotions are adequate insofar as they are an adequate response to another person or aspect of the world, and so not a matter of choice. The value of a particular emotion depends upon whether it fits an independent reality. It may be possible to reasonably react to one person or situation with different emotions, but the ultimate success of an emotional reaction is determined by how it is with the person or situation in the world to which one responds emotionally. There are many discussions of the rationality of emotion (See, e.g., de Sousa and Scarantino 2018, Section Ten.) but this is a topic which Plamper avoids.

How, in any case, does Reddy's proposal help Grima? We are told that emotion language has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. Universalists focus upon one aspect of emotion language, while relativists focus upon a different aspect. So far, so good, but how does this save Grima from contradiction? Is the idea that she can choose which aspect to emphasize, so a normative stance is allowed her? But, then, when should we choose a normative stance and when a descriptive stance? Or, are we supposed to have learned that evaluation is unavoidable, and therefore Grima is innocent? However, in that case, what is there to say of the universalists? Are they simply blind to the normative side of emotional language? So much is unclear here!

There is much to take exception within this sprawling work; however, the core difficulty is the author's unwillingness to tie himself down on the nature of emotion. It is widely recognized in the contemporary (Plamper would say "analytic") philosophical literature that emotions are complex entities. The philosopher Aaron Ben Ze'ev (Ben Ze'ev 2017) suggests the four basic components of emotion are "cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling." This complexity (de Sousa and Sarantino 2018 speak of "mult-dimensional heterogeneity.") means generalizations about emotions will not be straightforward. Plamper confesses to feeling a need for the category of

“emotion” as a “meta-category”, thereby allowing himself as a historian to make generalizations (p. 38). However, those very generalizations will be suspect if they involve treating emotion as a lump, rather than a complex entity. Indeed, in the analysis of Grima’s work, discussed above, it is precisely on account of treating emotion as a lump that Plamper was able to leap to the conclusion that the objectivist about emotion had been defeated.

This version of the history of emotion is built on shaky foundations. Additionally, as we have seen in our discussion of the account of Reddy’s work, summaries are offered which fail to provide clarification. Having a view about the nature of emotion need not be an obstacle to scholarly objectivity; it can provide a structure by which to organize a summary, recognize weak and strong points in a theory, elaborate and clarify points where an original formulation was unclear.

The History of Emotions may provide an accurate summary of much of what has been written on the subject of emotion; however, insofar as the author fails to adequately respect the complexity of the emotions, the book itself cannot be counted a history of the complex psychological phenomenon which is emotion.

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