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## **Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Welfare State Regimes in Europe**

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# **Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Welfare State Regimes in Europe**

by

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines whether the stand-alone and cross-level interactive effects of individual and contextual predicting variables of anti-immigrant sentiment vary as a function of institutional differences in welfare regimes. Using data from the 2003 ISSP module, several direct and indirect measures tapping welfare state systems were created to assess the disparities in anti-immigrant sentiment across 22 Western and Eastern European countries. Results from the hierarchical multilevel models show that the mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment are lower in those countries with high levels of public spending in social protection programs. The findings further indicate that an individual's labor force status (being unemployed), nativism and conservatism political stance become even stronger predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment in countries with more robust welfare state systems. Moreover, the differences in the mean level of anti-immigrant sentiment between the two parts of the continent stay significant even after multiple controls at the micro- and macro-levels. The implications of these findings are discussed from the perspective of the ethnic economic competition model, as well as by taking into account the converging trend in immigration policy among the member states of the European Union in recent years.

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## **Introduction**

In most European countries there is an ongoing debate on the type and extent of social services the state should extend to migrants. On the one hand, opponents of the development of welfare programs to facilitate migrants' incorporation into the host society claim that these programs foster a 'culture of dependency' and become a financial burden on the state. Some maintain that the very existence of redistributive social programs acts as a magnet which attracts a large number of unskilled workers, interested not only in job opportunities but also in potential unemployment benefits and other compensations (Brucker et al. 2001). On the other hand, others recognize the positive effect migrants have on the host societies' economy, especially if these migrants are skilled workers (Facchini and Mayda 2007). In spite of the weak empirical evidence supporting the negative fiscal effects of immigration on the state, countries such as the United States, Germany, and France have recently produced legislation to deny welfare benefits to documented and undocumented migrants. It is not clear however, whether the implementation of these legislations is necessarily paralleled by a public backlash against foreigners and, if so, whether different groups within the native population have different responses towards immigration depending on their position in the social structure of the host society. We argue that to the extent that different welfare state and immigration policy regimes produce distinctive patterns of immigrant's incorporation across countries, we expect to find variation in how different publics perceive such processes.

The literature on anti-immigrant sentiments has demonstrated that classic individual predictors of prejudice such as education, perceptions of threat and national identity vary depending on the contextual characteristics such as economic and demographic environments (see Ceobanu & Escandell 2008). In this paper we argue that the institutional environment (e.g. the policies, programs and legislations enacted by the welfare state) is another key contextual variable to consider in establishing the causal relationship between classic individual level predictors of prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment. We aim to investigate whether native individuals that benefit from highly-developed corporatist welfare state programs (such as Sweden) are more, less or just as likely to express anti-immigrant sentiments than individuals living in countries with more restricted welfare policies and where an ethos of individual responsibility prevails (such as Britain).

We argue that the institutional and political environment sets the stage for specific inter-group relationships to take place, and as such, variability across institutional environments will necessarily produce differences in public opinion towards immigration. Furthermore, within countries, we examine whether groups whom benefit differently from welfare state programs (such as the unemployed, the disabled, the elderly etc), are more or less likely to express prejudice.

Our approach is thus twofold. First, we explore whether the relationship between individuals' characteristics and anti-immigrant sentiment vary across institutional environments defined by the type of welfare state system in Western and Eastern European democracies. Welfare states are defined as "powerful institutional forces embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership belonging, entitlement and identity" (Geddes, 2003: 152). We use an embedded approach because individuals' public attitudes are expected to vary across country levels depending on institutional characteristics, more specifically the type of welfare state regimes. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that institutional structures have historically resulted from class based social movements leading to forms of collective action and solidarity that result in specific institutional welfare regimes. We expect that the institutional arrangements that result from these class based social movements will lead to solidarity and ultimately affect the ways migrants become incorporated into the host society. By introducing the institutional dimension, we explore the relationship between perceptions of economic and political threats posed by immigrants and endorsements of restrictive immigration policies which are mediated by the existence or lack of robust welfare state systems. From this perspective, types of welfare regimes (and the policies aimed at regulating social inequalities) may affect public attitudes towards immigrations. Thus levels of expenditure on social protection systems will help explain the interaction between attitudes towards welfare state policies and inequality and the emergence of new forms of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Secondly, we examine individual level theories as they are tied to prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment (Quillian 1995). For example we examine whether individuals' socioeconomic characteristics shape their attitudes towards immigration. Thus, we address whether those who are more socially and economically vulnerable are more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment. We also investigate

individual political and national identification as they relate to immigrant prejudice. We expect that those expressing higher levels of nativism are more likely to express harsh feelings towards immigrants. Moreover, we expect to find a relationship between micro level predictors and anti-immigrant sentiment and the development (or lack of) welfare state policies. Thus, institutional factors are tested vis-à-vis other contextual effects such as a country's economic conditions which may be associated to policy-making decision processes regarding the development of welfare state policies and their relationship to perceptions towards migrants.

Finally, we take into consideration regional differences between the ex-soviet bloc and other Western European countries incorporated at different stages into the European Union. Do the institutional legacies in these regions, such as public attitudes towards inequality and its origins, influence the expression of anti-immigrant sentiments?

### **Immigration and Welfare State Regimes**

There is an extensive literature in the US that examines the use of welfare programs by migrants (see for example Bean and Van Hook; Bean and Stevens). In the European context, similar research is divided among those who conceptualize the welfare state as exclusive towards migrants (for example Freeman 1986) versus those who argue that the state has the responsibility to provide social rights and benefits to migrants (Soysal 1994). Nevertheless, empirical research in the European context has been limited to Northern European countries and has focused mainly on addressing migrants' total participation and the overall economic burden immigration poses on specific welfare programs (see Pedersen 2000; Rosholm et al., 2001). Moreover, cross-national empirical research is even scarcer with the exception of several economic studies (see Facchini and Mayda 2007; see also Hanson 2005). Thus, a pressing gap in the sociological scholarship focused on immigration and welfare states requires a comparative framework to study cross country differences in the institutional determinants that explain individual attitudes towards immigration and immigration policies.

The existing literature *does* demonstrate that immigration and ethnic heterogeneity often become an obstacle for the development of robust welfare systems (Bay and Pedersen 2006; Quadagno 1994; Gilens

1999; Alesina et al 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Bay and Pedersen (2006) for example, examined the relationship between attitudes towards unconditional income redistribution policies and ethnic heterogeneity in Norway. They found that, many initial supporters of an unconditional basic income policy changed their mind when told it would include non-citizens living in Norway (p. 432). Along these lines, Ragin (2004) examining the working class solidarity towards beneficiaries of universalistic welfare system in Scandinavian countries, suggests that the high degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity in these countries was an important historical precondition for the development of particularly comprehensive and redistributive welfare state systems (Ragin 1994; Rojas 1999; Kildal and Kuhne 2002). Overall, these studies assume that to understand individual's public opinion towards welfare, it is necessary to understand their perceptions towards those more likely to become welfare recipients. Our study inverts this approach: we propose that the existence or --lack thereof-- of welfare state systems might affect the attitudes towards newcomers.

In a study examining the relationship between welfare determinants and individual attitudes, Facchini and Mayda (2007) show that high income individuals are more negatively affected by unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita accessibility to benefits. However, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution suffer more with unskilled immigration if taxes are kept constant and the adjustment is carried out through a reduction in the per capita transfers. Based on this evidence, we expect differences in the relationship between perceptions towards immigration (unskilled and/or skilled) by individuals at the lower versus higher brackets of the income distribution and between countries with robust versus weak universal welfare state regimes. Before we establish several hypotheses building upon these studies, a characterization of the different types of welfare state regimes is in order.

#### *Types of Welfare State Regimes*

Across Europe, different institutional and organizational structures reflect the array of social policy models regarding migrant's social rights (Cornelius et al. 2004; Soysal 1994; Esping-Andersen 1999; Sainsbury 1999). Using several social and economic measures such as social rights, degree of decommodification and the stratification, Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies several European countries into liberal, conservative-

corporatist and social democratic welfare state regimes. With regard to immigration and welfare state regimes, Sainsbury (2006) establishes a three-prong classification: 1) the liberal *inclusive* model (e.g. United States) characterized by bestowing citizenship on the basis of birthplace criteria (*ius solis*), 2) the conservative model based on *exclusionary* rights (e.g. Germany) based on lineage (*ius sanguinis*) and 3) social democratic *inclusive* based rights based on residence (*ius domicile*).

A third classification of welfare state regimes is specifically tied to international migration. Soysal (1994) provides a classification of European countries based on incorporation regimes. She distinguishes between: *Corporatist*, *Liberal*, and *Statist*. Examples of these models are Sweden and the Netherlands, for the centralized collectivist corporatist model, Britain and Switzerland for the individualist liberal-decentralized model; France for the state-centered incorporation regimen; and Germany representing a model between the statist and corporatist. A central tenant in Soysal's classification is the variation across countries in terms of migrant's capacity to formally create advocacy groups that seek formal political representation into the host society. The Swedish civil society for example, thus directly supports numerous ethnic migrant organizations coupled by a comprehensive funding scheme aimed at strengthening 'migrant's self-organization and to further contact and cooperation between migrants and Swedish institutions' (Soysal 1994: p. 91). While a similar institutional environment is found in the Netherlands, a more limited funding scheme is provided in Britain and Switzerland. Otherwise, France does not directly support collective ethnic identity and organizing. Germany while funding for organizations is available, this is channeled through local government as opposed to the national centralized scheme provided by Sweden and the Netherlands. Funding schemes oriented to preservation of the original culture, political activities and representation, as well as political adaptation (such as services to migrants) are more abundant in social democratic regimes compared to the other models.

Furthermore the corporatist model is characterized by the function of corporate groups, such as faith-based organizations and occupational associations that play key roles in the incorporation process of new immigrants. Under this model, immigrants obtain their social right through these corporate groups. Hence, the corporatist model is centrally organized and collectively oriented (Soysal, 1994). The liberal

model does not have a centralized administration or formal collective groups that play a role in incorporation. Rather, the labor market is the main instrument of incorporation. Even though a central authority determines the basic rules and process of incorporation, the authority does not play a significant role; instead, individual action is the main source of incorporation with help coming from private associations or local groups. The statist model is opposed to the liberal model, as the state is seen as the administrative unit that organizes incorporation, and the model does not have an intermediary structure (and so, it is distanced from corporatist model).

A final consideration is the transitional nature of the welfare state regimes of Central and Eastern European countries, especially during the nineties. This European region is characterized by an array of countries with different levels of welfare state development (Standing 1996). Fender (2007) supports Esping-Andersen's three type classification in Western Europe and further proposes expanding the classification for Central Eastern European countries. He divides the Central and Eastern European countries between former *USSR types* (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, and Russia) versus post communist countries *European types* (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and a third one *developing welfare states types* (e.g. Romania and Moldova). While the USSR type is characterized by lower levels of total governmental expenditures compared to Western European countries, the biggest difference is their very low levels of institutional trust. The European type is characterized by greater levels of egalitarian political environments and sustained levels of growth. Finally, the *developing welfare state regime type* is characterized by high levels of infant mortality and clearly behind in levels of economic growth.

One common feature among the Central and Eastern European countries is the economic challenges they faced during the democratic transition which strongly disposed individuals toward social explanations of inequality (e.g. poverty) that are added to a strongly rooted ethics of moralist individualism (see Kluegel et al. 1995). Building on the work by Kluegel et al (1995), we argue that the comparative desirability of cooperation and individualism affect the development of social policies and programs. As such, one feature to take into consideration while analyzing welfare state regimes and anti-immigrant sentiment is not only the disparities in levels of social expenditures but also their public attitudes towards welfare state policies



(see Blekesaune 2007).

### **Predictors of Anti-immigrant Sentiment**

There is an extensive literature (mainly from the North American and European continents) on anti-immigrant sentiment that focuses on how national contexts of advanced liberal democracies shape public responses towards immigration (see for example Coenders & Scheepers 2003; Ceobanu & escandell 2008; Kunovich 2002, 2004; McLaren 2003; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky 2006; Scheepers, Gijbers & Coenders 2002; Scheepers, Gijbers & Hello 2002). The range of explanations for expressions of prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment covers a lot of theoretical ground. For example, classic studies examine psycho-social dynamics like authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950), alienation (Fromm 1955), or social dominance theory (Pratto et al. 1994). Recent work has established socio-economic correlates of prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment (Pettigrew 2000; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007), for example, studies focused on economic self-interests and competition that find inspiration in the rational actor models (Bonacich 1972, 1976; Burns & Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade & Hempstead 1996; Esses, Jackson & Armstrong 1998; Haubert & Fussell 2006; Mayda 2006; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior 2004). In an effort to systematize the micro level predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment we have synthesized below the main theoretical influences as they relate to our measures.

We use national feelings as a predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment. The relationship between national identity and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrant minorities has long been of interest to social scientists (Billiet et al. 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; de Figueredo and Elkins 2003; Hjerm 1998; Knudsen 1997; Luedtke 2005; Maddens et al. 2000; Sides and Citrin 2007). Assuming that national identity is multidimensional, scholars have examined how clusters of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ national feelings differently impact anti-immigrant sentiment, thus contributing to our understandings of some of the mechanisms that ignite exclusionism (see Bar-Tal and Staub 1997; Blank and Schmidt 2003; Christin and Treschel 2002; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Jones and Smith 2001; Schatz and Staub 1999; Schatz et al., 1999; Staub, 1997). Among these positive and negative national feelings are institutional legitimacy and nativism respectively.

We establish a theoretical distinction between institutional support and nativism as two polarized forms of national identification (see Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). On the one hand, institutional legitimacy represents a type of national solidarity based on inclusion and inclusiveness and reflects a country's socio-political and economic systems and stability. Nativism, in turn, stresses the efforts made to maintain or preserve the established nationals' dominant position as a group. These forms of attachment to the nation has become increasingly visible in the two regions as a result of events such as the expansion of the EU in the West and the (re)definition of national character for many countries from Eastern Europe following the collapse of communist regimes. Thus, we expect that strong feeling of identification with the nation will lead to more anti-immigrant sentiment. We argue however that the positive and negative effects of national identity predicting anti-immigrant sentiment might be shaped by the contextual differences as a result of different types of institutional environments.

Among other individual level predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment, scholars have focused on the impacts exerted by group realistic and perceived threats (see Fetzer 2000a,b; Jackson et al. 2001; Quillian 1995), inter-group contact (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew 1997), and cultural and symbolic threats (Jackson et al 2001; Raijman et al. 2003). Chief among these individual level predictors is popular mobilization by right-wing and anti-immigrant parties (Golder 2003; van der Brug & Fennema 2003; van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2000), education (Coenders & Scheepers 2003; Hjerm 2001; Kunovich 2002; McLaren 2003; Quillian 1995), position within the labor market (Burns & Gimpel 2000; Haubert & Fussell 2006; Mayda 2006), and economic vulnerability (McLaren 2003). We expect that the effects of education as well as individuals' objective economic position will be shaped by the different types of welfare state regimes. Our goal here is to examine whether individuals' economic vulnerability predicting anti-immigrant sentiment varies across institutional environments.

A new line of research within the public opinion literature on immigration has put at center-stage an emphasis on the embedded nature of micro level predictors into larger contextual frameworks. Contextual factors may include the effects of ethnic composition (e.g. minority group size) as well as the economic infrastructure (e.g. economic inequality) and their roles in shaping the relationships between classic

individual predictors and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). Theoretically, the inclusion of macro-structural allows for new ways of explaining the variation of attitudes toward minority group members. Researchers were thus able to put to test a whole array of propositions about the embedded nature of public responses toward immigrants and immigration policies, while controlling for individual-level attributes. Studies have shown, for example, that liberal-democratic traditions constitute a key contextual predictor for the emergence of new forms of anti-immigrant sentiment (see Ceobanu & Escandell 2008; Coenders & Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers & Gijsberts 2002), permissiveness of immigration policies (Hjerm 2007), or the degree of religious heterogeneity (Hello, Scheepers & Gijsberts 2002). We add to this contextual approach the ways micro-level predictors are embedded within welfare state regimes

With the above theoretical framework and contextualization in mind, we argue that more empirical attention has to be given to the potential positive effects welfare systems (as mechanisms of redistribution) may have in creating improved conditions for migrants settlement into host societies and for fostering better inter-group relations. Two very distinct propositions can be formulated: 1) countries with highly developed and robust social protection systems are more likely to create the necessary conditions for larger social and cultural integration of migrants; and 2) in countries with a highly developed social protection system, anti-immigrant sentiment may develop as a result of ethnic competition, self interest and perceptions of threat. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

H1: Anti-immigrant sentiment (across Western and Eastern Europe) is higher in countries with less developed welfare state regimes than in countries with more developed systems.

H2: Anti-immigrant sentiment is lower in countries with higher mean levels of *state-centered views* towards inequality compared to countries with high levels of *individualistic views* towards inequality.

H3: As a result of competition for scarce resources, individuals' objective economic position (e.g. being unemployed) will predict AIS more strongly in countries with more developed systems of welfare state regimes than in countries with less developed systems.

H4: Stronger in-group identification (e.g. nativism) will predict AIS more strongly in countries with developed systems welfare state regimes.

### **Data and Measurements**

Data for this study come from the 2003 module ‘Aspects of National Identity’ of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The pooled dataset comprises 23,818 individuals (10,029 Easterners and 13,789 Westerners). This survey was administered in former communist countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) and Western European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany).

The dependent variable was operationalised as a weighted mean index of anti-immigrant sentiment consisting of four items (see Appendix 1). Responses to these statements range from 1 to 4 on a 4-point scale, with a high score reflecting elevated levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. A confirmatory factor analyses was used to validate that the four items included captured the same dimension.

‘Table 1 about here’

The key predictors for the national identity measures at the individual level are: ‘nativism’ and ‘institutional support’ (see Appendix 1 for the exact wording of the items). We also used confirmatory factor analysis to validate these measures. Other key independent variables are labor force status (‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, ‘students’, ‘retired’ and ‘never in the labor force’). These variables are used to test the cross-level interaction hypotheses outlined above. Other control variables were used such as ‘political stance’ (rightist party attachment’), and several socio-demographic variables such as ‘age’, sex, and ‘university education’. Education was also used to test for possible cross-level interactions.

Aside from the individual-level variables, we have created several macro level measures to assess countries’ institutional environment, using the official national statistics offered by the *Eurostat*. The direct measure for the welfare state regime is the “total public social expenditure” (as a percentage of the GDP). This measure includes healthcare, pensions, unemployment and other social transfers. Regardless of whether migrants have access or not to these benefits (which varies across countries), the goal is to assess

overall size of the welfare state regimes in Western and Eastern Europe. A second indirect measure captures the climate towards the institutions of the welfare state. We use an overall aggregate level regarding the attitudes towards the welfare state as is measured in the World Value Survey (WVS). The question asked in particular is: ‘Now I’d like you to tell me your views on some important political issues. How would you place your views on this (1-10) scale?: The state should take the initiative to provide for all people (value 10) versus individuals should take the initiative to provide for themselves (value 0)’. To assess this last indirect measure we used the two of three waves in which this question was included, wave 1994-1999 and 1999-2004. These two measures are used to assess the institutional environment regarding whether there is more support for a collective state-centered or individualistic approach towards inequality.

Three additional macro level measures are included in the analysis to tap for the composition of countries’ population of refugees and asylum seekers. We estimated the size of the number of refugee and political asylum applications using *Eurostat* and office of the *United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees* (UNHCR). We calculated a three-year average of asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants. The aggregate-level controls attempt to capture disparities among countries and reflect economic circumstances measured through the inverse of Gross Domestic Product per capita (‘economic condition’) and we created a dummy variable, labeled “Eastern Europe,” aimed at capturing regional variation.

### *Model*

We estimated several models using hierarchical linear modeling of anti-immigrant sentiment as being determined by micro and macro-level variables. We also introduced several controls for possible variations across regions in Europe and included several models estimating interactions between each individual- and country-level variable. Tables 2 and 3 report the results of such models. In table 2 model 1 to 4 test for the random intercept effects without any predictors at the macro level which mathematically can be written as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^{10} \beta_{qj} * X_{qij} + r_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{ij}$  is the response of an individual  $i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n_j$ ) in the  $j$ th ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, J$ ) country on the dependent

variable anti-immigrant sentiment,  $X_{qij}$  ( $q = 1, 2, \dots, 10$ ) is a level-1 predicting variable  $q$  for case  $i$  in unit  $j$ , betas are level-1 coefficients ( $\beta_{0j}$  the intercept and  $\beta_{qj}$  is a vector of slopes), and  $r_{ij}$  is a level-1 residual.

Table 2 models 5 to 6 include several parameters at the macro level, and we test hypothesis 1 and 2.

Mathematically the model can be written as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{s=1}^5 \gamma_{0s} * W_{0sj} + u_{0j}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\beta_{0j}$  is the intercept estimated in equation (1),  $W_{0sj}$  ( $s = 1, 2, \dots, 5$ ) is a level-2 predicting variable or interaction term,  $\gamma_{00}$  is a level-2 intercept,  $\gamma_{0s}$  is the vector of slopes for the estimated level-2 predicting variables, and  $u_{0j}$  is a level-2 random effect. Table 3 introduces the hypothesis 3 and 4 and tests for the cross-level interactions, mathematically written as:

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \sum_{m=1}^3 \gamma_{1m} * W_{1mj} + u_{1j}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\beta_{1j}$  is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the four level-1 clusters of national feelings,  $W_{1mj}$  is a level-2 predicting variable (the direct and indirect measure for the institutional environment and other macro level controls),  $\gamma_{10}$  is a level-2 intercept,  $\gamma_{1m}$  is a vector of level-2 slopes, and  $u_{1j}$  is a level-2 random effect. The overall equation for all the cross level interactions can be expressed as follows:

$$\beta_{qj} = \gamma_{q0} + \sum_{q=2}^{10} \gamma_{q1} * W_{1j} + u_{qj}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\beta_{qj}$  ( $q = 2, \dots, 10$ ) is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the level-1 control variables,  $W_{1j}$  is the level-2 predicting variable corresponding,  $\gamma_{q0}$  is a vector of level-2 intercepts,  $\gamma_{q1}$  is a vector of level-2 slopes, and  $u_{qj}$  is a level-2 random effect.

## Results

We tested hypotheses 1 to 4 regarding the effects of classic predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment across different institutional environments in tables 2 and 3. We report the interpretation of results from

tables 2 first since we first test for the random intercept model (equation 1). The first model gives an estimation of the basic socio-demographic variables and their effects. The effects are statistically significant and in the expected direction, reproducing the findings of other studies (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello et al. 2002; Kunovich 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). Model 2 further controls for the labor force status variables also validating previous research. The unemployed are more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment compared to those employed. Similarly retirees are more likely to express prejudice and students less likely. In model 3 we tested the micro level effects of political stance, nativism and institutional support. These effects yielded large coefficients in the expected direction thus corroborating previous research of anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). One unit increase of institutional support (a civic-leaning measure of national identity) decreases anti-immigrant sentiment substantially. Similarly, the effects of nativism increases anti-immigrant sentiment as do more conservative political leanings. When contrasted with the unrestricted model, model 1 to 3 in table 2 (the random intercept models) account for 23 percent of the explained total variance in anti-immigrant sentiment.

Model 4 introduces several macro level explanatory variables to explain the different mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment across countries. Model 4 shows that the number of applications of asylum seekers by country reduces the grand mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. This variable supports the idea that the number of asylum applications is associated with institutional environments which are more supportive of migrants and which also translates into lower immigrant prejudice. This measure is an institutional one indirectly in that it taps into the host societies' approach towards political refugees and asylum seekers since the number of applications reflects the higher application quotas and overall admission levels. Results in model 4 further show that Eastern European countries show a significantly higher level of anti-immigrant sentiment compared to the West supporting previous findings in the literature (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). These two macro level findings are significant after controlling for the GDP per capita level, that is that more developed countries tend to have lower grand mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment.

‘Tables 3 and 4 about here’

Model 5 introduces one of the two main macro level variable in this study. Our analysis shows that overall expenditures on social protection systems, as an indicator of welfare state regime attains statistical significance. Thus, countries with stronger welfare state regimes report lower grand mean level of anti-immigrant sentiment. This is a key finding since it provides evidence that the existence of robust welfare systems is a positive institutional dimension isolated from degree of economic development, and regional differences between East and West (controls that are already in the model). This effect further supports the findings from the previous model with the negative sign for the refugees and asylum seekers variable. The total variance in the dependent variable changes substantially to almost 50% as compared to models 1 to 3.

In model 6, we introduced the indirect effect based on the overall aggregate level regarding attitudes towards the welfare state as is measured in the World Value Survey (WVS). The results, however, are puzzling because they do not support the previous findings in model 5. In fact, countries that score higher in state responsibility as opposed to individualism, show higher mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. This is probably due to the fact that the variance of the state-individualism measure does not fluctuate much within Western European countries as compared to Eastern European countries which show higher mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. A careful review of this measure shows that some countries with strong welfare systems score higher in individualism than those countries with relatively weak welfare state systems which score higher on agreeing that the state should provide for all. It seems that (at the aggregate level) once a robust welfare state system is already in place, individuals are more likely to embrace individualism and *vice versa* if the welfare state is weak.

Table 3 tests hypotheses 3 and 4 running cross level interactions (or random slope models), models 1 to 18. For clarity, we have interpreted only those cross level interactions that yielded significant results. Model 1 in table 3, for example, shows that the effects of education in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment are weaker in countries in which state versus individual beliefs towards inequality are higher. Education is thus a weaker predictor in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment in these type of institutional environments. In model 6 results further show that institutional environments matter to interpret the relationship of the classic predictors of prejudice.



Table 3 model 6 indicates that being unemployed becomes a more powerful predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment in countries with robust welfare state systems. This result illustrates that an individual's socioeconomic position matters and that being unemployed is a stronger predictor in countries with robust welfare state systems. Similarly, in model 10, being politically conservative in a country where there is higher agreement that the state over the individual should be in charge of provisions, is a stronger predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment. Model 12 further confirms this finding, since being politically conservative (voting for a right wing political party) predicts more strongly anti-immigrant sentiment in countries with robust welfare systems compared to countries with weaker systems.


Finally, model 15 further confirms hypothesis 4 and 5 since the effects of nativism are shaped by the institutional environment of the country. Nativism is a weaker predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment in countries where robust welfare state systems are present. Along these lines, institutional support in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment becomes a stronger predictor when high levels of social protection systems are present. Thus, investments in social protection systems seem to have a strong payoff when it comes to reducing prejudice towards immigrants.

### **Conclusion and discussion**

We started the article by establishing the hypothesis that anti-immigrant sentiment will be higher in Western and Eastern European countries as a result of higher levels of expenditures on social protection systems. As mentioned in the previous section, hypothesis 1 is confirmed. The model represented in figure 1 (model 6 in table 2) however, does not account for any cross level interactions, thus disallowing the effects of nativism to vary, as showed by the parallel lines for the different predicted values of levels of social protection system. Figure 1 confirms that, as predicted, a unit change on nativism increases the levels of anti-immigrant sentiment substantially. Moreover, it further shows that the mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment are higher in countries where the levels of public social protection expenditures are relatively low (as a percentage of GDP). These findings indicate that substantial increases of social protection expenditures results in environments with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Thus, based on these results, welfare state regimes with high levels of expenditure (such as the corporatist models) are less likely

to show high mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment compared to other welfare state modalities. Results


**Figure 1. Anti-immigrant sentiment and nativism by attitudes towards the welfare state (from model 6, table 2)**



hold true after controlling for regional differences between the West and Eastern European countries.


Similar results are reported in Figure 2 where anti-immigrant sentiment is only allowed to vary at the intercept level (model 5 in table 2). As showed in the literature, the mean level of anti-immigrant sentiment decreases as institutional support increases. Hypothesis 2, however, is not confirmed since individualistic views towards inequality tend to be associated with less anti-immigrant sentiment than the views that the state is responsible for inequality. These findings are difficult to interpret especially after controlling for differences between East and Western Europe. Eastern European countries showed consistently higher levels indicating that the state is primarily responsible for inequality. These results further show that where the state provides ample benefits and compensations there are higher levels of individualism versus state-centered approaches compared to societies in which those benefits are less prevalent. One conclusion that can be reached is that high levels of expenditure on social protection are not necessarily coupled with similar attitudes towards the welfare state. Further research is needed however to conclusively associate stratification belief systems (based on individualism versus collectivist beliefs) and the levels of anti-immigrant prejudice.

**Figure 2. Anti-immigrant sentiment by institutional support and attitudes towards the welfare state system**



The policy implications of these results are especially relevant when testing or the cross level interaction effects. Hypothesis 3, represented in figure 3, shows that as a result of competition for scarce resources, individuals' objective economic position (e.g. being unemployed) becomes a stronger predictor

**Figure 3. Anti-immigrant sentiment and institutional support by attitudes towards the welfare state.**




of anti-immigrant sentiment in countries where developed systems of welfare state regimes are present.

These results support the previous findings by Pedersen and Bay (2000) in Norway based on inter-group solidarity. Moreover, the results partially confirm the findings by Facchini and Mayda (2007) by showing that unemployed individuals in a country with a strong welfare state system report lower mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment compared to employed individuals in a country with low levels of social expenditure. Nevertheless, a closer reading of these findings indicates that the difference of effects of being unemployed in explaining attitudes towards immigration is more substantial in a country with a robust welfare state system compared to one with a weak system. The results thus seem to corroborate that in corporatist countries, while the predicted level of anti-immigrant is lower among those unemployed, the effects of individual's economic position are stronger in predicting prejudice. The existence of state and local networks of support for migrants may trigger negative feelings towards migrants among the most economically vulnerable individuals in the host society.

Finally, we further test the economic competition hypothesis by examining how a predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment, such as individuals scoring low on institutional support, also fluctuates across different welfare state regimes. As reported in Figure 4, the effect of institutional support decreases anti-immigrant sentiment. The effects are strongly shaped by the type of institutional environment, since in countries with a weaker social protection system the effects of institutional support are weaker (flatter) effects. The implication of this figure further validates the importance of establishing robust welfare state systems. Investing in strong governmental services for not only migrant populations, both at the local and national level, such as universal programs to help settlement, language classes, access to health care etc but also multicultural campaigns targeting the native born produce the outcome of a more integrated polity. By reaching out to the multiple constituencies within the nation state, the implementation of governmental programs can lay the groundwork for greater social adaptation. From the perspective of public opinion the findings in this paper corroborate that anti-immigrant sentiment is lower in Western European countries compared to the ex-soviet bloc. Investing in strong social protection systems seems to be a good way of reducing this gap.

**Figure 4. Anti-immigrant sentiment and institutional support by size of the welfare state system**



## Appendix 1 Question wording for the dependent and micro level variables

Variable	Description
<b>Anti-immigrant sentiment</b>	<p>There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [R's country]. (By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in [R's country]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?</p> <p>Immigrants increase crime rates.</p> <p>Immigrants are generally good for [R's country's] economy.</p> <p>Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [R's country].</p> <p>Immigrants make [R's country] more open to new ideas and cultures.</p>
<b>Nativism</b>	<p>Some people say the following things are important for being (e.g., truly British). Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...</p> <p>To have been born in [R's country]?</p> <p>To have [R's country] citizenship?</p> <p>To have lived in [R's country] for most of one's life?</p> <p>To be able to speak [R's country dominant language(s)]?</p>
<b>Institutional Support</b>	<p>How proud are you of [R's country] in each of the following?</p> <p>The way democracy works.</p> <p>[R's country] economic achievements.</p> <p>Its social security system.</p>

Source: ISSP 2003 Codebooks (Zentralarchiv für Emprische Sozialforschung, Cologne, Germany).

**Table 2.** HLM Statistics from the Models Predicting Anti-immigrant Sentiment the Individual and Country Predictors for Western and Eastern European countries, ISSP 2003

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	0.475** (0.014)	0.501** (0.014)	0.409** (0.025)	0.369** (0.022)	0.366** (0.019)	0.382** (0.019)
Individual level:						
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Sex (male = 1)	0.015** (0.001)	0.018** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)
University education <sup>a</sup>	-0.107** (0.010)	-0.106** (0.010)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)
Unemployed <sup>a, b</sup>		0.018** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Students <sup>a, b</sup>		-0.044** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)
Retired <sup>a, b</sup>		0.033** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)
Never in labor force <sup>a, b</sup>		0.030** (0.005)	0.019** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)
Rightist party attachment <sup>a</sup>			0.032** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)
Nativism			0.285** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)
Institutional support			-0.163** (0.016)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)
Country level:						
GDP per capita rate				-0.005† (0.003)	-0.008† (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)
Refugees and asylum seekers				-0.012* (0.005)	-0.013* (0.005)	-0.012* (0.005)
Region (Eastern Europe=1)				0.096** (0.011)	0.104** (0.011)	0.065** (0.011)
State responsibility						0.024** (0.009)
Public social protection (% of GDP)					-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Variance components <sup>c</sup>						
Individual-level random effect ( $\boldsymbol{r}$ )	0.037	0.037	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
Country-level random effect ( $\boldsymbol{u}_0$ )	0.004	0.004	0.014	0.008	0.007	0.008

*Note:* Fixed-effect entries are restricted ML coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). Except for region, macro-level predictors are grand-mean centered.

<sup>a</sup> Dummy variable (yes = 1).

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is 'employed.'

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed tests).

**Table 3.** HLM Statistics from the Models Predicting Anti-immigrant Sentiment using Cross-level Interactions between Individual and Country Predictors for Western and Eastern European countries, ISSP 2003

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	0.385** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.365** (0.019)	0.384** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.365** (0.019)
Individual level:						
Age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Sex (male = 1)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)
University education <sup>a</sup>	-0.075** (0.005)	-0.075** (0.005)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)
Unemployed <sup>a, b</sup>	0.016** (0.006)	0.016** (0.006)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Students <sup>a, b</sup>	-0.039** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)
Retired <sup>a, b</sup>	0.018* (0.006)	0.018* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)
Never in labor force <sup>a, b</sup>	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)
Rightist party attachment <sup>a</sup>	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)
Nativism	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)
Institutional support	-0.160** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.160** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)
Country level:						
GDP per capita rate	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.008* (0.003)
Refugees and asylum seekers	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.012* (0.004)	-0.012* (0.004)	-0.012* (0.004)	-0.011* (0.004)	-0.013* (0.005)
Region (Eastern Europe=1)	0.057** (0.015)	0.060** (0.014)	0.060** (0.014)	0.060** (0.014)	0.060** (0.014)	0.105** (0.011)
State responsibility	0.018 (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)		0.022* (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)	
Public social protection (% of GDP)			-0.003 (0.002)			-0.002 (0.001)
Cross level interactions:						
University education*State responsibility	0.015** (0.004)					
University education*Refugees		0.004 (0.004)				
University education*Public social protection			0.000 (0.001)			
Unemployed*State responsibility				0.003 (0.003)		
Unemployed*Refugees					0.000 (0.002)	
Unemployed*Public social protection						0.002* (0.001)
Retired*State responsibility						
Retired*Refugees						
Retired*Public social protection						
Right party attachment*State responsibility						
Right party attachment*Refugees						
Right party attachment*Public social protection						
Nativism*State responsibility						



Nativism*Refugees						
Nativism*Public social protection						
Institutional support*State responsibility						
Institutional support*Refugees						
Institutional support*Public social protection						
Variance components <sup>c</sup>						
Individual-level random effect ( <i>r</i> )	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
Country-level random effect ( <i>u</i> <sub>0</sub> )	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.007	0.007

*Note:* Fixed-effect entries are restricted ML coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). Except for region, macro-level predictors are grand-mean centered.

<sup>a</sup> Dummy variable (yes = 1).

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is 'employed.'

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed tests).

**Table 3.** HLM Statistics from the Models Predicting Anti-immigrant Sentiment using Cross-level Interactions between Individual and Country Predictors for Western and Eastern European countries, ISSP 2003 (Continuation).

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Constant	0.385** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.366** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.367** (0.019)
Individual level:						
Age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Sex (male = 1)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)
University education <sup>a</sup>	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)
Unemployed <sup>a, b</sup>	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Students <sup>a, b</sup>	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)
Retired <sup>a, b</sup>	0.018* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)
Never in labor force <sup>a, b</sup>	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)
Rightist party attachment <sup>a</sup>	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.033** (0.008)
Nativism	0.284** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)
Institutional support	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.160** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)
Country level:						
GDP per capita rate	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.002)
Refugees and asylum seekers	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.0138* (0.005)
Region (Eastern Europe=1)	0.060** (0.014)	0.059** (0.014)	0.104** (0.014)	0.059** (0.014)	0.059** (0.014)	0.102** (0.011)
State responsibility	0.020* (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)		0.012 (0.010)	0.023*	
Public social protection (% of GDP)			-0.003 (0.001)			-0.005* (0.002)
Cross level interactions:						
University education*State responsibility						
University education*Refugees						
University education*Public social protection						
Unemployed*State responsibility						
Unemployed*Refugees						
Unemployed*Public social protection						
Retired*State responsibility	0.006 (0.004)					
Retired*Refugees		-0.001 (0.004)				
Retired*Public social protection			0.001 (0.000)			
Right party attachment*State responsibility				0.008* (0.004)		
Right party attachment*Refugees					-0.006 (0.004)	
Right party attachment*Public social protection						0.002* (0.001)
Nativism*State responsibility						

Nativism*Refugees						
Nativism*Public social protection						
Institutional support*State responsibility						
Institutional support*Refugees						
Institutional support*Public social protection						
Variance components <sup>c</sup>						
Individual-level random effect ( <i>r</i> )	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
Country-level random effect ( <i>u</i> <sub>0</sub> )	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.007

*Note:* Fixed-effect entries are restricted ML coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). Except for region, macro-level predictors are grand-mean centered.

<sup>a</sup> Dummy variable (yes = 1).

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is 'employed.'

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed tests).

**Table 3.** HLM Statistics from the Models Predicting Anti-immigrant Sentiment using Cross-level Interactions between Individual and Country Predictors for Western and Eastern European countries, ISSP 2003 (Continuation).

	13	14	15	16	17	18
Constant	0.385** (0.020)	0.385** (0.020)	0.365** (0.019)	0.384** (0.020)	0.384** (0.020)	0.366** (0.019)
Individual level:						
Age	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Sex (male = 1)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)	0.022** (0.004)
University education <sup>a</sup>	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)	-0.075** (0.006)
Unemployed <sup>a, b</sup>	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Students <sup>a, b</sup>	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)	-0.040** (0.006)
Retired <sup>a, b</sup>	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.018* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)	0.017* (0.006)
Never in labor force <sup>a, b</sup>	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)	0.020** (0.006)
Rightist party attachment <sup>a</sup>	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)	0.034** (0.008)
Nativism	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.284** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)	0.283** (0.029)
Institutional support	-0.160** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.017)	-0.161** (0.015)
Country level:						
GDP per capita rate	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.009* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.008* (0.004)
Refugees and asylum seekers	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.023** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.013* (0.005)
Region (Eastern Europe=1)	0.059** (0.014)	0.058** (0.014)	0.107** (0.014)	0.059** (0.012)	0.060** (0.015)	0.105** (0.012)
State responsibility	0.038* (0.010)	0.023* (0.010)		0.025* (0.003)	0.022* (0.010)	
Public social protection (% of GDP)			0.002** (0.003)			0.001 (0.002)
Cross level interactions:						
University education*State responsibility						
University education*Refugees						
University education*Public social protection						
Unemployed*State responsibility						
Unemployed*Refugees						
Unemployed*Public social protection						
Retired*State responsibility						
Retired*Refugees						
Retired*Public social protection						
Right party attachment*State responsibility						
Right party attachment*Refugees						
Right party attachment*Public social protection						
Nativism*State responsibility	-0.042 (0.036)					

Nativism*Refugees		0.033	(0.032)				
Nativism*Public social protection				-0.006**	(0.020)		
Institutional support*State responsibility						-0.006	(0.011)
Institutional support*Refugees							-0.002 (0.007)
Institutional support*Public social protection							-0.006** (0.002)
Variance components <sup>c</sup>							
Individual-level random effect ( <i>r</i> )	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
Country-level random effect ( <i>u</i> <sub>0</sub> )	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009

*Note:* Fixed-effect entries are restricted ML coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). Except for region, macro-level predictors are grand-mean centered.

<sup>a</sup> Dummy variable (yes = 1).

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is 'employed.'

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$  (one-tailed tests).



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