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Trump’s All Too Familiar Strategy and Its Future in the GOP

Abstract: Although many observers have been surprised both by the racial explicit nature of Donald Trump’s campaign and the subsequent success of that campaign, we contend that Trump’s tactics and their success are far from new. We describe how for the past half century Republicans have used race and increasingly immigration to attract white voters – especially working class whites. All of this has led to an increasingly racially polarized polity and for the most part Republican electoral success. We conclude with some expectations about the future of race, immigration, and party politics.

Introduction

Donald Trump attacks Mexican immigrants. He disparages Muslims. He insults women. And what happens? Voters flock to him. Trump’s rapid rise to the top of the Republican polls and his enduring role as the Party’s nominee sparked all kinds of diverse reactions. The Republican establishment was scared. The Democratic Party was appalled. And the media was enthralled.

But the most common reaction of all was surprise. Many wondered how Trump could end up as the Republican nominee? How could a campaign premised on prejudice and denigration be so successful? Trump may ultimately lose his presidential bid but not before capturing the Republican Party and the hearts of millions of Americans. How could it happen? Why did it happen?

Even though many seemed surprised by the rise of Donald Trump, nobody should be. Trump’s strategy is tried and true. It has been developed over decades by the Republican Party and it has worked.1

1 The pattern is also not limited to recent decades in the American context. The anti-immigrant strategy has been employed successfully in many earlier periods in American history and indeed in many other countries around the world. Trump’s rise is analogous to the rise of extreme right in Europe and mirrors the success of the UK Independence Party in Britain, the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France, and many others.

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Immigration and a White Backlash

Well before Donald Trump arrived on the Presidential scene, we wrote a book documenting the widely successful Republican tactic of scapegoating immigrants. By blaming immigrants for much of what ails America and by promising to stem the tide of immigration, Republican elites have been able to garner more of the White vote (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

The gains Republicans have made using immigration are impressive. In 1990, White voters were (almost) evenly divided between Democratic and Republican congressional candidates and there was almost no correlation between attitudes on immigration and White partisanship. In 2014, after years of Republican campaigning against immigrants, Whites who express fears about immigrants are much more likely to vote Republican than Whites who view immigrants positively. In the 2014 midterms 75 percent of Americans who felt that most illegal immigrants should be deported voted Republican. In contrast, only 35 percent of those who favored a chance for undocumented immigrants to apply for legal status supported Republican candidates. Of those who saw immigration as the nation’s most important problem, 74 percent went Republican. And Whites overall have been shifting to the Republican Party. In 2014, 62 percent of White voters favored Republican candidates in Congressional contests.²

It is also important to note that the relationship between immigration and partisanship is not just a spurious one. The relationship between immigration attitudes and partisan choice holds when we control for a range of other issue positions, attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities, perceptions of the economy, and just about everything else we think matters in Presidential or Congressional elections. There are other signs as well. We find that how an individual thinks about immigration at one point in time predicts how their partisanship will change in the future. To be sure, the effect is not large – but even small individual shifts in partisanship, if repeated over the course of decades, can become massive shifts over time. Variation across states also points to the centrality of immigration in American politics. White Americans who live in states with larger immigrant populations hold significant more negative views toward immigrants, all else equal. That pattern translates into policy outcomes as well. In states with larger Latino populations, less spending goes to education and welfare and more state money goes to criminal punishment. Tax policy also becomes more

² That 62 percent figure highlights the fact that Whites are by no means unanimous in their views or their votes today. Many Whites have positive views of immigrants and are, in fact, turned off by the White backlash strategy. Racial and ethnic minorities are, by contrast, more unified on the question of immigration and on their partisan choices as we will document below.
regressive. In other words, when Latinos make up a larger share of the disadvantaged population, states are less generous and more punitive.

Finally, when we look at the media, we see yet more evidence of the power of immigration. Increases in negative coverage of immigration by the media are correlated with shifts in aggregate White partisanship toward the Republican Party. Immigration policy, immigration views, and party politics have indeed become intricately intertwined.

Trump is simply the apex of that White backlash strategy. He, almost more than any other national Republican figure, owes his success to anti-immigrant views. He was a relative non-entity in the Republican field – polling last or near last – until immigration became part of his equation. But then Trump made his now famous disparaging comments about Mexicans as rapists and criminals. Right after those comments, Trump garnered enormous media attention and he rapidly went from near last to first in the polls.

Moreover, the support that he did garner was always closely tied to views on immigration. Data from early polls during the primary show that Republicans most opposed to immigration were about 50 percentage points more likely to support Trump than the small minority of the party who are strongly sympathetic to immigrants (Tesler 2015). And in the general election campaign views on immigration similarly predicted Trump support.

Race and Party

But the Trump phenomenon and the larger Republican story is not just about immigration. The anti-immigrant story is only part of the White backlash story. Race, more broadly speaking, has been part of the Republican play book for quite some time (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Valentino and Sears 2005). A little over five decades ago, the Republican Party decided on its infamous Southern Strategy. Personified by George Wallace’s segregationist rhetoric, the strategy was to dismiss Black demands for ever greater government handouts and to highlight all of the failings of the Black community and in so doing attract racist White Southerners who had faithfully supported the Democratic Party. Through Goldwater, Nixon, Reagan and onto George H. W. Bush, the campaign tactics were sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle. While Wallace would proclaim, “Segregation now, segregation forever,” George H.W. Bush would more delicately run an ad about Willie Horton, an African American felon. Almost always there was a hint of race in the air and at least an implicit denigration of African Americans.
For White Southerners it was all too attractive. White Southerners went from overwhelmingly siding with the Democratic Party in 1960 to overwhelming voting for Republican candidates in 1990. And it is probably not just White Southerners. Since 1990, racial views and partisanship have only become more and more intertwined at the national level. For much of this recent period, racial resentment has been one of the strongest predictors of party affiliation (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Valentino and Sears 2005). Barack Obama’s presidency only served to make racial views matters even more. As Michael Tesler has so aptly demonstrated, how people think about health care and a host of other ostensibly non-racial issues is now highly correlated with their racial views (Tesler 2012).

All of this has also translated back into the Trump phenomenon. Research during the general election campaign showed that White independents and Republicans who think their identity as Whites is extremely important were more than 30 points more likely to support Trump than those who think their racial identity is not important (Tesler and Sides 2016). Another study found that racial resentment, more than populism or authoritarianism, determined who supported Trump and who did not (Enders and Smallpage 2016).

In short, Trump’s rise is neither surprising nor unusual. It is a logical outgrowth of decades of a conscious Republican strategy on immigration and race.

A Broader Populist Backlash?

The story of race and immigration that we have told is also not the entire account. The Trump phenomenon of today has other elements not least of which is a broader populist campaign targeting liberal intellectuals, insiders, and political elites. Trump plays the role of a brash outsider taking on the Washington establishment for the masses who have been betrayed by their government leaders.

Yet again there is nothing new here. Trump’s populism echoes George Wallace’s attempts to garner support from Whites – particularly in the South – who felt that the federal government had abandoned them. It is not that different from Huey Long’s efforts to speak for the masses. And it is hardly distinct from a much earlier period in American history when William Jennings Bryan spoke for farmers who felt abused by eastern elites.

Each of these different elements – immigration, race, and populism – have been present at various times and in various forms throughout American political history. Trump is not playing a particularly new game. He is borrowing from an old playbook.
What Comes First?

One of the most important unanswered questions about these three elements is exactly how they fit with together. Is the Trump phenomenon of today fundamentally driven by immigration, is it more centrally shaped by race, or is populism at its core? While critically important, it is a question that is almost impossible to answer. One problem is that the three elements are often highly correlated with each other making it difficult to disentangle them empirically. A deeper problem is that the three different elements often actively reinforce each other. In methodological terms, they are all endogenous to each other. Controlling for one does not allow us to see the independent effect of the other because they are intricately intertwined with each other repeatedly over long periods of time. We know that all three elements are present and we strongly suspect that they all matter for Trump and for the Republican Party but we do not yet know which is the fundamental driver of what we are seeing in 2016.3

Where Has Racial Populism Led American Politics?

These efforts by Trump and by other members of the Republican Party before him have had two important consequences. One is racial polarization and the other is electoral success for the Republican Party. We examine racial polarization first.

Trump and the broader Republican efforts have led to an alarmingly divided electorate. On one side are the White Americans we have just talked about. On the other is the increasingly large racial and ethnic minority population.

Just as many Whites have been attracted by the racial rhetoric of the Republican Party, many racial and ethnic minorities have been repelled. Over the last few decades, more and more racial and ethnic minorities have entered the country, more and more have become engaged in the political arena, and perhaps most importantly, they have spoken with an increasingly clear political voice. Beginning the in the 1960s and continuing to the present day, there has been a slow and uneven but inexorable shift of non-White America to the Democratic Party. African Americans, once evenly divided, are now firmly and almost

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3 This is akin to the research trying to address the question of whether race or conservatism is at the core of White opposition to racially liberal policy efforts and White support for the Republican Party (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). There has, to this point, been little consensus as to the answer for many of the same reasons (Schuman 2000).
unanimously on the side of the Democratic Party. In 2012, 87 percent of African Americans identified with or leaned towards the Democratic Party.\(^4\) Although reliable, long term trend data on Asian American partisanship are not available, the last two decades have also witnessed a dramatic shift of Asian American partisanship. In the early 1990s the Republican Party held a slight edge among Asian Americans but by 2012, the number of Asian Americans Democratic identifiers more than doubled the number of Asian American Republicans (Hajnal and Lee 2012). Data for the Hispanic population indicate that in recent years Latinos have overwhelmingly favored the Democratic Party. Latino Democratic identifiers now outnumber Latino Republican identifiers by more than two to one (Hajnal and Lee 2012).

The end result of this movement of minorities to the left and Whites to the right is a nation sharply divided by race. As Figure 1 illustrates the gap between White Americans who gave 60 percent of their votes to Republican Congressional candidates in 2014 and Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans who bestowed only 10 percent, 36 percent, and 33 percent of their votes respectively on Republican candidates is dramatic.\(^5\) The party that is dominant among

![Figure 1: Race, Class, Age, Gender, and the 2014 House Vote. Source: National Exit Polls.](image)

\(^4\) Source: CCES 2012.
\(^5\) In the 2014 House elections, Democrats garnered the support of 90 percent of Blacks, 66 percent of Asian Americans, and 64 percent of Latinos. Source: NYT Exit Poll and Asian American Decisions Poll.
Whites is overwhelmingly opposed by minorities. That is not a gap. It is effectively a racial chasm.

Critically, that racial divide dwarfs divisions across class and other demographic characteristics that are supposedly central to the political arena. Class and growing income inequality have recently been receiving a tremendous amount of attention in the media and scholars but, as Figure 1 shows, it seems apparent that race has replaced class as the primary dividing line in American politics. The gap between high school graduates and those with post-graduate degrees was only two points. Americans with incomes over $200,000 were only 18 points more Republican than Americans with incomes under $30,000. Race is far bigger than education. It is far bigger than income. Race trumps gender and age in the vote as well.

Moreover, these patterns are not peculiar to the 2014 House elections. The last presidential election was by some calculations the most racially divided presidential contest in American history. That contest pitted 93 percent of Blacks, 71 percent of Latinos, and 73 percent of Asian Americans on one side against the clear majority of Whites (59 percent) on the other.

And when we look more broadly across a range of national and state elections between 2006 and 2012 as we do in Figure 2, we see essentially the same pattern of heightened racial divisions and muted class divisions. In every type of contest from Presidential elections all the way down to state legislative elections, race typically outweighs class. Across these different contests, the average Black-White gap hovers between 40 and 50 points. But it is not just the Black-White divide that stands out. The gap between White voters and Latino voters

Figure 2: Race and Class in American Elections.
is typically around 20 points across the different types of contests. Asian Americans and Whites differ by almost the same average margin across these elections. Again the contrast with class is telling. The income or education gap in party choice tends to average about 10 points. Despite growing economic divides, class does little to structure partisan choices across an array of political contests.⁶

All of this is, of course, troubling. Division is a normal and healthy part of democracy but when the core dividing line in a nation becomes closely aligned with race and ethnicity, larger concerns about inequality, conflict, and discrimination emerge. In short, when race becomes the primary determinant of political decision making, the nation’s population is in danger of being driven apart.

A Successful Strategy?

The other outcome of the Republican strategy on race and immigration is success in the electoral arena. Trump may well lose the election and Republicans may suffer losses in 2016 but the fact remains that the White backlash strategy has been quite successful for the Republican Party for quite some time.

That is perplexing to some. In an increasingly diverse American polity, how can it be that an anti-minority, anti-immigrant strategy wins elections? The answer is simple. Despite America’s increasing diversity, White voters still dominate. Whites still make up the vast majority of voters – some 75 percent in 2014. And Whites, as we have already noted, tend to favor the Republican Party by large margins. All told, 89 percent of all Republican votes in 2014 came from White voters. Put simply, the Republican Party does not yet need the minority vote.

By winning the White vote Republicans have been able to largely win the electoral battle with their Democratic rivals. Republicans currently control the Senate (although it is certainly up for grabs in 2016). They are in the majority in the House. They occupy the Governor’s mansion in some 31 states and they are the majority party in 32 states. In sharp contrast, Democrats are in control of the Governor’s mansion and both houses in just seven states. By attacking America’s immigrants and disparaging its racial minorities, the Republican Party may have lost a number of racial and ethnic minority votes but it has very much won the wider electoral war.

⁶ Even when income and education matter, they often work in different directions. Upper income Americans tend to slightly favor Republican candidates, while more well educated Americans tend to favor Democratic candidates. The era of lower class Americans residing on the Democratic left and middle class Americans choosing the Republican right are long gone.
The Future of Race, Immigration, and American Politics

What does all of this mean for the future of race, immigration, and American politics? A reflexive response to the patterns we have illustrated so far is to boldly claim that the future is clear. Driven by further immigration and greater childbirth among non-Whites, a rapidly expanding racial and ethnic minority population will win out over a declining White population. That will mean more racial strife as the diminishing White majority struggles against the rising minority/immigrant tide. That scenario will also bring about the demise of the Republican Party. Pundits and prognosticators and maybe even most social scientists tend to support this view (Gimpel 2014). We agree that all of this is a very real possibility.

However, in this final section, we seek to add nuance to our predictions and to introduce much greater uncertainty about America’s electoral and racial futures. We note several underlying features of the American polity that suggest the possibility of an alternative future path.

In thinking about the future, the first point to recognize is that the Republican Party is likely to play a key role in determining the path the nation takes. As the party with the clearest position on immigration and the party with the bleakest future, Republicans face an incredibly consequential choice. They can continue to use immigration and race to appeal to the White majority or they can moderate their tactics on immigration and race to try to appeal to a more diverse audience. How they deal with that choice is likely to determine whether we continue to go down a path of increasingly racialized politics or whether we shift to an alternate path that incorporates more compromise on immigration and less racial division.

Over the short term it is far from clear what the Republican Party will do. Republican leaders are of course not blind to the political imperatives of immigration and demographic change. Members of the Republican Party are already engaging in active debate about immigration (Preston 2012). Indeed as early as 2008, elites within the Party called for a more moderate Republican Party and an end to racial scapegoating. They recognized that the future – especially in Presidential elections – was likely to be in the hands of racial and ethnic minority voters. A number of Republican Senators – most notably Marco Rubio – have recently signaled a desire to move to the center on immigration. More moderate voices in the party have begun to push for comprehensive immigration reform and are now willing to support some form of amnesty (Preston 2012). Even former House Speaker John Boehner has signaled that “a comprehensive approach is long overdue” (Preston 2012).
But the conservative wing of the Party remains adamantly opposed to these moves. Many current incumbents in the Republican Party owe their own success to the White backlash strategy. If they move to the middle on race and immigration, they are likely to face primary challenges on the right. And in relatively safe districts and states, they have little chance of losing to Democrats on the left. These incumbents are largely beholden to a race-baiting strategy and will be hard to convince to shift away from it.

What’s more, Trump’s campaign suggests the possibility of an ever greater White backlash against immigrants and minorities. Although partisan polarization has grown faster on immigration than almost any other issue, there is still room for immigration to push more Whites to the Republican Party. Even among Democratic identifiers, 58 percent feel that we “should restrict and control people coming to live in our country more than we do” (Pew 2012). If more and more working class Whites shift to the Republican Party as 2016 suggest they will do, race baiting may continue to be an effective electoral strategy for years to come.

Thus, over the short term, the Republican Party is likely to send a somewhat mixed and incoherent signal on race and immigration. Forward-thinking elites intent on winning the Presidency will attempt to move the party away from the White backlash strategy and towards a more inclusive agenda. But other leaders recognizing the immediate power of that strategy will likely hold on to it.

But what happens when White Americans cease to be a majority of the population sometime around the mid-point of the century? If the current strategy begins to fail, can Republicans radically alter course and resurrect their fortunes? There is, we believe, every reason to believe that they can and will be able to adjust their strategy and reverse the decline.

The history of immigration politics in the US is particularly instructive here. Although immigration has sparked a number of popular nativist movements throughout American history, none of these movements has ever led to the demise of a major party. In every case, if the electoral advantage of immigration accrued overwhelmingly to one political party, the other party adapted and changed course. For example, in the years following the Civil War, Republicans looked favorably on immigration, recognizing its contributions to economic growth in the North and free labor in the West. But intense partisan pressures led

7 Nativism also led to the birth and growth of several independent political organizations. Nativism helped create the Know Nothings, the American Party, the Workingmen’s Party, the Immigration Restriction League, and other prominent organizations. But in each case the movement either eventually faded away or was appropriated by one of the two major parties.
Republicans in California and elsewhere to renounce their previous positions on immigration and adopt a decidedly sinophobic platform (Tichenor 2002). That shift ultimately led to Republican support of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. In American history, immigration has had a powerful but generally short-lived impact on American partisan politics.

Moreover, both parties have at different times chosen to reverse their stances on immigration. The Democrats of the 1950s were decidedly anti-immigrant in their tone and actions but by 1965 were instrumental in passing the Hart Cellars Act which repealed national origin quotas and instituted an immigration system based largely on family reunification. The Republican Party platform on immigration has been equally fluid in the past. As late as the Reagan Presidency the Republican Party was decidedly split on the issue of immigration and only in the last two decades have Republican leaders put forward a clear, anti-immigration platform (Miller and Schofield 2008; Jeong et al. 2011; Wong 2013). There is little reason to expect Republicans to fail to adjust their strategy in the future if the electoral incentives to do so become acute enough.

If the Republican Party does choose to embrace a more pro-immigrant stance, there is a very real chance that that strategy will be successful. Democrats have made enormous strides with minority voters in recent decades but their hold on them—particularly with respect to Latinos and Asian Americans—is tenuous. When Latinos and Asian Americans vote, they strongly favor Democratic candidates. Similarly, when Latinos and Asian Americans choose to affiliate with a party, they generally choose the Democratic Party. But all of this ignores the fact that almost half of Latinos and Asian Americans do not vote. When given the option, most choose not to identify with any major party. When asked in national surveys, most Latinos and Asian Americans say that they do not fit into a party at all. As Table 1 shows, the clear majority of both populations—56 percent of Latinos and 57 percent of Asian Americans—identify either as Independents or as

Table 1: Weak Partisan Ties among Latinos and Asian Americans.

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nonidentifiers claiming they do not think in partisan terms or refusing to answer the question altogether (Hajnal and Lee 2011).

Surveys also suggest that if Republicans change tactics on immigration reform, they can make major inroads with the Latino population. A 2013 Latino Decisions poll asked Latino respondents “if they would be more or less likely to vote for a Republican candidate in the future if the Republicans take a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform including a pathway to citizenship.” Forty-three percent of Latinos who had previously supported Obama said that they would be more likely to vote for the Republican candidate.⁸ There is no similar data available for Asian Americans but experimental studies show that emphasizing or de-emphasizing racial discrimination can induce large shifts in Asian American partisanship (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2014). All of this suggests that both pan-ethnic groups are still very much up for grabs politically.

African Americans represent a far tougher case for the Republican Party (Dawson 1994). But even among African Americans, there are signs of ambivalence toward the Democratic Party. Many African American commentators have expressed frustration with the Obama administration and the party’s lack of action on reducing racial inequality.⁹ In surveys, almost 30 percent of Blacks feel that the Democratic Party does not “work hard for Black interests.”¹⁰ Many racial and ethnic minorities are not particularly enthralled with the Democratic Party.

History also suggests that racial and ethnic minorities are not blindly loyal to one party. Their allegiances will shift when partisan programs shift. As Dawson (1994) has aptly demonstrated, African Americans have generally offered their support to the party that presented the most racial liberal policy agenda and have shifted in massive numbers when the two parties reversed their stances on race. More recently in 2004 Latinos offered up an historic 40 percent of their votes to George Bush when Bush advocated for comprehensive immigration reform.

Critically, the Republican Party may be able to attract minority support without realizing overwhelming losses among White Americans. It is true that large segments of the American public express strongly negative views on immigration.

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⁸ The same poll asked Latinos whether they would support a Republican candidate who supports a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants over a Democrat who opposes citizenship. Sixty-one percent of Latino survey respondents who voted for President Obama in the past reported that they would lend their support to the pro-immigration Republican candidate. http://ccis.ucsd.edu/2013/05/what-the-gop-has-to-gain-and-lose-%E2%80%93among-latinos-when-it-comes-to-immigration-reform/.

⁹ Frymer (1999) contends that African Americans have effectively been “captured” by the Democrats. Because there is no viable, attractive alternative, Democrats need not and indeed have not made a real effort to enact a pro-Black agenda.

¹⁰ Source: 1994 National Black Politics Study.
But polls also clearly show that White Americans are far from universally fearful of immigration. Many hold ambivalent views on immigration. They admire immigrants and recognize some of the benefits that immigrants provide the nation. But they are deeply concerned about other aspects of immigration. And many others have generally positive feelings about immigrants. This heterogeneity in White preferences means that Republicans may be able to retain a substantial amount of support from White Americans even if they shift to more immigrant-friendly policies.

We do not yet know what the outcome of the battle within the Republican Party will be. Donald Trump’s success in 2016 as a candidate and as a campaigning model is both interesting and distressing. But it is not particularly new. The Trump phenomenon is just a continuation of a long term Republican strategy – albeit an extreme case of that strategy.

Because Trump is not all that different from the past, we do not expect 2016 to be particularly telling for the future of race, immigration, and party politics. Regardless of how well or how poorly the Republicans do in 2016, there will still be reason for some leaders in the party to continue their White backlash strategy and still be reasons for other leaders to try to shift the party to the middle on race and immigration.

We do, however, believe that the outcome of the intra-party battle within the Republican Party will have enormous implications. America faces two radically different futures. In one scenario, the Republican Party alters its stance on immigration, it garners more votes from the nation’s expanding racial and ethnic minority population, the worrisome racial divide between an almost exclusively White Republican Party and a disproportionately non-White Democratic Party shrinks, and wide-ranging racial conflict is averted. But in a more ominous scenario, the Republican Party continues to fuel a White backlash against immigrants and minorities, an increasingly anxious and aggrieved White population fights against the rising tide of minority voters, who in turn flock in every larger numbers to the Democratic Party, the racial divide in American party politics expands to a racial chasm, and the prospects for racial conflict swell.

11 Notably, younger Whites appear to particularly favorable to immigration and less susceptible to the immigrant threat narrative. We found that across all of our surveys younger Whites held significantly less negative views on immigration. Also, additional tests showed that views on immigration were less influential in predicting the partisan choices of younger White Americans. This implies that in the future Republicans are likely to incur even fewer costs if they shift to an immigrant friendly platform.
Hanging in the balance is the fate of America’s immigrants, its racial and ethnic minorities, and other less advantaged segments of the population. If White backlash continues to be a successful electoral strategy, states with large numbers of immigrants and minorities will likely continue to disinvest in public goods. That means that precisely where the number of immigrants and minorities is largest and where the need is the greatest, these public funds will become less and less available. This, of course, has troubling implications for the welfare of these different groups. But if the Republican Party alters course or the White backlash strategy ultimately loses out in the electoral arena, immigrants and minorities will have a far greater chance to be included in the governing coalition and a far greater chance to see resources and help come their way.

References


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