Mind the gap? Looking into restrictionism of elites and the public on integration and border policy towards asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark

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Introduction

This paper sets out to examine an intriguing and contemporary social topic, at the heart of public debate in many democratic nation states in recent years: Host countries’ reception of asylum seekers and refugees arriving in their territory in search of protection. It aims to answer the following question: how do the elites and publics in host countries perceive the direction asylum policy should take (i.e. restrictionist or expansionist) and do they agree or diverge on the subject? The answer has important implications as it has been argued that the difference between policy makers’ perceptions and public opinion in relation to immigration and asylum is one of the reasons for a ‘policy gap’ between immigration and asylum policy goals and outcomes (Cornelius et al., 1994; Statham and Geddes, 2006; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Boswell, 2007; Castles, 2004).

The study question will be examined through a focus on Denmark, a liberal democratic nation-state characterized by a highly homogeneous populous until recent decades. Several contrasting factors make Denmark an interesting case study. On the one hand it is characterized by a long-standing humanitarian ideology exemplified in profound involvement in global human crises (Moore, 2010). Like other Scandinavian states, Denmark has a generous socio-democratic welfare regime offering universal benefits to all members of society. On the other hand it has witnessed the rise of a far-right anti-immigration political party, the Danskfolkeparti (Danish People’s Party) which has pushed Danish immigration policy to be the most restrictive among the Nordic countries (Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2013).

At the analytical level, I argue that the elite opinions and public sentiments are the two main driving forces behind asylum policy design in industrialized democracies therefore warrant examination. Analysis of these two domains reveals the ‘context of reception’ (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006) faced by asylum seekers in their destination host countries. Both are critical for an understanding of the asylum debate in terms of discourse, policy parameters
and outcomes; the congruence or distance between them offers a statement about the structure and the nature of asylum policy-making in the country (Lahav, 2004).

I thus focus on two social levels where asylum hosting takes place: the macro-level political arena of asylum policy-making construction, and the micro-level citizen attitudes. The basic argument is that asylum politics are determined by the interaction of two main factors: the actions of state policy actors and public sentiments on the issue. The two are intertwined and interdependent, and despite the difficulty determining causality between them, combined they determine the host society’s discourse: to accept asylum seekers or not, and if so under which conditions. Together, they shape asylum seekers’ opportunity structures in host societies and the willingness to include them as legitimate members of the collective (Raijman, 2010).

Based on Hammar’s (1985) well acknowledged categorization of immigration policy into two main types or stages, I examine at both policy-maker and public levels attitudes to immigration policy (management of asylum seekers’ entry, i.e. the field of border policy) and immigrant policy (granting rights to resident asylum seekers, i.e. the field of integration policy). Immigration policy refers to governing asylum seekers’ admission into the country’s territory, thus very much relating to the state’s sovereign right to draw a distinction between who is allowed entry and who is not; immigrant policy focuses on the conditions provided to asylum seekers and their level of inclusion in the national allocation of benefits. Investigating the construction of these two realms manifests the weighty social dilemma of hosting asylum seekers: on the one hand the desire to safeguard borders and limit entrance and allocation of social goods to non-nationals; on the other hand, the moral and legal obligations to maintain international agreements fortifying human rights and humanitarian conduct in general.

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1 Various studies have set out to unravel the policy/attitudes nexus, trying to resolve the causal mechanism between the two (e.g. Careja and Andreß, 2013; Weldon, 2006; Hjerm, 2007; Carlsson et al., 2016; Hellwig and Kweon, 2016; Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005; Van Der Waal et al., 2013; Raven et al., 2011). This study does not aim to gauge causality between policy and attitudes in the field of asylum but examines the gap between the two.
The study findings show that the government and public actors deploy a parallel restrictionist stance which is very much determined by the type of policy in question. On the issue of immigration (border) policy, both the government actors and the public depict a moderate restrictionism level, to the extent that it does not rule out completely admission to new asylum seekers. In terms of immigrant (integration) policy, the government actors as well as the public show a low restrictionist stance. These findings indicate that both the Danish public and the policy makers are quite in tune, both evincing willingness to integrate asylum seekers and refugees into Danish society, yet not in a completely inclusive way.

The study aims to contribute to the asylum and immigration body of knowledge. Students of immigration politics focusing on newcomers’ context of reception tend typically to dwell on one of two streams: the policy-making arena and macro conditions in nation-state host societies (such as the migration or citizenship regimes, e.g. Joppke, 2000; 2007; Brubaker, 1989) or on attitudes towards ethnic minority out-groups (Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). To date very few studies have focused on both levels (e.g. Lahav, 2004; Statham, 2003 who investigated political elites as well as public sentiments). Thus, addressing the ‘policy gap’ hypothesis between publics and policy makers on the asylum issue has seldom been possible. In addition, Denmark is a relatively understudied case compared to other asylum host countries, while also having drawn much global attention to controversial asylum policies it has implemented in recent years, hence warranting its scrutiny and investigation.

The paper is organized as follows: First I present the Danish setting with regards to immigration and asylum, followed by the two theoretical pillars of the study: categorization of asylum policy areas (border and integration) and the nexus between public opinion and public policy on asylum. Then the methodology and data collection at both public opinion and policy will be described, followed by the results found at both levels. I conclude with discussion of the study findings.
The Danish Setting

Traditionally, Denmark has not regarded itself as an immigration country which has led to its depiction and development as a quite homogeneous ‘tribe-like’ society (Gundelach, 2001). This state of affairs started slowly changing in the mid-1960s when the first immigrant groups outside northern Europe arrived in the country originating mostly from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan who occupied vacant low-skilled positions in the labor market and numbered a few thousands (Wren, 2001; Rezaei and Goli, 2007; Nannestad, 2003; Olwig and Paerregaard, 2011; Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). Following the global oil crisis of 1973 and large-scale unemployment, liberal immigration policy came to a halt. While labor migration witnessed a sharp decline, from the early 1980s asylum became an important vehicle of immigration to Denmark as well as family reunification (Olwig, 2012; Rezaei and Goli, 2007; Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2013; Gudbrandsen, 2012).

Asylum seekers have arrived to Denmark continuously ever since the end of World War II (Wren, 2001), starting with Eastern European asylum seekers in the 1950s, Chilean and Vietnamese in the 1970s, and asylum seekers from former Communist regimes in the 1980s. Since 1990 close to 145,000 asylum seekers have entered Denmark (Danmark Statistik, own data analysis). Most arrived between 2000 and 2016, predominantly from numerous areas of conflict in the Middle East, Africa and Asia such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and lately Syria (UNHCR, 2012; The Danish Immigration Service, various years). According to Danmarks Statistik, the Danish Statistical Bureau, in mid-2016 immigrants and their descendants comprised 12.8 percent of the Danish population, while asylum seekers and refugees accounted for less than half a percent. Recognition rates of asylum applications are relatively generous in Denmark, but have fluctuated over the years. Overall, between 2007 and 2016 the recognition rate of asylum claims was 33-87 percent (The Danish Immigration Service, 2016).
Historically Denmark, much like Sweden, implemented relatively liberal refugee policies which resulted in the arrival of a significant number of asylum seekers from Muslim-majority as well as non-Muslim countries (Wren, 2001). In fact, in those years Denmark ranked among the most liberal countries in the EU in terms of the high level of protection offered via its asylum policy (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-Nissen, 2010; Jørgensen, 2013). Yet an exclusionist and negative anti-immigrant and asylum seeker discourse - more particularly an anti-Muslim immigration discourse which seeds were planted when the labor migrants turned to a ‘surplus’ to Denmark's needs started developing in Denmark in the mid-1980s (Wren, 2001). The integration of labor migrants and asylum seekers became a growing concern in the public debate (Olwig, 2012; Hedetoft, 2006) with right-wing parties nurturing and mobilizing these fears (Williams, 2010). The dramatic shift in the institutionalized reception of newcomers was rooted in both nationalistic notions and expectations that immigrants and asylum seekers, like Danes, were duty-bound to preserve the egalitarian welfare community and adopt ‘liberal’ (i.e. democratic and secular) values (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2013; Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). Some even coined the hostility as the government’s ‘culture war’ (kulturkamp) against non-European (mostly Muslim) immigrants (Bloom, 2014). The rise of the radical right-wing Danish People's Party in 1995 and especially its success in the 2001 elections turned immigration into a high-profile center-stage issue in Danish politics (Mudde, 2013; Kærgård, 2010; Yilmaz, 2012), with mainstream political parties evincing keener interest in the subject as well (Jensen and Thomsen, 2013; Gudbrandsen, 2012; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). Under the Liberal-Conservative government elected in 2001, backed up by the Danish People’s Party, various restrictive amendments to immigration law were introduced. The new ‘Alien Package’ (Bloom, 2014) included the drastic restriction of family reunification, access to asylum limited by abolition of the ‘de facto’ refugee category² (which since has been reinstated), reduction of welfare

² A ‘de-facto’ refugee (also termed as “B-status”) is an individual who has been granted asylum in Denmark
benefits for immigrant workers, and general tightening of the terms of access to citizenship in Denmark (Akkerman, 2012; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-Nissen, 2010; Jørgensen, 2013; Olwig, 2012). Under the Danish People’s Party pressure, Denmark took a sharp turn to the right on asylum and immigration issues, exercising its EU opt-out on Justice and Home Affairs.

The changes in policy introduced since 2001 are the basis of the immigration and asylum policy practiced in Denmark today, though they have been amended since, at times more restrictively (Jørgensen, 2013). The change to a Social-democratic-led government between 2011-2015 led to policy amendments that were perceived as less ‘confrontational’ and somewhat inclusive (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014), yet de facto, much of the restrictionist asylum policy set at the beginning of the millennium remained intact, with only minor changes. The newly elected Liberal government that took office in June 2015 tightened refugee policy once again: cash benefits for newly arrived asylum seekers were almost halved, the parliament passed legislation allowing authorities to confiscate asylum seekers’ valuables and cash to offset their accommodation costs (Tanner, 2016) and waiting time to apply for family reunification was increased from one to three years.

Despite the reluctant migration policy that has developed in recent decades, asylum seekers enjoy under the Danish Aliens Act a generous set of rights in Denmark, in line with the country’s social-democratic universal welfare logic. These include a cash allowance, housing at an accommodation center run by the Danish Red Cross or local municipalities, healthcare and educational benefits. After residing for a minimum of six months in the country, asylum seekers are granted access to the labor market. Once an asylum application has been approved, a place of residence is assigned by the Danish authorities for the first three years in Denmark. The geographical dispersal of refugees in local communities across Denmark is a much debated issue of Danish Asylum policy. Its supporters claim it reduces based on the Danish Aliens Act and who does not qualify as a refugee according to one of the five conditions listed in the 1951 Refugee convention.
overburdening of a few areas and assists refugees in adapting to the Danish way of life (Olwig, 2012; Rezaei and Goli, 2007), while its critics argue that it leads to refugees’ isolation and social exclusion (Larsen, 2012; Wren, 2003).

Social climate

The exclusionist discourse signaling the ‘end of tolerance’ (Hervik, 2012:219) for asylum seekers and migrants can also be found in two other arenas: the media, where reporting on immigration issues in Denmark is highly salient and by and large more negative than positive (van Klinger et al., 2014; Hervik, 2012), and public opinion. In 2011 only 27.4 percent agreed that refugees and immigrants should have the same rights to social welfare as Danes. Regarding how many refugees Denmark should accommodate, 36 percent claimed that the number of refugees should be lower than the current number; 39.6 percent responded that the number should stay the same; only 24.4 percent stated it should be higher.\(^3\) Studies on Denmark show that government immigration policies are responsive to citizen preferences and that negative public opinion in the country significantly increases the probability of asylum restrictions (Gudbrandsen, 2012, 2013; Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005).

Ample scholarly literature treats Danes’ concern regarding Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers. Many deem them carriers of ‘alien’ values and practices perceived incompatible with Danish liberal values, hence difficult to integrate as well as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Danish society (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2013; Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014; Yilmaz, 2012; Bloom, 2014; Hervik, 2012).

In sum, faced with growing numbers of asylum-seeker and family-reunification populations, accompanied by a decrease in the need for foreign labor, from the mid-1970s the public and the elites in Denmark expressed deepening concern as to the country’s ability to absorb the new populations. A decade later the right-wing converted this disquiet into a

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\(^3\) Data retrieved from the ‘Election Surveys’ longitudinal project, carried out in Denmark since 1971 and the most prominent in examining public opinion regarding asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark over the years.
restrictionist asylum and immigration policy. The discourse is dominated by political elites, mostly from the right side of the political spectrum – but lately also by social-democrats, who maintain that asylum seekers’ entry into Denmark and their rights should be limited due to their burden on the welfare system and fears of a cultural clash. The longitudinal ‘Election Surveys’ project shows that public opinion seems to support and even encourage this policy direction.

Theoretical considerations

Investigating publics and policy makers’ stance with regards to asylum seekers and refugees relies on two bodies of literature. The first focuses on asylum policy categorizations into two distinct areas: integration (immigrant) and border (immigration) policy; the second dwells on investigation of the two social levels affecting asylum seekers’ reception: public opinion and the elite policy-making arena.

The two asylum policy areas: immigrant and immigration policy

Immigration policies are distinct in their objectives and also in the areas they target (Vermeulen, 1997). Many studies set out to examine the new and constantly changing immigration policy outputs, offering typologies for categorizing them according to the various foci.

Hammar (1985) was a pioneer in measuring and categorizing immigration policy and offered a classic typology of policies. The first is Immigration policy, which covers rules and procedures governing selection and admission of foreign citizens, being primarily concerned with regulation and alien control. The second is Immigrant policy. This focuses on conditions provided for resident immigrants regarding access to the labor market, housing, social services, etc., namely their place in the general allocation of benefits. The way both foregoing policy types are implemented by policy makers is determined largely by a country's history
and tradition with immigration. In many cases the two are related, for instance, when states utilize immigrant policies to both exclude immigrants currently residing in the country and deter future potential migrants from entering (de-Haas et al., 2015).

A general consensus seems to exist on policy output classification in the field of immigration, as other scholars measuring asylum and immigration policy outputs in the three decades following Tomas Hammar offer similar categorizations, thus distinguishing policies targeted before entry into the destination country (policy outputs on entry/border issues, thus the meta-issue of control) from policies after entry (policy outputs on integration/absorption issues, thus the meta-issue of rights when residing in the host state) (Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999, 2010; Lahav, 2004; Bjerre et al., 2015; Cerna, 2008; Ruhs, 2011; Thielemann, 2003; Klugman and Pereira, 2009; Helbling, 2014; de-Haas et al., 2015; Guiraudon, 2000).

‘Immigrant’ and ‘immigration’ policy in measuring attitudes

For decades, social science research has examined the sources of xenophobia, hostility, prejudice, discrimination and exclusionist attitudes to ethnic minorities by domestic populations in receiving societies (Semyonov et al., 2006; Scheepers et al.; 2002; Quillian, 1995; Stephan and Stephan, 2000; Raijman, 2013—to name just a few). These studies aim at gauging the determinants and manifestations of public attitudes, ultimately in order to grasp perceptions of ‘membership’ and of the boundaries of the social collective (Raijman, 2010).

The theory of ethnic antagonism (Bonacich, 1972) posits that a population’s majority (in-group) members adopt two distinct exclusionary actions (or strategies) against its minority members (out-group): exclusion from the social system and exclusion from rights (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009). *Exclusion from the social system* is attempts and efforts by majority group members to prevent the physical presence of outgroups in the country; *exclusion from rights* pertains to the mechanisms adapted by majority group members to
restrict or deny out-groups equal access to rights and benefits commonly enjoyed by members of the in-group population. Bonacich (1972) holds that the strategy of excluding out-groups from access to equal rights is based primarily on a sense of exclusiveness in the in-group population with regard to rights and privileges—a notion originally advanced in Blumer’s (1958) group position theoretical model. The model contends that the sense of group position involves assumptions of proper or proprietary claim over certain rights, resources, statuses and privileges: those things that in-group members are duly entitled to.

Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) assessed exclusionist attitudes by offering a bi-dimensional focus on issues of entry and granting rights. They gauged public support for restrictive admission policies (border policy) and denial of equal access to rights to foreigners (integration policy). Following this study, I measure exclusionist attitudes on two dimensions of public views: support for restrictive admission of asylum seekers at the border, and willingness to allocate them social rights. The former, an issue of immigration policy, concerns closure of the territorial border and asylum seekers’ access to state territory, what Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) labeled ‘exclusion from the social system’. The latter, an issue of immigrant policy, concerns social closure inside the territorial borders and refers to asylum seekers’ exclusion from the ‘system of rights and privileges’. Here I examine citizens’ willingness to admit those seeking refuge and share national benefits (the right to work, financial support and family reunification) with them. Although the two dimensions are not mutually exclusive they should be viewed as two different strategies or types of action endorsed by in-group members with regard to out-group populations.

The nexus of public opinion and public policy on immigration and asylum

The direction to which publics and policy makers tend to drive immigration policy, and whether a ‘gap’ exists between them, has been a focus of much discussion and research with no clear conclusion thus far. Some studies even argue that public opinion on immigration
should not be taken into consideration at all; they maintain that asylum policy does not take into account public preferences but is determined fairly autonomously solely by political elites (Statham and Geddes, 2006). However, other scholars claim that since governments and administration agencies sustain their legitimacy and capacity to govern by their compatibility with public expectations, public opinion is a valid and even a crucial factor to examine (Boswell, 2007; Morales et al., 2015; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Shamir and Shamir, 2000; Lahav, 2004). Some even argue for a significant impact of publics on policy makers in the field of immigration (Gudbrandsen, 2012; van Oorschot, 2006; Brooks and Manza, 2006; Hoskin, 1991; Gibney, 2004).

Gary Freeman was one of the first to examine the nature of the public opinion/policy makers’ gap. In his canonical ‘client politics’ theory (2002), referring mainly to labor immigration policies in democratic states, he posits a continuous discrepancy between the desires of largely anti-immigrant publics and expansionist liberal policies pursued by governments. He claims that the elites mobilize open-door immigration policies to serve the economic interests of the ‘organized public’, mainly employers. This theory has been challenged by various scholars who claim that the ‘client politics’ phenomenon no longer holds in contemporary times. Instead much closer similarity exists between (protectionist) publics and elites in relation to immigration and asylum policies (e.g. Simon and Lynch, 1999; Ford et al., 2015; Simon and Sikich, 2007). For example, Givens and Luedtke (2005) argue that the rise of radical right groups in Europe in recent years reflects policy makers’ responsiveness to restrictionist public opinion vis-à-vis immigration and asylum issues. Hence, they claim, anti-minority sentiments in both the elites and the publics seem to override the ‘client politics’ argument.

Lahav (2004) posits significant coherence between public opinion and attitudes of political decision makers regarding core issues on immigration and asylum. Based on an analysis of elite and public opinion in Europe regarding immigration and asylum, she shows
that public attitudes are less restrictionist and elites are less liberal on migration issues than traditionally presumed. This perhaps implies that there are more similarities than differences between these micro (citizen) and macro (policy) levels. Simon and Lynch (1999) found that public restrictionism towards immigration depends on the specific core issue in question. In their study of public attitudes toward immigration and immigration policy in seven Western countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, U.S.A, Japan, Australia and Canada), they found that respondents in all the seven countries in the study desired the policy to be more restrictive on ‘immigrants of color’ and believed their country had done more than its share of accepting asylum seekers and refugees. Yet, they show willingness to accept immigrants with special skills and are generally positive regarding immigrants’ impact on the nation’s economy (Simon and Sikich, 2007:961).

Faist (1994) maintains that ‘restrictionist’ politics stem from political elites as a bottom-up course of action influenced by the public’s discriminatory, anti-minority sentiments: framing immigration and asylum as a ‘problem’ for the public shapes and determines the (restrictive) decisions taken by executives in the public arena. Perceiving the public/elites reciprocal influence on asylum issues, Statham (2003) in his study of UK asylum politics determines in contrast to Thomas Faist that policy elites push forward a negative discourse regarding asylum seekers as an ‘alien swamping’ and a financial burden, which in turn encourages anti-asylum mobilization in the general unorganized public.

While these studies claim to have discovered a clear direction in which publics and policy makers are heading in terms of immigration and asylum policy, others argue that a uniform trend or a systematic public opinion/policy gap does not exist (Morales et al., 2015). In their comparative longitudinal study on public attitudes and policies on immigration and asylum in seven West European countries, Morales and her colleagues found that a different dynamics obtained in each of the seven; some countries evinced a disconnection between the concerns of the public and the policies implemented, while others showed no gap. They
conclude that the study of the opinion/policy gap as regards immigration and asylum policies requires closer scrutiny and is ‘far from straightforward’ (Morales et al., 2015: 1509). Accordingly, the aim of this study is to address the public/policy gap question.

**Methodology**

This study applies two methods to address its research question: claim-making initiatives of political elites in the asylum field and public opinion data. The former derives from a political-science focus and methodology, looking into macro-level actors and their endeavors to construct public policy; the latter takes a psycho-social approach to examining individual attitudes. In the following I elaborate on the data collection process and the units of analysis at the public policy and public opinion levels.

**Public opinion**

Public attitudes on border and integration measures regarding asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark was gauged through a public opinion poll administered by a professional surveying company. The Danish surveying company *Voxmeter* conducted the survey on September 17-26, 2013, based on a representative sample of the Danish adult population (N=500). Respondents were recruited via a web panel\(^4\) and they answered questions in an online survey. Response rate was 33 percent. The great majority of the respondents (98 percent) were Danish-born; the rest (2 percent) had Danish- or European-born parents. Table 1 below shows that the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample quite closely matched the socio-demographic characteristics of the general adult Danish population.

\(^4\) The web panel included participants in previous nationally representative telephone surveys conducted by Voxmeter.
Table 1: Similarity of study sample and population in major individual-level characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variable</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (percent men)</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left wing</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right wing</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danmarks Statistik; I used proxies for the religiosity level and the years of schooling relying on data from the European Social Survey Round 7 (2014).

The survey questionnaire, administered in Danish, examined attitudes on various issues pertaining to asylum seekers. The questionnaire was fully structured and included 27 attitudinal batteries followed by 16 standard socio-demographic questions. This paper focuses on two issues measured in the survey: (1) policy at the border and (2) granting of rights.

Original data was compiled in this study due to lack of existing detailed survey data on the specific issue of asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark. Public opinion on asylum seekers and refugees has been examined over the years, yet the question wording in most surveys covered asylum seekers and immigrants together. Hence the important distinction between the two groups could not be made and in many cases very few questions sought attitudes to asylum seekers and refugees altogether, thus they were insufficient for the purpose of this study. Also they did not allow analysis of attitudes on the two issues of border and integration.

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5 Public opinion polls were carried out by commercial research institutes (TNS Gallup, Megafon, Voxmeter), scholars (Jens Peter Frolund Thomsen from Aarhus University, survey in 2002) and research institutes (Rockwool Foundation, longitudinal survey in the years 1985-2002). The majority of these surveys were omnibus-styled, including questions on a range of topics, one of them being the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. The most repeated survey in Denmark on this topic is the ‘Election Surveys’ longitudinal project, carried out in Denmark since 1971.
The variable of **border policy preference** (border policy) was measured by a single item in the survey following a short introduction: ‘Over the past years many people have entered Denmark who for various reasons are seeking asylum. It could be due to civil war or political persecution.’ Which do you agree with most: (1) ‘Asylum seekers should have unconditional entry into Denmark’; (2) ‘Asylum seekers’ entry into Denmark should be limited’; (3) ‘Asylum seekers should not be allowed entry into Denmark’.

The variable of **entitlement to rights** (integration policy) was gauged by three items concerning the allocation of goods to asylum seekers in three major policy domains (see e.g. Verkuyten, 2004): labor market, welfare benefits, and family reunification: ‘People applying for refugee status should be allowed to work while their cases are considered’; ‘Granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members to Denmark’ and ‘Financial support should be given to refugee applicants while their cases are considered’. Answers ranged from 1 ’Strongly agree’ to 7 ‘Strongly disagree’ so that higher scores indicated stronger disagreement to grant rights. Correlations between the three items were from 0.50 and 0.51 Standardized factor loadings were higher than 0.5, demonstrating high reliability (Brown, 2015).

**Public policy**

Political construction of asylum policy in Denmark was investigated through the claims of state actors (government, parliament and bureaucratic authorities) as reported in the printed media. Following Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüst (2010), Koopmans and Statham (1999b) and Statham and Geddes (2006), I chose to use media data as this allows investigation of a large variety of issue positions, and constitutes the most important arena for public debate on current political topics. Overall, the claims-making perspective sees news as a record of public events and retrieves information on contention that is constructed by **political actors in public** (Statham and Tumber, 2013). Importantly, despite using media data, I was not
interested in journalistic framing, namely how claims are selected or reframed by the media, but employed the reportage to obtain information on the actors’ positions and arguments. Reporting was followed in Politiken, a liberal daily broadsheet published in Danish. I made use of a quality printed newspaper as my source of data, as these offer information in a detailed manner, often providing a broader picture than official state documents, and commonly also reporting divergent positions which are a highly informative source of data for this study. Indeed, the tendency of news media to focus on ‘conflict’ stories, where different sides can be pitted against each other, makes the media a particularly rich source for collection of data on political claim-making.

Claim-making articles were analyzed in the time frame of 2001 to 2012 following the dramatic right-wing mobilization on asylum and immigration issues in the aftermath of the 2001 elections. This lengthy period was chosen as it allows monitoring major events in terms of asylum migration and asylum policy in Denmark. Also, using this duration one can be sure that the results are not distorted by specific events that might follow a logic different from regular political debates (Helbling, 2014).

Using a list of relevant key words, close to 2000 articles were found in Politiken during the 2001-2012 time span. Excluded from this database were articles which did not include claims, editorials, duplicate covering of claims and claims that focused on migrant groups other than asylum seekers. Next, articles were divided by years and a random systematic sampling technique was deployed among the articles each year in order to ensure a good coverage of articles for the whole analysis period. The final sample included 316 articles. Out of these reported here are claims initiated by state actors, namely government members, parliament and bureaucratic authorities.6

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6 The original database included claims initiated by the state, courts, municipalities, civil society and international actors.
Claim-making in the asylum policy arena

The unit of analysis for examining the formulation of asylum policy is instances of claim-making as retrieved from the news (Koopmans and Statham, 1999a, 1999b; Koopmans et al., 2005; and the studies of Temple et al., 2016; Lahusen et al., 2016 deploying this approach). A claim is the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action in the public sphere. It consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or of other collective actors in the policy field (Statham and Geddes, 2006).

Each claim was categorized according to these two elements: (1) Policy area (border or integration policy) and (2) Stance (restrictionist or expansionist). Under policy area, border policy referred to entry/arrival issues as well as deportation and repatriation of asylum seekers and refugees; integration policy referred to conditions and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees residing in Denmark, including welfare policies, medical services, conditions in asylum centers and RSD and legalization procedures. Under stance, the categorization was either an ‘expansionist’ view in the claim, namely in favor of asylum seekers code (+1) or a ‘restrictionist’ view, namely against the interests of asylum seekers code (-1). For example, a government actor calling for denial of asylum seekers’ entry into Denmark would be coded as a restrictionist claim (-1); an opposite claim arguing for allowing asylum seekers to enter would be coded as an expansionist claim (+1). Claims that had a neutral stance (not in favor or against asylum seekers and more ‘technical’ in nature) were coded 0.
Findings

Public opinion

First I examine sentiments among the Danish population about restricting potential new asylum seekers’ entry into the country (border policy). As Figure 1 shows, two thirds of the respondents call for limiting asylum seekers entry, but a substantial proportion (26.3 percent) support unconditional entry. Only a small minority (7.7 percent) claim the asylum seekers’ entry into Denmark should be banned completely.

Figure 1: Attitudes to restricting asylum seekers entry (border policy)

Next I examined attitudes to granting rights to asylum seekers already residing in the country (integration policy). Figure 2 portrays the distribution of the three items measuring this policy (access to the labor market, financial assistance and family reunification). As the figure shows, attitudes on the three items are close to the middle of the scale, with family reunification earning the least support ($\bar{x}=4.1$), then the right to work while asylum cases were being processed ($\bar{x}=3.9$) and last earning the most support was granting asylum seekers financial support while their applications were being considered ($\bar{x}=3.8$).
Table 2 below encapsulates Danes’ attitudes to the two forms of exclusionism measured in the study: border policy and integration policy, both in the form of percentages in order to allow comparison. The Table shows that the Danish public opposes most of all unlimited entry which received the highest disagreement score (73.7 percent). The public was less exclusionist on integration policy than on border policy: 43.4 percent opposed family reunification of refugees; 35.8 percent were against allowing asylum seekers to work while their asylum request is being processed and 32.4 percent opposed granting financial support.

Table 2: Percentages of exclusionist attitudes on border and integration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border policy (Percent deny/limit entrance)</th>
<th>73.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration policy (Percent exclusionist(^7))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed to work</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive financial support</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunify with family members</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Answer scale was 1 to 7 (Exclusionism=high score). ‘Percent exclusionist’ refers to respondents who opted for the scores 5 to 7.
As for the public policy level, I assessed for each claim initiated by the state actor whether it is ‘expansionist’ or ‘restrictionist’, looking into the two main policy issues: ‘border’ (i.e. policy relating to entry/exit issues at the border - ‘immigration policy’) and ‘integration’ (i.e. policy relating to integration/treatment of asylum seekers - ‘immigrant policy’). Table 3 below presents the state actors’ stance on asylum policy in the form of a mean across all actors (from -1 to +1). As background to this data, I also display the policy issue saliency of ‘border’ and ‘integration’ among the claims enacted by the state actors.

Table 3: Stance and issue saliency among all state claims on integration and border policy (N=311)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Stance (mean)</th>
<th>Saliency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows that the government’s restrictionism is displayed especially with regard to border policy (-0.45) compared to integration policy (0.10). Interestingly though, while their level of restrictionism is higher on border issues, the focus on this issue is relatively marginal. The majority of their claims are centered on integration policy (69.1 percent), much more than on border policy (30.9 percent). This pattern exemplifies how Danish executives scour for solutions for the asylum seekers in the country, much more than they do on border issues – control of entry and deportation; yet when they do introduce a claim related to border policy it is framed in quite a restrictionist way.
Public opinion and public policy – a gap?

Lastly, based on the data I collected in the study, Table 4 examines whether an attitudinal gap exists between the public and the state actors, dwelling on their level of restrictionism/expansionism towards asylum seekers and refugees in relation to the two policy areas.

Table 4: Levels of restrictionism/expansionism\(^8\) towards asylum seekers and refugees among the public and state actors - according to policy type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Policy type</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low Restrictionism (73.7%)</td>
<td>Low Restrictionism (37.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low Restrictionism (-0.45)</td>
<td>Low Restrictionism (0.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gauging the restrictionism level among the public and the government actors, Table 4 shows that the two follow very similar logics. On the issue of border policy, the government actors deploy a parallel restrictionist tone to that of the public, both entailing a moderate restrictionism level. Thus, while most Danes perceive that new asylum seekers’ entry into the country should be limited or denied completely (73.7 percent), the government holds a similar position, upholding a negative view on border policy, but to the extent that it does not rule out completely admission to new asylum seekers (their restrictionist stance score was

\(^8\) Levels of restrictionism/expansionism among government actors were gauged using the following index: stance -1 to -0.5 = high restrictionism; -0.49 to 0 = moderate restrictionism; 0.01 to 0.5 = low restrictionism; 0.51 to 1 = high expansionism. In the public it was measured by percentage opting for exclusionist measures at the border and in terms of granting rights: 0 to 25 percent = high expansionism; 26 to 50 percent = low restrictionism; 51 to 75 percent = moderate restrictionism; 76 to 100 percent = high restrictionism.
-0.45 and not -1, thus leaving some leeway for pro-asylum border policies). In terms of integration policy, i.e. on the issue of treating asylum seekers residing in the country, it seems that the government actors as well as the public show a low restrictionist stance. This finding shows that both the Danish public and the policy makers are quite in tune, both evincing willingness to integrate asylum seekers and refugees into Danish society, yet not in a completely inclusive way. Most of the public supports granting asylum seekers the right to participate in the labor market, receiving financial support while their asylum application is being assessed and having recognized refugees reunify with their family members. In terms of the policy level, decision makers show some support (0.10 on the -1 to +1 scale) to granting asylum seekers and refugees ‘integration rights’ which refers to overall conditions offered to asylum seekers residing in the country (i.e. access to the labor market, medical services, social benefits, as well as descent living conditions in the asylum centers along with an RSD procedure that maintains asylum seekers’ rights).

Discussion

This study set out to examine a social question set at the very heart of public life in many democratic nation-states today as well as in academic literature: how do the elites and public in host countries perceive the direction asylum policy should take (restrictionist or expansionist) and do they agree or diverge on the subject? This question deserved empirical scrutiny as recent studies claim that a marked divide exists between public attitudes towards the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees and official policies regarding asylum and humanitarian assistance (Blitz, 2017). Regarding the 2015 surge of asylum seekers to Europe, Blitz claims that states have developed restrictive policies in spite of widespread public sympathy for asylum seekers and refugees.

Focusing on the case study of Denmark, I investigated two main social levels: the political elites that are in charge of setting the agenda on asylum policy, and the public – as
the main source of legitimacy of the state. On each social level I examined the issue of immigration (border) and immigrant (integration) policies. At the public opinion level I gauged attitudes towards allowing new asylum seekers entrance into the country (border policy) and allocation of rights in terms of financial assistance, access to the labor market and family reunification after receiving refugee status. The three constitute three important aspects of integration policy in the host state. At the asylum politics level, I examined claims of state actors regarding entry as well as deportation issues (border policy) and claims on conditions and rights of resident asylum seekers in the host state (integration policy). Analysis of these two policy ‘arenas’ enabled examination of ‘hosting’ of asylum seekers along its various dimensions: access to the territory and then granting of rights, i.e. ‘closure’ without and within the host society; while referring to the two asylum populations these policies target: resident asylum seekers (integration policy) as well as future potential new entrants (border policy).

All in all Danes evinced more negative views towards allowing asylum seekers to enter the country compared to granting rights once they are within its borders. The majority called for a ‘balanced’ policy and opined that asylum seekers’ entry should be ‘limited’, while moderate levels of disagreement with granting rights to asylum seekers were expressed. Similarly, at the elites’ level, the stance on asylum policy was more restrictionist regarding the issue of border policy compared to integration policy, albeit showing a quite restrictionist stance on both, in line with previous work indicating that government actors are the main advocates of restrictionist policies on asylum seekers (Menjivar, 2006).

These findings highlight three main points: the first, it seems that an external/internal logic is at play, which suggests that Danes support a ‘hard to enter yet easy once-within’ policy, thus separating an ‘outside’ from an ‘inside’ immigration policy. This perhaps taps to the fact that states have a natural right to preserve their sovereignty and enforce a selective and restrictive entrance policy, yet once the immigrant has entered the country a more
humanistic and rights-based approach is to be adopted. The logic being, that allowing entrance is followed by a ‘price tag’ and the state is obliged to live up to and ‘pay off’ its commitment to the migrant through status granting and access to public goods (Avineri et al., 2009).

The second, and deriving from the first point, is that this finding at both public and elites’ levels reinforces the ‘privileged’ position of asylum seekers resident in the country (integration policy) over those who must leave or have not yet arrived (border policy). Asylum seekers who have already entered the country territory are a ‘familiar’ group in terms of its socio-cultural characteristics and in its numbers, versus an ‘unknown’ population of asylum seekers that have not yet reached the state’s border. Gibney (2004) argues that two main factors underlie host states’ perceptions of asylum seekers as a major threat; these relating to the volume and anonymity of their migratory pattern: arriving in large numbers and in an irregular and unpredictable way (see also Grove and Zwi, 2006). Thus, asylum seekers that are without the ‘social system’ may be regarded as a larger threat than asylum within since they are an anonymous group with an undetermined volume.

Third, the fact that both the public and the elites are more supportive of integrating asylum seekers compared to border/entry issues may be seen as derived by a ‘meeting point’ between Denmark’s history of taking responsibility over humanitarian issues and its social-democratic welfare logic which promotes granting of rights to all sectors of society. I argue though that not only a humanitarian and ‘equity between all’ logic is at play here but also a fundamental concern that asylum seekers and refugees, as indeed all immigrants in general, may turn to be economic burdens on the welfare state if they are not integrated socially and economically. The interplay between these logics at the heart of focusing on integration policy can be exemplified by public statements in recent years, for example by the former social-democrat Prime Minister Helle Thorning Schmidt, who referring solely to integration policy, stated in the traditional Prime Minister’s New Year’s address on 1 January 2015:
‘What is the track record like if we look at the refugees already living in Denmark? Has the integration of refugees been successful? No. It is a fact that far too many have ended up living on cash benefits...Here tonight, I want to say loud and clear: refugees must not become social welfare clients’. The statement mirrors the foremost public debate: PM Thorning Schmidt focuses on integration through participation in the labor market (inter alia in order to avoid being a social fiscal burden) and disregards in her speech issues of deterring new arrivals.

Scholars such as Sales (2002) argue that the way asylum policy has been formulated in recent years is more in terms of controlling entry than regulating the settlement of those allowed to remain. The data at the policy level in this study show a different reality: state actors in Denmark, albeit their relative restrictive stance focus for the most part on integration issues; hence are finding ways to treat and cater for asylum seekers already living in the country and allocate less attention to border policy measures (i.e. preventing the arrival of new asylum claimants).

In terms of the gap on asylum policy between the publics and elites, the data show that on both the issue of border and integration policy, the government actors deploy a parallel moderate to low restrictionist tone respectively, to that of the public. Thus, Danes perceive that new asylum seekers’ entry into the country should be limited and the government follows a similar logic, upholding a negative view on border policy; these findings supporting studies that have argued for a substantial restrictionism level that has developed in Denmark towards asylum seekers and migrants in general (Jørgensen, 2013; Olwig, 2012). With regard to integration policy, i.e. the issue of treating asylum seekers residing in the country and granting them integration rights, the government and the public both show a low restrictionist stance. Thus, as opposed to previous studies which perceive that a major gap exists between liberal elites and restrictionist publics (Freeman, 2002), or quite the opposite, between pro-asylum publics and protectionist decision makers (Blitz,
2017), while a third argument pertains to both publics and policy makers evincing a highly restrictionist stance (Givens and Luedtke, 2005), the data found in the study depicts a different picture. In relation to integration policy the findings are more in line with Lahav (2004) who argues for a coherence between (a not very restrictionist) public opinion and (not very liberal) attitudes of political decision makers regarding immigration and asylum. Thus the two social levels comprising asylum seekers’ context of reception in Denmark seem to share similar views – evident restrictionism on mostly border policy and less so on integration issues.

Before concluding, two points should be made: First, state actors are not a monolithic entity and discrepancy exists among its members, thus ‘filtering’ out right-wing government actors who were in power most of the study period, would presumably yield a different picture in terms of the government-public gap on asylum. The state actors category in this study includes ministerial offices as well as left-wing politicians who tend to uphold a neutral stance in the case of the ministries and an expansionist stance in the case of the left – both serving as a ‘balance’ on government right-wing restrictionism. Second, in another study conducted by the author, perceptions of asylum seekers as posing various threats was evident, especially with regard to being a burden on welfare resources (Hercowitz-Amir, 2017). Low welfare allocation support to newcomers in Denmark was also found in other studies (e.g. The Election Surveys project). This taps to the concerns the Danish public may have over distribution of national goods to newcomers, to an extent that may affect their attitudes towards granting welfare and labor market rights to asylum seekers (integration policy) as well as family reunification rights to approved refugees which may serve as yet an additional burden on welfare resources.

To conclude, as asylum evolved into a central debated issue among domestic politicians and the general public over the last several decades, we may learn from the case of Denmark where restrictionism lies - in terms of policy issue (border) and type of actors
(among both publics and elites), thus tapping to the interesting interplay in Denmark between restrictionist voices and welfare logics. The framework in Denmark of focusing on integration of asylum seekers (vs. deterring their entry) is evincing some ‘cracks’ lately. The currently residing Liberal government that took office in June 2015 has tightened asylum policy once again, in a controversial manner which couples both types of policies: cutting back of asylum seekers’ rights in Denmark as a ‘signal policy’, i.e., as a message deterring potential asylum seekers from choosing Denmark as their host destination. Hence, it is creating a mix between border and integration policy and ‘mismatching’ the original goals of integration tools and their implementation in order to achieve other alternative goals (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2015). As can also be observed in this study, the state actors have not abandoned border policy issues and a substantial percentage of their claims (close to a third) focused on border policy. It thus remains to be seen how the public debate on asylum will be shaped in the coming years in Denmark: a shift towards border policy or a continued focus on integration policy as a ‘first step’ toward asylum seekers’ future inclusion in the country. One may presume that the answer to this question will depend greatly on an interplay of factors which include the number of new arrivals, the challenges they present to the Danish society and the government in power.
References


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