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## **Gender Differences in Support for Radical Right, Anti-Immigrant Political Parties**

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## **Introduction**

The rise of radical right parties in Western Europe has led to the politicization of issues such as immigration, making them more salient to voters. The radical right has been skillful in some countries in using the issues of immigration and unemployment to increase its vote share. In using immigration as an issue, radical right parties, particularly in France and Austria, have been able to attract mainly young male voters, who are often referred to as “modernization losers.”

Although the radical right has been successful in some countries, there has been an ongoing gender gap in the vote for radical right parties. The electorates of radical right parties are predominantly male. In this paper I will explore two reasons for this gap. The overall hypothesis is that the anti-immigrant positions these parties take are not attractive to women. First, this may be due to different attitudes women may have toward immigrants. Second, women may be in jobs in which they are less likely to feel threatened by globalization or immigration.

The process of globalization has led to increased unemployment and increased uncertainty in industrial sectors of the economy. Blue-collar workers in particular have felt the brunt of the change to a more service-oriented economy. Immigrants are often used as scapegoats for unemployment. The study of the radical right has tended to focus on two areas: 1) why particular groups, such as blue-collar workers, choose to vote for the radical right and the relationship to immigration (Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 1988, Betz 1994, Kriesi 1995); and 2) the relationship of aggregate socio-economic variables to the vote for the radical right (Swank and Betz 1995, Jackman and Volpert 1996, Chapin 1997).

None of these studies goes very far in explaining why men are more likely to vote for the radical right than women. Table 1 displays gender differences in the vote for radical right parties in Austria, France and Germany. In elections from 1988 to 1995 the radical right’s electorate has been around 40 percent female and 60 percent male. The only case in which the percentage of men and women was equal was in the 1993 French legislative election. This difference between men and women’s vote for radical right parties is generally considered to be a reflection of some of the messages of the radical right, which women may construe as ultraconservative.

**Table 1. Gender Basis of Radical Right Vote (percentage)**

Year		Austria FPÖ	France FN	Germany REP
1988 (Leg.)	Female Male		39 61	
1989 (Euro)	Female Male		43 57	36 64
1990 (Leg.)	Female Male	40 60		42 57
1992 (Reg.)	Female Male		47 53	
1993 (Leg.)	Female Male	44 56	50 50	
1994 (Euro)	Female Male		42 58	40 60*
1995 (Pres.)	Female Male	38 62	40 60	

\*estimate based on previous election data.

Source: Betz 1994, 143; Perrineau 1997, 210; Müller and Ulram 1995, 150

Radical right parties do tend to have male-dominated hierarchical structures. They also tend to be anti-abortion and for giving women money (*kinderschecks*) for each child they have. However, these types of positions have not kept women from voting for conservative parties in the past. As I will discuss in more detail below, several studies have shown that until recently, women have tended to vote in higher percentages for conservative parties than men.

Radical right parties are aware of the importance of the women's vote. Women have played important roles in the leadership of radical right parties. The current leader of the Austrian Freedom party is a woman, and several women in the National Front have stood for office (however, this is usually in place of their husbands who have been banned for campaign irregularities). In general, the radical right parties have not ignored women in their quest for electoral success.

## Radical Right Voters and Immigration

My main argument rests on the assumption that the immigration issue is important to radical right voters. Before exploring the gender gap, it is useful to determine if immigration is an important factor in the radical right vote. If it is important, I would expect to find that radical right voters would have stronger anti-immigrant positions than the general public.

Are radical right party voters more anti-immigrant? In his 1994 analysis of the radical right vote, Betz found that voters for the Republikaner, FPÖ and Vlaams Blok all had much stronger anti-immigrant positions than Green voters, and voters in general. Table 2 displays the answers which the different parties' voters gave to questions related to foreigners in their countries. In the case of the German Republikaner, none of the party's voters strongly agreed with the statement that "Foreigners' way of life

can enrich our way of life.” Also, only 13 percent agreed with the statement that they “Do not mind there being many foreigners in Germany.”

**Table 2. Attitudes toward Immigrants and Foreign Residents (in %)**

- Foreigners’ way of life can enrich our way of life (Germany 1989):
 

	Greens	REP	All
Strongly agree	39	0	9
Strongly disagree	3	38	15
  
- Do not mind there being many foreigners in Germany (1993):
 

	Greens	REP	All
	75	13	45
  
- Find having Turks as neighbors is (Austria 1992):
 

	Greens	FPÖ	All
Pleasant	29	0	13
Unpleasant	12	52	25
Don’t care	57	36	55
  
- Find having Jews as neighbors is (Austria 1992):
 

	Greens	FPÖ	All
Pleasant	33	0	18
Unpleasant	5	39	13
Don’t care	57	48	63
  
- The FPÖ’s demand that foreigners should not be given the right to vote (Austria 1992):
 

	Greens	FPÖ	All
Opposed	43	6	25
  
- Immigrants should have the same rights as Belgians (1993):
 

	AGALEV	Vlaams Blok	All
Agree	67	6	30
Should have fewer	19	93	56

*Source:* Betz 1994, 188

- Do you think that there are too many immigrants in France? (1997)
 

	PS	FN	All
Agree completely	20.2	70.1	30.9
Somewhat agree	24.3	23.7	28.1
Somewhat disagree	23.3	3.6	19.1
Disagree completely	31.2	6.4	19.8

*Source:* French 1997 Legislative Post-election survey, CEVIPOF

The results were similar for the FPÖ (Freedom Party) in Austria and the Vlaams Blok (Flemish

Block) in Belgium. Voters for the radical right in these cases have stronger anti immigrant attitudes than the general public. Since the radical right attracts more men than women, I hypothesize that women may have different attitudes toward immigration than men.

## **Women and Immigration**

Many European countries imported labor during the 1960s and early 1970s to address labor shortages. Both France and Germany, for example, recruited foreign workers after World War II. Germany has never considered itself an "immigration country" and foreign workers have always been considered temporary residents. France has always accepted immigrants as permanent residents. However, it also has looked at foreign workers as temporary residents. In both countries the focus of the "problem" is not with European immigration (there were few restrictions on E.C. citizens, even before the Schengen agreement) but with non-European immigrant workers, such as the Turks in Germany and the North Africans in France.

Several other countries such as Austria, Belgium and the UK have had immigration become an important issue in the 1980s and 1990s. Although all of these countries have placed restrictions on immigration, and stopped the importation of labor after the economic crisis of the early 1970s, the issue of immigration has become more salient with time. The process of globalization has put many workers in a position in which they feel they are competing with foreign workers.

In general, immigration flows during the period of labor importation were geared toward men who would work in the host country for a limited time. The numbers of women immigrants has increased since the labor migrations of the 1960s and early 1970s due to family reunification and the increased flow of women workers (Kofman, 1999). Despite the "feminization of international migration" the process of migration still tends to be characterized as a male dominated activity. In the media, immigrants laborers are generally portrayed as male.

Since immigration is considered a male-dominated activity, women may not feel as directly threatened by it as men. Although women have entered the work force in great numbers, there are still large numbers of women who work at home. Also, those who do work tend to be clustered in female-dominated areas and the service sector, which tend to have few immigrants in them. The service sector has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy in Europe.

Women are less represented in the industrial sector of the economy, which has been hardest hit by globalization. It would seem that women workers may be less directly affected by immigration than men. Other issues, such as equal pay, child care, and education may be more important issues for women than men, thus making them less likely to be attracted to the anti-immigration appeal of radical right parties. I hypothesize that the fact that women work in sectors less affected by immigration leads them to be less likely to vote for radical right parties.

I will begin this analysis by examining radical right parties' positions on immigration, and the relationship between their vote and immigration. I then explore voting patterns for the radical right, and general voting patterns for women. Using survey data, I compare men's and women's attitudes toward immigration, to determine if there are any differences in their responses. I then examine women's role in the work place, and how this may affect their voting patterns.

## **The Radical Right and Immigration**

In this section I will examine in more detail the relationship between immigration, unemployment and the vote for the radical right. As discussed above, radical right party voters do tend to have stronger anti-immigrant sentiments than voters overall. The relationship between the radical right vote, immigration and unemployment is important to the argument that the nature of the sectors that men and women work in has an effect on the gender gap.

The leader of the French *Front National*, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has consistently linked the number of immigrants in France to the number of unemployed. His plan to repatriate immigrants and give French citizens preference in the job market has struck a chord with many working class French voters. Likewise in Austria, the Freedom Party's "Austria First" petition drive was an attempt to push the grand coalition government to toughen immigration control. The Freedom Party's leader, Jörg Haider, has connected the number of immigrants to the number of unemployed in Austria, and the party has called for a reduction in the number of immigrants in Austria until full employment of Austrians has been reached ("Bundnis für Arbeit," 1997). The Berlin Republikaner also recommends the prevention of the flow and employment of foreigners to avoid unemployment of German workers (Berliner Programm, 1995). Several recent surveys in Europe have shown that a majority of voters consider unemployment one of the most important problems facing their country.

In interviews with mainstream and radical right party legislators and party strategists in France, Germany and Austria, unemployment was described as one of the most important problems facing the country. In France, interviewees felt that the combination of high unemployment and large numbers of immigrants in particular areas of the country had led to the increase in support for the National Front. One legislator noted that immigration would not be an issue if unemployment were not so high. The issue of unemployment has played an important role in party strategy in recent legislative election campaigns.

Why should unemployment or the percentage of foreigners matter in the vote for the radical right? Increases in unemployment mean a decline in living standards for those workers directly affected and are also a sign of adverse economic conditions. Lewis-Beck (1988) looks at the role of economics in elections in Western Europe and the U.S. He argues that the impact of economic voting is stronger in some countries than others. For example, he finds that the impact of economic voting is stronger in Germany than in France. Despite these cross-national differences, he finds that, "evaluations of collective economic performance and policy move the voter. In particular, in each of these nations retrospective and prospective evaluations of government economic management significantly influenced incumbent support" (Lewis-Beck 1988, 156). Several other studies such as those of Kramer (1983), Kiewiet (1983), and Markus (1988) also find a relationship between national economic performance and the vote for incumbents. However, this only helps to explain why an incumbent's support might increase or decrease. It does not help to explain why voters might turn to a radical right party.

The presence of foreigners is another factor that may lead to an increased vote for the radical right. The radical right's xenophobic stance has an added appeal for those who feel that cultural homogeneity is being attacked, or that foreign workers threaten their jobs or wage levels. Although there may be no direct connection between unemployment and immigrants, voters may perceive that a relationship exists, particularly when certain industries such as construction tend to employ large numbers of immigrants during periods of high unemployment.

In my own analysis of the relationship between unemployment, immigration and the radical right vote (Givens 2000), I have found that in the case of Austria and France there does appear to be a relationship. However, in the German case, I did not find the same relationship. This would indicate that there are other factors which may play a role in the radical right vote, however, in the cases of France and Austria, where radical right parties been more successful, high levels of unemployment along with high numbers of immigrants in a region do appear to influence the vote for the radical right.

It is clear that radical right parties have used the issues of immigration and economic uncertainty as part of their electoral campaigns. Voters who live in regions with high numbers of immigrants and unemployment may feel that these immigrants are in competition with them for jobs. However, this competition may have a different effect on men than it does on women. If women do not feel that they are in competition with immigrants, the immigration may not have as much of an effect on their vote as it would on men's.

## **The Radical Right Electorate**

In order to understand gender differences in the radical right vote, it is useful to first get an understanding of the general nature of the radical right vote. In this section I examine survey data to determine if radical right parties are attracting different electorates in different countries. If these parties are making different appeals, it may make a difference in the gender gap.

Survey evidence indicates that radical right voters are predominately male, blue-collar workers or small business owners, and have a low level of education. For example, Betz (1994) uses survey data from national election surveys and the European Union's *Eurobarometer* to determine the nature of the parties' constituencies. Although he finds that these parties are not homogenous, there are certain characteristics that do stand out. He finds that these parties are attractive to young men, the self-employed and working-class voters (Betz 1994, 174). Betz shows that the make-up of the radical right's constituency became more and more blue-collar during the 1980s, as it changed its appeal from one of liberal economics to anti-immigrant to increase their following.

Kriesi finds that the radical right parties are attracting similar types of 'modernization losers.' He argues that the difference in their levels of success depends on the relative strength of traditional cleavages. The traditional cleavages, such as religion and class, restrict the ability of radical right parties to mobilize voters who may be attracted to their positions on immigration and economic change. He finds that traditional cleavages are weaker in France than in Germany and that this explains the difference in the radical right parties' level of success in these countries.

Kitschelt and Kriesi use survey data such as the *World Values Survey* and the *Eurobarometer* surveys to describe voters for the radical right. In the case of the *Eurobarometer*, data exist for all European Union countries. The 1990 *World Values Survey* used by Kitschelt includes data for countries from around the world. His analysis focuses on the following countries: France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Britain, Denmark and Norway.

The French National Front is Kitschelt's prototype of a "New Radical Right" (NRR) party, while the German Republikaner is described as a NRR party that does not combine the right type of appeals. His "master case" is a radical right party that combines an authoritarian appeal with a capitalist appeal. He argues that a party with this type of appeal will find "the highest support among craftspeople, shopkeepers, and blue-collar workers" (Kitschelt 1995, 19). To test his hypotheses Kitschelt uses data from the *World Values Survey* of 1990. He begins by comparing the attitudes of voters for the radical right parties to those of the population (of the sample) in general. He finds that there are differences between radical right voters, and populist party voters. Populist parties tend to attract voters from all occupational categories while radical right parties tend to attract more blue-collar workers and the self-employed. Kitschelt cross-validates these data with *Eurobarometer* data that show that white-collar employees and professionals are under represented in both types of party, and that the populist parties have no distinctive occupational composition in their electorate. For example, in the case of Austria he finds more equal support for the extreme right in all occupational categories.

Kitschelt's data in Table 3 displays the percentage of each social group that votes for the radical right in Austria, France and Germany in 1989. The main difference in the numbers is the percentage of highly educated voters who support the Freedom party. In France and Germany the percentage of highly educated voters who vote for the radical right is much smaller compared to the other categories. Although Kitschelt would argue that this is due to the populist strategy of the FPÖ, I argue that this can be explained by the fact that the Freedom party has existed for a longer time than the other radical right parties and had already attracted a portion of the electorate that was highly educated. This is a case where a traditional cleavage still plays a role in the make-up of a party's electorate.

**Table 3. Social Structure Supporting Extreme Right-Wing Parties – 1989 (in percentage of each social group)**

	GERMANY (REP 1989)	FRANCE (FN 1989)	AUSTRIA (FPÖ 1989)
• OCCUPATION: Self-employed, farmers	5.2	3.7	15.0
White-collar, state officials	3.3	2.4	9.0
Blue-collar	6.3	3.3	Skilled 11.0 Unskilled 8.0
• EDUCATION: Low	5.8	3.3	6.0
Medium	5.1	3.1	11.0
High	1.0	2.0	14.0
• GENDER: Men	5.8	3.5	12.0
Women	3.1	2.2	7.0

Source: Kitschelt 1995, 77.

Another problem with Kitschelt's analysis is that it does not recognize the radical right's move away from the capitalist appeal, as described by Betz. Betz argues that the rise of the radical right coincided with the move away from Keynesianism to a type of neoliberalism, exemplified by the policies of the Thatcher government in Britain. The radical right adopted this neoliberal approach, and the German Republikaner even chose their name to reflect their admiration of the American Republican party and "Reaganomics." As socio-economic conditions changed, the radical right began to abandon this neoliberalism for a type of "economic nationalism." Although radical right parties started by pursuing a neoliberal agenda, as economic conditions worsened in Europe, they began to take change their strategy to attract those voters who felt threatened economically. Economic nationalism meant that these parties now promoted protectionist measures for sectors of the economy that were threatened by globalization, and began questioning the governments' support of the Maastricht treaty and European Union.

A problem with both Kitschelt and Kriesi's analysis is the static nature of the data, and the fact that they are dealing too few observations to make reliable inferences. Surveys such as the *World Values Survey* and the *Eurobarometer* surveys do not include enough radical right voters to get clear results and they are limited to one or two years. For example, Kriesi's data from the 1990 Eurobarometer survey has only 41 respondents who indicated they voted for the French National Front and 10 for the German Republikaner. Kitschelt's analysis using the World Values Survey is problematic, since it relies on data in which the radical right voters comprise only 4 to 9% of the national samples. In the case of Germany he



admits that “the results have to be taken with a grain of salt, as there are fewer than 30 Republicans in the entire sample” (Kitschelt 1995, 73).

Using national level election surveys, I show that the radical right electorates are actually similar in their socio-economic make-up. Table 4 demonstrates that the radical right parties in France, Germany and Austria are attracting similar types of voters. I compare the composition of the radical right parties’ voters to determine if the type of voter they are attracting in the mid-1990s is similar compared to the mid-1980s. I have chosen these time periods because they present the time when the radical right first had electoral success, and a time when they had become established parties. Since the results are from national level surveys, the categories are not exactly the same for each country. Note that the data presented in the tables is the percentage of a particular social group that has voted for a party.

**Table 4. Percentage of Social Group Voting for Radical Right Party, by Country**

AUSTRIA	FPÖ		FRANCE	FN		GERMANY	NPD '87	REP '94
	'86	'94		'86	'97			
<b>GENDER</b>			<b>GENDER</b>			<b>GENDER</b>		
Male	12	28	Male	5.2	12.0	Male	0.3	2.5
Female	7	17	Female	3.2	7.5	Female	0.1	1.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>			<b>EDUCATION</b>			<b>EDUCATION</b>		
Primary	6	21	Primary	4.3	10.4	Primary	0.5	2.7
Secondary	11	26	Secondary	6.5	12.9	Secondary	0.2	1.5
University or higher	11	19	Vocational or Technical	5.3	--	University or higher	0	0.5
			University	2.4	6.0			
<b>PROFESSION</b>			<b>PROFESSION</b>			<b>PROFESSION</b>		
Farmers	5	15	Farmers	1.9	4.2	Farmers	0	3.6
Self-Employed	15	30	Self-Employed	7.1	9.0	Self-Employed	0.5	2.2
Managers, Professionals	9	14	Managers, Professionals	3.5	4.1	Managers, Professionals	0.2	0.6
White-Collar	13	22	White-Collar	3.9	6.8	White-Collar	0.1	1.2
Blue-Collar	10	29	Blue-Collar	4.8	8.0	Blue-Collar	0.3	3.6
<b>AGE</b>			<b>AGE</b>			<b>AGE</b>		
< 30	12	25	18-24	7.4	10.0	18-24	0.2	1.5
30-44	11	22	25-34	4.1	12.2	25-34	0.2	2.1
45-59	6	22	35-44	3.1	9.6	35-44	0.1	1.7
60	8	22	45-54	4.9	9.8	45-59	0.2	1.9
			55-64	3.5	9.5	60-69	0.2	1.6
			65	4.4	7.4	70	0.7	1.2
<b>Total Vote</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>1.8</b>
			<b>N</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>173</b>

Source: Austria: Plasser, Ulram and Müller, 1995, 354, 356 and 358. France: *SOFRES* Post-Electoral Survey, May 1988, N=3000, *SOFRES, CEVIPOF* Post-Electoral Survey, May 1997, N=3000. Germany: *Politbarometer West [Germany]*, 1977-1995 Partial Accumulation, 1987 data N=10,000, 1994 data N=10,000.

The radical right tends to attract a higher percentage of male vs. female voters. This trend continues from the 1980s to the 1990s. As shown in table 4, the radical right in each country has continued to attract nearly twice as many men as women.

In the area of education, both the Republikaner and the FN have continued their trend in attracting less educated voters. In the age category the trend is also toward an increase in the percentage

of young voters attracted to each party. The main change from the 1980s is an overall increase in each category as the parties' percentage of the vote increased. However, the continuation of a higher percentage of young voters (under 30) voting for the radical right than older voters, continues the trend of radical right parties attracting younger voters.

One of the most striking instances of constituent profiles becoming similar is in the area of professions. As Betz found, the representation of blue-collar workers in the radical right electorate has increased steadily since the 1980s. This is true not only in France and Germany, but also in Austria. Each of the radical right parties has shown a significant increase in the percentage of self-employed and blue-collar workers they are attracting.

These survey data would indicate that the vote for the radical right is not only similar, but that the types of voters for each party are converging. In France, Germany and Austria, the radical right parties are attracting less-educated, young, male, blue-collar voters. It is difficult to determine if this trend will continue, particularly as the fortunes of the parties change. However, these data make it difficult to argue that the parties are attracting different types of voters. The consistency across countries in the gender gap makes it likely that there are similar factors playing into the radical right vote in Europe.

## **Women voters**

In order to understand the radical right gender gap, one must also understand women's general voting patterns. In this section I begin by discussing research on general gender gaps between men and women in Europe. I then discuss the radical right gender gap.

Joni Lovenduski notes that "much of the research on women and voting between 1945 and 1979 was very perfunctory, what there was tended to rest on untested popular psychological assumptions about women and politics and implicit beliefs about appropriate behavior" (Lovenduski 1999, 196). During this time period, women tended to vote more for conservative parties, and studies tended to focus on explaining this vote. More recent studies of the "women's vote" in Europe has shown that this "gender gap" in the vote for conservative vs. left parties varies across Europe. In countries such as Britain, Italy and France women tend to vote more often for Conservative parties than men do. However, women tend to vote for more left parties in Denmark, Germany and Portugal (Norris 1996). It is difficult to find a similar cross-national trend in the women's vote for mainstream conservative and left parties. Norris does find that there are generational differences in the gender gap. Younger women tend to vote more than younger men for left parties, while older women tend to vote more than older men for conservative parties. This may have important implications for understanding the role gender plays in the radical right vote.

In Europe, the mainstream parties generally have a higher percentage of women in their electorate than men, in part because women are about 52% of the electorate and men are about 48%. For example, in Austria, the SPÖ and the ÖVP each have a higher percentage of female voters (around 54% ) than male voters (around 46% ). The percentages are similar for the SPD and CDU/CSU in Germany with the percentage of women around 53% and the percentage of men around 47%. This is also the case for both the FDP and Green parties. In the most recent French presidential election surveys showed that the conservative and socialist candidates' voters were about 52% female and 48% male. These percentages are in stark contrast to the radical right parties' voters who tend to be closer to two-thirds male and one-third female.

## **The Radical Right Gender Gap**

Nearly every study of the radical right has shown that men are more likely to vote for the radical right than women and that this gender gap has continued over time. As discussed above, table 1 displays the percentage of men and women who voted for the radical right in national elections. Even prior to Haider's 1986 takeover of the Freedom party in Austria, the FPÖ had a higher percentage of male than female voters (54% vs. 46%). This split was even more stark in the 1995 legislative election. In this election, the Freedom party's electorate was 62% male and 38% female. In the 1997 legislative elections in France the FN electorate was 60% male and only 40% female. The potential Republikaner electorate in Germany in 1998 was 52% male and 48% female, according to a survey by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Neu 1998).

In Germany, as in France and Austria, the vote for the radical right is predominantly male. Even in Austria, where the Freedom party has achieved more than 25% of the vote, men are still more likely to vote for this party than women. The explanations for this gender gap are numerous. Most authors argue that the radical right's nostalgia for the past is not attractive to women voters. Perrineau notes that the increase in women's participation in the work force and the fight for equality has led to insecurity in men. He argues that changes in the way politicians deal with nationalism have led some male voters to search for a "father figure" supplied by the National Front in the form of the party leader, Le Pen (Perrineau 1998). Betz argues that women are more involved in social activities, such as attending church, and this leads them to vote for the radical right in lower numbers than men, who are less likely to attend church than women (Betz 1994, 145). Each of these analyses theorizes about the women's vote without providing any data which would support their arguments.

### **Gender differences in attitudes toward immigration?**

Analysts often point to differences between men and women in their attitudes toward important issues. For example, it is assumed that women are beginning to vote in larger numbers for left parties because left parties tend to take on issues such as child care, women's rights, and women's political participation more often than right parties. However, issues such as unemployment and crime are as important for women as they are for men.

The fact that women vote in smaller percentages than men for radical right parties led me to the hypothesis that women may be less anti-immigrant than men. This may particularly be true since, as shown above, radical right voters tend to be more anti-immigrant than voters for other parties. To measure anti-immigrant sentiment, I use data from the 1988 Eurobarometer 30 and the 1993 Eurobarometer 39.

Table 5 displays the answers given by survey respondents relating to their attitudes towards immigrants (foreigners or people of another nationality) living in their countries. The results from 1989 and 1993 indicate that women have similar attitudes as men toward immigrants. In both years there is almost no difference in the percentage of men and women indicating that there are "too many" people of another nationality living in their country.

### **Table 5. Attitudes Toward Immigrants by Gender**

•

- Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people of another nationality, living in our country: are there too many, a lot but not too many or not many? (1988) N=11114

	Male	Female
Too many	31.5	32.1
A lot but not too many	41.1	43.8
Not many	27.4	24.1

(Of those respondents who were not working) N=5696

	Male	Female
Too many	33.4	32.6
A lot but not too many	40.7	42.5
Not many	25.9	24.9

*Source:* Eurobarometer 30, October-November 1988

- Generally speaking, how do you feel about people living in (OUR COUNTRY) who are not nationals of the European Community Countries: are there too many, a lot but not too many, or not many? (1993) N=15,136

	Male	Female
Too many	41	40.9
A lot but not too many	32.6	32.9
Not many	14.3	12.2

(Of those respondents who were unemployed) N=930

	Male	Female
Too many	47.1	49.5
A lot but not too many	30.1	31.7
Not many	17.4	12.0

*Source:* Eurobarometer 39, March-April 1993

In order to determine if there might be a difference between men and women who were not working, I looked only at respondents who were not working. The results were similar. In 1988 the results were almost the same as for the entire sample, and in 1993 there was little difference between unemployed men and women, although the overall percentages increased.

I also looked at many other subsets of the data, including dividing the data by country and by age group. Although there were clearly country differences in the percentage of people who felt there are too many immigrants in their country, it was difficult to find any gender differences. I also found age differences, with younger people less likely to respond that there were too many non-natives in their country, but there was little difference across genders.

These results indicate that there is no difference between men and women in their attitudes toward immigrants. These results cannot indicate whether or not the issue is as important for women in their voting behavior, but it does indicate that other factors may play an important role in the vote for the radical right.

### **Occupational segregation of men and women**

It is clear from the evidence provided above that there are few differences in men and women's attitudes toward immigration. We have seen above that radical right parties tend to draw their votes from blue-collar and self-employed workers. Can differences in the areas that men and women work in explain the radical right gender gap? The main argument of this section is that women's position in the labor market leaves them less vulnerable to competition from immigrants and globalization.

An *Economist* article from September 1996 argues that "women are catching up with men for economic reasons ('women's jobs' are growing faster than men's) and social ones (men won't do women's work'). Both reasons hit unskilled and ill-educated men disproportionately hard." (*Economist*, 1996). Men may be more likely than women to lose their jobs, or be forced into lower paying jobs in the new global economy. If men are more likely to be the "modernization losers" then men may also be more likely to vote for radical right parties.

A study of occupational segregation of men and women in Europe also indicates that women are benefitting from the expansion of the service sector, while men are suffering from declines in the industrial sector (Rubery and Fagan, 1993). Rubery and Fagan find that women have increased their relative share of the service sector. Also, women in industrial positions tend to be in clerical positions which are less vulnerable to redundancy. As the numbers of industrial jobs have declined in Europe, blue-collar workers have been hit hard.

Table 6 displays women's share of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors from 1983, 1987 and 1990. Although women are only 40 percent of the work force in Germany, they represent 50 percent of all service workers. The results are similar for the other countries in the survey, depending on women's participation in the workforce. At the most, women represent only 25 percent of industrial workers. This is the sector in which the radical right has had the most success.

**Table 6. Concentration and Segregation of Women's Employment by major industrial sector**  
**Women's share of employment (percentage of total work force)**

Country		Agriculture	Industry	Services	Total
Belgium	1983	28.6	18.7	42.8	34.3
	1987	28.4	19.6	44.0	35.8
	1990	26.0	19.4	46.4	37.5
Germany	1983	49.9	23.6	49.1	38.6
	1987	45.5	24.4	49.2	39.1
	1990	43.9	25.4	50.8	40.4
France	1983	36.3	24.5	50.6	40.7
	1987	35.2	24.3	51.6	42.0
	1990	34.4	24.8	51.8	42.5
Italy	1983	35.4	23.4	37.0	32.0
	1987	33.6	23.5	38.7	33.2
	1990	35.4	24.5	39.4	34.2
UK	1983	20.4	22.4	52.5	40.9
	1987	20.8	22.9	53.1	42.4
	1990	22.7	23.2	53.9	43.2

Source: Rubery and Fagan 1993, 17.

The structure of the labor market is much different for men than it is for women. Men are over-represented in the sectors which have been hardest hit by globalization and women are in the fastest

growing sectors. This would indicate that women may have different occupational concerns than men, despite the fact that they have similar positions on immigration.

In order to reinforce this point, it would be helpful to determine the types of women who do vote for the radical right. Are they blue-collar workers? This will be difficult to answer with general survey data, such as *Eurobarometer*, but it may be possible to get more detailed information from national level election surveys.

## **Conclusion**

In this analysis I have been able to show that women have similar attitudes as men toward immigrants or non-EU nationals. My first hypothesis, that women would have different attitudes, cannot be supported. Other factors must play a role in women's vote for the radical right. My second hypothesis, that women vote differently due to different socio-economic profiles may have more merit.

I have not yet been able to identify a clear causal mechanism between the nature of the women's labor force and the vote for the radical right. Clearly more research is needed to determine what types of women are voting for radical right parties, and the factors that make men more likely to vote for the radical right than women. It would appear that the answer will not be found directly in the immigration issue.

Other areas for future research include looking more closely at the relationship between age and the radical right vote as well as gender. A multi-variate approach may be more likely to get at the different factors which are playing into the radical right vote.

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