This presentation draws on ethnographic research primarily conducted while I was employed as a regular production worker in a North Carolina meatpacking plant for sixteen months between 2009 and 2010. As part of a larger project that attempts to explain the character of social relations between Latina/o migrants and their chief counterparts in the workplace – African Americans – I trace the categories and meanings of shop floor racial talk with parallel attention to the diverse ethnoracial panoramas in Latina/o migrants’ origin countries. How are the terms moyo, negro, and moreno used at work? What does this suggest about how Latinos view African Americans as a group? And how does this language relate to pre-migration ideas about blacks and blackness? I find that the use of ethnoracial forms of identification is much more prevalent among Latina/os towards African Americans than the converse, and I examine the features of one particularly salient designation of African Americans as moyos, a term whose valence is indefinite and situational, but frequently acquires pejorative significance. I trace the transnational origins of this identification, finding that its adaptation and propagation occurs within the transnational spaces that Latina/o migrants occupy. Ultimately, I argue that Latinos’ deployment of bold symbolic boundaries expresses racialized resentment, reflecting and reinforcing their perception that they are the most oppressively exploited workers and that African Americans occupy a privileged position in the workplace.

Vanesa Ribas received her Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2012. Her research has appeared in the American Sociological Review (with Neal Caren and Raj Ghoshal), Social Science and Medicine (with Janette Dill and Philip Cohen), Teaching Sociology (with Raj Ghoshal et al.), and is forthcoming in Sociological Perspectives. She is working on a book based on her study of Latina/o migration to the American South, labor exploitation, and race relations in a large meatpacking plant.

Seminar to be held on Wednesday, May 22nd in ERC 115 at 12:00 pm.

To what extent is the French republican model still viable in debates over immigration and integration in France today?  Viewed from the perspective of the last thirty years, which saw the rise of a powerful anti-immigrant political movement, the Front National, one might conclude that immigration in postwar France has been raging out of control.  Yet despite the remarkable showing of the Front National in recent presidential elections, France has remained a relatively open immigration country, a tradition which dates from the middle of the nineteenth century.  Annual levels of immigration have not fallen much below 100,000 since the early 1950s, the right to asylum has been respected by every postwar government, and France has maintained what is arguably the most liberal naturalization policy in Western Europe.  How can we explain this continuity in the midst of crisis?  I argue that the continuity in the principles and outcomes of French immigration policy is closely linked to the power of the republican model and to the limits of control that are a function of rights-based politics.

James F. Hollifield is Ora Nixon Arnold Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University (SMU). He received his PhD in political science from Duke University in 1985. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he has worked as a consultant for a variety of governmental and intergovernmental organizations, and has published widely on international political and economic issues, including Immigrants, Markets, and States (Harvard UP, 1992), L’immigration et l’Etat Nation (L’Harmattan, 1997), Controlling Immigration (Stanford UP, 2nd Edition, 2004), Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines (Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2008), and International Political Economy: History, Theory and Policy (Cambridge UP, forthcoming) along with numerous other books and scientific articles. Hollifield has been the recipient of grants from private corporations and foundations as well as government agencies, including the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Social Science Research Council, the Sloan Foundation, the Raytheon Company, and the National Science Foundation. His current research looks at the rapidly evolving relationship between trade, migration, and development with a special focus on human capital and how states use migration for strategic gains. He sits on several boards and is currently Chairman of the Owens Foundation and the Dallas County Historical Foundation, the governing body of the Sixth Floor Museum at Dealey Plaza.

Opinions on the extent to which the U.S. enforces immigration laws vary dramatically. Some contend that enforcement is already extremely tough, while others contend that the government fails to enforce immigration law. Rarely are these claims backed by more than one or two statistics.

Based on a long series of Freedom of Information Act requests, the Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) keeps records of immigration enforcement statistics. Their numbers paint a more nuanced picture than either side’s advocates, but leave major holes that available data appear unable to fill.

Removals (Deportations)

The common claim that the Obama Administration deports unauthorized immigrants in record numbers is true. Figure 1 reports the total number of removals each fiscal year between 1980 and 2011. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines a removal as “the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal.” These numbers do not include individuals that were “turned back” at the border—only individuals who went through either an administrative or judicial removal process.

Figure 1. Number of alien removals, FY 1980—2011

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2011.

It is important to note, however, that looking at only the number of deportations can be misleading. The number of new removals ordered in immigration court has dropped each year that President Obama has been in office, as has the number of deportation proceedings.

Figure 2. Number of removals ordered in immigration courts, FY 1998—2013

Source: TRAC. FY 2013 figures include only October through April.

Figure 3. Number of deportation proceedings in immigration courts, FY 1992—2013

Source: TRAC. FY 2013 figures include only October through April.

Like the total number of deportations, court actions do not tell the whole story. This is because not all deportations are a result of immigration court cases. Table 1 suggests that a large and increasing share of deportations occur without ever going to immigration court. TRAC forwards two potential reasons for this, but explains that data are not sufficient to parse between them:

• Reinstated orders. Already-deported immigrants who re-enter the country illegally do not get a new deportation order, but they are deported again. In May 2012, 34.7 percent of all deportations were reinstated orders.
• Administrative removals. Not all types of deportation require a hearing. For example, immigrants previously convicted of aggravated felonies may be removed administratively. Removals that never reach court still count as deportations, but do not appear in statistics about immigration courts.
• Incomplete data. Elsewhere, TRAC has alleged that ICE does not release sufficient data to resolve some perceived data inconsistencies.

Table 1. Immigration court orders versus actual deportations, FY 2010—12

Source: TRAC.

Among those deportation cases that do reach immigration court, the share that end in an allowance to stay in the U.S. has risen dramatically (Figure 4). This rapid increase may be due in part to President Obama’s deferred action program, which allows “DREAMers” to avoid deportation. Additionally, if the government is deporting more immigrants administratively, it could follow that individuals who reach immigration court now tend to have less serious criminal backgrounds. Data presented later (Figure 6) suggest that this is plausible.

Figure 4. Percent of deportation cases ending in allowance to stay in the U.S., FY 1998—2013

Source: TRAC. FY 2013 figures include only October through April.

Spending

Money provides another measure of the U.S. government’s commitment to interior enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the principal DHS office responsible for interior enforcement of U.S. immigration law. Its budget increased rapidly since 2005, but has dropped slightly since the recession began having major budget impacts in FY 2009.

Figure 5. ICE budget, FY 2005—13

Source: TRAC (2005-10), DHS (2011-12), CRS (2013). Note: 2005-10 figures represent total expenditures. 2011-12 represent enacted budget. 2013 represents pre-sequester enacted budget.

Criminal Activity

The extent to which the government deports immigrants accused of crimes (other than entering or remaining in the U.S. without authorization) often rises to prominence in the immigration debate. Since 2008, the share of deportation orders sought in immigration court due to criminal activity has fallen. As explained above, however, many immigrants who have been found guilty of aggravated felonies are deported without ever going to immigration court.

Notably, the data below only represent situations in which ICE cites criminal activity as a basis for deportation. For some immigrants with criminal histories, ICE may choose to cite other reasons in its pursuit of deportation. According to TRAC, ICE has stated that it “cannot reliably identify” the total number of cases in which the immigrant had a criminal history. As with the issue of deportation proceedings above, the available data are not equipped to answer all questions.

Figure 6. Deportation orders sought in immigration court based on alleged criminal activity, Jan. 2008 – Mar. 2012

Source: TRAC. * Preliminary Counts.

A more detailed version of Figure 6 is available here.

Similarly, the number of criminal prosecutions from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE referrals has fallen in recent years. The table below displays the number of criminal prosecutions over the previous 12 months.

Table 2. Trend in criminal prosecutions from referrals to CBP and ICE, Jan. 2009 – Aug. 2012 (previous 12 months)

Source: TRAC.

In ICE detention centers, the majority of immigrants have a criminal conviction. Table 3 displays the top 10 most serious convictions for those with a criminal conviction, and the source table displays the most serious conviction for all those who were in in ICE detention centers as of October 2011.

Table 3. Most serious charge for ICE detainees by frequency, October 2011

Source: TRAC.

Court Backlog

S. 744, the current immigration proposal, mandates the appointment of additional immigration judges. This could help clear the large and growing backlog in immigration courts. This backlog could be part of ICE’s motivation for bypassing immigration courts at a higher rate (presuming, as data suggest, that the agency is actually doing so).

Between 1998 and 2013, the backlog of cases in immigration courts increased by over 150 percent. The increase may be partly attributable to Operation Streamline, which began in began in December 2005 in the Del Rio Border Patrol Sector. The operation requires that “all prosecutable aliens, regardless of nationality, apprehended within the geographic boundaries be prosecuted.” Since that time, Border Patrol has initiated several similar operations across the southwest border, and the number of pending cases has nearly doubled.

Figure 7. Number of pending cases in immigration courts, FY 1998—2013

Source: TRAC. FY 2013 figures as of April 2013.

During the same period, the average processing time for immigration courts increased by nearly 175 percent.

Figure 8. Immigration court processing time for all types of charges

Source: TRAC. FY 2013 figures include only October through April.

An Incomplete Picture

As noted above, deportations and ICE funding have hit record numbers in recent years. On its face, this suggests that immigration enforcement has increased as well. However, court activity around deportations has fallen, and unauthorized immigrants who reach immigration court now stand a much better chance of being allowed to stay in the U.S.

Unfortunately, ICE has not released data that fully explain how these trends fit together. Data suggest that the Obama Administration’s use of immigration courts in deportation proceedings is declining. However, it is unclear how much of this is due to the deportation of previously-deported individuals, to the increased use of administrative proceedings, or to some other factors. In turn, this makes it difficult to determine how heavily ICE emphasizes the deportation of criminals. TRAC, which has endeavored to make these data public for years, has issued strongly-worded rebukes of the quality and quantity of data that ICE maintains and provides.

It is certain that the Obama Administration has deported unauthorized immigrants in record numbers, and that immigration courts have become much more likely to allow immigrants to stay in the U.S. The largest take away, though, may be that the available information makes interior enforcement difficult to assess.

About the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Immigration Task Force. Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation, and respectful dialogue. Like BPC’s other projects, the Immigration Task Force combines politically-balanced policymaking with strong, proactive advocacy and outreach. The Task Force is chaired by former Governors Haley Barbour and Ed Rendell, as well as former Secretaries Henry Cisneros and Condoleezza Rice. For more information, please visit www.bipartisanpolicy.org. This analysis originally appeared here.

For KPCC interview, click here.

For Fronteras interview, click here.

While members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) spent yesterday inside the Dirksen Senate Office Building marking up the bipartisan Senate “gang of 8’s” comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bill, some Republican members of the House of Representatives gathered outside of the Capital Building to declare their opposition to reform efforts. These Representatives have been described as a “veritable all-star team of anti-‘amnesty’ activists.”

While the House has yet to formally take up debate on immigration reform, the group of 8 Representatives who made their opposition known yesterday – particularly with respect to a pathway to citizenship – provides an opportunity to evaluate the early predictions made related to support and opposition to CIR in the House.

The 8 Representatives who gathered yesterday in opposition to CIR are listed in Figure 1. The figure also plots the predicted probability of each of the representatives. As the figure shows, the representatives are correctly predicted as “solid no” votes. The predicted probabilities range from a low of .07, which means a 7% chance of voting yes on CIR to .24, which means a 24% chance of voting yes. The average predicted probability of voting yes on CIR for these 8 Representatives is .13, or only 13%.

It is no special feat to predict that a Representative such as Steve King (IA-4), who has a long history of anti-immigrant voting and other antics, will vote no on CIR. But what this retrospective shows is that the group that assembled yesterday is not alone.

In looking at all of the Representatives with predicted probabilities of less than .13, the results indicate that there are 101 other Representatives who may join this “all star team of anti-‘amnesty’ activists.” Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities for all of these Representatives. They are spread across 17 states with the largest concentrations in Texas and Florida. While the predicted probabilities in the figure reflect the assumptions of the statistical models, when viewed from a different perspective we see that there are 31 Representatives who share immigration voting records that mirror the “anti-‘amnesty’ gang” (they are represented by the orange dots).

The road to CIR is a long one. And while the wheels are currently turning in the Senate we know that the road to final passage runs through the House. What remains to be seen is how many Representatives will join together in efforts to block CIR from passage – which makes it all the more interesting to see which Representatives will stand up to counter these efforts.

Tom K. Wong, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of political science at UC San Diego. He is an expert on immigration politics and policy. He is a research associate at CCIS and beginning in fall 2013 he will be Director of the International Migration Studies Program at UC San Diego.

To view full report, click here.

The Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP) is now accepting applications for the 2013-2014 academic year. For more information and to apply, please click here.

*Application deadline is extended to May 15, 2013.

Abstract: There is broad consensus that immigration policies moved from prevalent negative ethnic selectivity towards widespread ethnic neutrality after World War II. This assessment is biased because it neglects visa policy-making. Travel visas are important immigration management tools, and overt selection by national origin persists in this policy field. The paper analyses the extreme case of recent Ecuadorian visa policy-making, from the annulment of all visa requirements in 2008 to the partial reintroduction of visas for ten African and Asian countries in 2010. The Ecuadorian government justifies the restrictive response to the increase in south-south flows as security policy. Qualitative research reveals that alleged security concerns are closely intertwined with ethnic prejudice of both domestic and international political actors.

Working Paper #188»

Recently, there have been a series of high profile endorsements for comprehensive immigration reform from the Republican Party. Immediately after the November 2012 election Bobby Jindal made a plea for more civility and less stupidity on the immigration issue. Before too long, it was the Gang of 8 in the U.S. Senate, which included four prominent Republican Senators who introduced their framework for an immigration bill. Then the RNC released a lengthy report calling for stronger outreach to Latinos, starting by passing an immigration reform bill. And now Tea Party favorite, Senator Rand Paul, has changed his position and is now in favor of comprehensive immigration reform. Can Republicans really draw more Latino support if they back a path to citizenship? The answer is unequivocally “Yes.” Or if they fail to support immigration reform with a path to citizenship, they could do even worse than Mitt Romney’s all-time low among Latino voters in 2012.

Even President Obama acknowledged that the Republican Party can make gains with Latino voters if they support this issue. Republican Scott Rigell from Virginia told the AP: “He said that actually implementing immigration reform would actually benefit Republicans more than it would Democrats. Looking at the data, Mr. Obama is right. In a recent poll of Latino registered voters on the topic of immigration reform, we asked a couple of different versions of the question “will Republican support for immigration reform make you more likely to vote Republican.” Here we focus on the possible gains (or losses) Republicans can make by reporting results just among Latinos who said they had voted for Obama in 2012, or just among Latino Republicans.

In a hypothetical election match-up with a Republican candidate who supports a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, against a Democrat who opposes citizenship and calls it “amnesty,” we find that 61% of Obama voters would actually choose the pro-immigration Republican.

When asked if they would be more or less likely to vote for a Republican candidate in the future if the Republicans take a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform including a pathway to citizenship, we find that 43% of Obama voters say more likely to vote Republican.

When we explain the current bipartisan efforts in the U.S. Senate with four Republicans working alongside four Democrats, and ask if the Republican commitment to the bipartisan plan makes them more or less likely to vote Republican, we find 26% of Obama voters say they are now more inclined to vote GOP.

Finally, when we ask Latinos to consider all elections they have voted in for local, state and federal office, and ask if they have ever voted for a Republican candidate, we find that 41% of Obama voters say yes, hey have voted Republican at some point.

While there are clear opportunities for the GOP to make gains among Democratically-leaning Latinos, there are also pitfalls if they fail to support immigration reform from within their own ranks.  When asked how important it is that Congress passes an immigration reform bill in 2013, 64% of Latino Republicans said “very” or “extremely” important. When given the argument that immigration reform should wait until later and Congress should focus only on the economy now, 69% of Latino Republicans disagreed and said Congress should focus on both immigration reform and the economy right now. Finally, when asked which immigration policy they would prefer, 66% of Latino Republicans said they wanted an immigration plan with a clear pathway to citizenship, and only 32% of Republicans said citizenship should wait until after the border is deemed secure.

The data are clear that Latino Republicans expect to see movement on an immigration bill, with a path to citizenship in 2013.  But if the bill stalls, or House Republicans block the effort or prevent a path to citizenship, can the Republican party actually do worse among Latinos than Mitt Romney did in 2012?  Yes.

When asked if they approve or disapprove of the job Congressional Republicans are currently doing handling immigration policy, 40% of Latino Romney voters said they disapproved (only 46% approved).

When asked if they perceived Republican Party as doing a good job reaching out to Latinos, or if the Party was ignoring Latinos or even being hostile to Latinos, 41% of self-described Republicans said the GOP was “ignoring or being hostile” to Latinos

When asked if they would be more or less likely to vote for Republican candidates, if the GOP blocks immigration reform with a path to citizenship, 33% of Latino Republicans said they would be less likely to support their party.

Finally, when asked if they would be more or less likely to vote for Democratic candidates, if the Democratic party takes a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform, 32% of Latino Republicans said they would be more likely to vote Democrat.

For more analysis from this report, go here. A version of this post previously appeared in the Latino Decisions blog.

Matt A. Barreto is an Associate Professor in political science at the University of Washington, Seattle and the director of the Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race (WISER). He is also the director of the annual Washington Poll.